Wilhelm Heitmeyer · Simon Howell · Sebastian Kurtenbach · Abdul Rauf · Muhammad Zaman · Steffen Zdun

# The Codes of the Street in Risky Neighborhoods

A Cross-Cultural Comparison of Youth Violence in Germany, Pakistan, and South Africa

The Codes of the Street in Risky Neighborhoods

Wilhelm Heitmeyer • Simon Howell • Sebastian Kurtenbach • Abdul Rauf • Muhammad Zaman • Steffen Zdun

# The Codes of the Street in Risky Neighborhoods

A Cross-Cultural Comparison of Youth Violence in Germany, Pakistan, and South Africa

Wilhelm Heitmeyer Institute of Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence Bielefeld University Bielefeld, Germany

Sebastian Kurtenbach Department of Social Work University of Applied Sciences Münster Münster, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Germany

Muhammad Zaman Department of Sociology Quaid-I-Azam University Islamabad, Pakistan

Institute of Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence Bielefeld University Bielefeld, Germany

Simon Howell Institute of Criminology University of Cape Town Cape Town, South Africa

Abdul Rauf Institute of Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence Bielefeld University Bielefeld, Germany

Steffen Zdun Institute of Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence Bielefeld University Bielefeld, Germany

#### ISBN 978-3-030-16286-3 ISBN 978-3-030-16287-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16287-0

Library of Congress Control Number: 2019935822

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019. This book is an open access publication.

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# Foreword

According to 1960s African American activist, Stokley Carmichael, violence is as American as apple pie. Indeed, the notion of violence in the United States is not limited to our urban centers and small towns, but violence is experienced in our schools, in our bars and nightclubs, on our sports fields, and featured in all sorts of products of American culture like movies, television series, news and social media, and computer games.

It is no wonder that violence is one of the most studied concepts in the social sciences, with a predominant clustering in the fields of anthropology, criminology/ criminal justice, psychology, sociology, and urban studies. Central to the core of the study of violence in the United States is Elijah Anderson's concept of the "code of the street" (1999). Nominally the concept of the street code is used to explain why young men living in impoverished circumstances resort to and justify the use of violence in their day-to-day activities. Anderson, and those who have chosen to use the street code concept, have conducted a considerable amount of research that has demonstrated its existence and utility. In fact, by last count there have been approximately 70 studies, only in journals ranked in the Social Science Citation Index, that have used the street code explanation. Although the concept and practice of the street code has been debated elsewhere, one of the shortcomings is the failure to test its salience beyond that narrow but important purview of the United States.

This anomaly has not gone unnoticed. This book is the outgrowth of work conducted by Wilhelm Heitmeyer, the founder of the Institute of Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence (IKG) at Bielefeld University, one of the leading European institutes in violence studies. Heitmeyer has always wanted to conduct research on interpersonal violence that occurs in different parts of the world, where violence is a significant problem for the stability of those particular societies. As a consequence of this interest, Heitmeyer and collaborators have analyzed the violence-related norms of male juveniles (aged 16–21 years old) living in high-risk urban neighborhoods.

The project resulted in this book. The Codes of the Street in Risky Neighborhoods: A Cross-Cultural Comparison of Youth Violence in Germany, Pakistan, and South Africa is the first comprehensive study of the street code concept attempting to determine if this concept and process exists in milieus beyond the United States, and if so where, and when it does, its extent, and how and why it is manifested. In sum, the purpose of the study is to provide "an international, cross-cultural comparison of the norms which define and make meaningful violence in three countries, namely Germany, South Africa, and Pakistan."

To begin with, the analysis is ambitious in its scope and aims. Although the researchers may be faulted for only looking at the explanation and practice of the street code in only three countries, cross-national studies of this nature are complicated not only conceptually, but in a managerial sense too. All sorts of barriers must be navigated.

Also, despite the sample size in each of the countries (n = 30) being comparatively low, it allows the researchers to deeply interrogate the process of what is really going on in their subjects' lives in risky spatial circumstances. This is possible, because the researchers deconstructed the street code to its core elements, and translated these component parts to interview guidelines for qualitative interviews that they conducted in Germany, South Africa, and Pakistan. By doing this, they were able to find out which street code elements are stable over all contexts, whether there is a general street code, and which component parts of the street code are culturally shaped.

Moreover, although all contributors to the research project are listed on the cover of this book, not all of them were responsible for writing each of the chapters. In addition to Sebastian Kurtenbach who coordinated the project, he is joined by other academics who are field experts in the countries where the street code is analyzed in this book.

Among the collaborators, I know Sebastian Kurtenbach the best and frequently interacted with him for the past few years. We first met in Germany when I was on sabbatical at the Ruhr University Bochum, and since then we have stayed in contact and engaged in some research collaborations. How did this come to be? I gave a presentation on street culture at Belfield University that was coordinated by Steffen Zdun (another contributor to this book). Subsequently Zdun, Kurtenbach, and I met in Bochum and discussed our respective research projects.

Later Kurtenbach and I walked some portions of the inner city of Baltimore, Washington, DC, and Dortmund in order to get a sense of the street, its urban patterning, and their street culture. As evidence of this disposition, he has given me comments on my papers (and I have reciprocated on his) and we are collaborators on a couple of other research projects. Beyond Kurtenbach, all but one of the authors of this book currently work at the IKG, have worked there at one point in time, or have some sort of association with the center. In addition to Kurtenbach, two of the co-authors will be contributing chapters to my forthcoming Routledge Handbook on Street Culture (2020). Not only am I familiar with the IKG, but also I have also reviewed for the International Journal for Conflict and Violence that it produces.

This book starts with a thorough review of the contribution of research on gangs, violence, community, neighborhoods, and community, including the scholarship produced by the Chicago school, and work by Thrasher, Coleman and Wilson, etc. It moves on to a discussion of space. The book describes in detail a multitude of human behaviors that exist and the linkages among the numerous variables in (e.g., risk, collective efficacy, legal cynicism, special threat, risky neighborhoods, etc.). These are followed by an intense discussion of the concept of street code and its use.

Three separate chapters follow that analyze the presence and utility of the street code in Germany (Dortmund Nordstadt, Duisburg-Marxloh, and Berlin-Neukoelln, in particular), South Africa (Cape Town and Durban), and Pakistan (in particular Islamabad and Rawalpindi). An integrating chapter that explains where the street code exists, and how it is modified or interpreted by young men follows this. In short, the street code concept and reliance on it to moderate interactions does not manifest itself the same in each of the different cultures.

We learn how living in a risky neighborhood and having to navigate it can negatively affect one's ability to secure a job outside of that physical space. Not only must young males be careful about their social interactions with others, but they must make important decisions about carrying a weapon and whether to use it too. The book also delves into the subjects' sense of belonging in their neighborhoods, and the kind of street etiquette they must engage in.

What this study points to is the necessity for more cross-cultural/national studies of youth violence in general, and the concept of the "the street code" in particular. More specifically, as this study points out, we may have to conclude that the "street code" concept is place specific and relegated primarily to the United States where we have seen it manifested. When we apply the street code concept to contexts outside the US, particularly those that do not conform to Anglo-American contexts, it does not do so well. This is an important finding in and of itself.

Baltimore, USA Jeffrey Ian Ross, Ph.D. University of Baltimore

# Contents





# **Chapter 1 Introduction**

#### **Wilhelm Heitmeyer and Sebastian Kurtenbach**

Violence, both conceptually and pragmatically, has been a central research topic in the Social Sciences for several years. Perhaps because the topic is especially prominent in the US and the UK, the extant literature on urban violence remains predominantly confined to studies in these and other industrialized countries, with far less empirical research having been undertaken in developing and least developed nations. Although a concern in itself, such a deficit is further compounded by the lack of transferability—it can hardly be said that the respective findings in developed countries are applicable to other contexts, such as those that are less developed. Indeed, Klein (2011) has gone so far as to argue that the lack of comparative work in the existing research on violence amongst young people in high-risk urban neighborhoods is itself one of the key issues that is lacking in the literature on violence. Moreover, although a considerable body of research now exists on youth-specific concerns— such as gangs and their involvement in criminality—more nuanced approaches to the myriad of contextual factors and concerns that a rapidly grown and heterogeneous population of young people now face, and the resultantly complex relationships they may have with violence, has been largely neglected. As a result, the norms that set the parameters, which themselves frame this population's understandings of violence, remain little understood, despite their importance in shaping both young people's tolerance to and use of violence in high-risk urban neighborhoods.

Anderson's (1999) seminal work, *Code of the Street* sought to address this deficit by bringing to light and defining the characteristic norms structuring participants' understandings of violence in high-risk, inner-city neighborhoods in the US. He argues that these norms prescribe that in order to obtain respect or status young men need to demonstrate a willingness to resort to violence in response to perceived or real threats of violence, or indeed if their dignity is challenged. As Stewart et al. (2006: 431) conclude: "At the heart of the street code is an emphasis on respect, toughness, and retribution. The code regulates the use of violence and supplies a rationale allowing those who are aggressive to precipitate violent encounters in approved ways." Anderson's insightful argument does not simply seek to understand the hierarchies and power networks used by young people to define themselves, but undertakes to explore their *relationship* with these structures and violence itself. Thus, for instance, it is not simply that violence provides a mechanism to establish hierarchies and enforce subordination, but in its enactment, violence may also become a symbolic instrument through which identity itself can be expressed—no individual that wishes to be treated respectfully should admit weakness or openly avoid conflict as all behavior to the contrary stands to be severely punished. In short, Anderson's work mandates that studies on violence seek to not only understand the weapons of violence, but violence *as* a weapon.

Violence-related norms of this kind can serve as guides to behavior that themselves shape how an individual may react to specific circumstances, or can at least seek to understand the form and character of responses an individual may be likely to understand as plausible in encountering violence. They may also serve as rationalizations for acts of violence that young men engage in for other reasons, such as gaining monetary wealth or accruing luxury goods, and may further serve as a justification that perpetrators use to explain their use of violence to themselves or others. As such, young peoples' complex relationships with violence need to be understood through a dynamic framework that not only seeks to understand the impact of violence and violent acts in isolation, but critically engages with how those acts are embedded in intersubjective relationships within a challenging environment to understand what stands beyond violence.

While violence and violence-related norms have been studied quite extensively by Anderson and others in the US, beyond this country only a limited number of studies of this kind have been conducted. Importantly, there are no comparisons of the code of the street and young people's relationships to violence among or between societies beyond Anglo-American countries. Not only is this indicative of an empirical deficit in the literature, but it suggests a broader conceptual shortcoming, because although Anderson's analysis may shed light on youth violence in the US, its applicability and utility in understanding youth violence beyond those borders remains untested. Beginning to address this need empirically is one of the principal goals of the proposed book—an international, cross-cultural comparison of the norms which define and make meaningful violence in three countries, namely Germany, South Africa, and Pakistan. This is much in line with a criticism leveled by Klein (2011) that even the more developed literature on gangs has been undermined by an absence of studies comparing data temporally and spatially, between young people from different sociocultural contexts, and in contrasting the results of studies, employing divergent methodological frameworks (see as an exception Decker and Weerman 2005). The unfortunate result is that assertions regarding youth violence—which may themselves have a wider impact when used to inform policy and government programs—are often made on the basis of generalized stereotypes, themselves formulated implicitly through the hegemonic discourses which narrate the literature. For example, depictions of gangs are typically framed using models derived from US street gangs in the 1980s despite gangs from elsewhere depicting very different structures, purposes, and concerns (Decker et al. 2009; Klein and Maxson 2006). The result is that the "traditional" understanding of gangs—young men concerned solely with drug trafficking and overt violence—is neither representative nor accurate even in the US itself, the depictions of which are doubly dangerous in fueling intellectual stasis and political division.

Comparative research on violence-related norms of young people can therefore not continue to remain informed, by and large, by the current state of the art. New research is needed that seeks to go beyond convenient depictions of young people, in attempting to adequately understanding the different types and roles of violence, and the norms that make them meaningful, which serve to characterize highly violent communities in very different geographic regions and socioeconomic contexts. Such studies need to include those structures which, while implicit, serve to define the contexts in which young people live, such as the spatial makeup and divisions of urban areas and which contextualize neighborhoods. Indeed, as can be seen in Anderson's (1999) work, the neighborhood takes a prominent place in the creation of individual risk factors. The wider conceptual utility of the work on youth violence requires, however, a cross-cultural perspective, from which we can conceptualize and prove the assumptions outlined in his framing of risky neighborhoods. In doing so, moreover, violence-related norms can be explored in the context in which they are understood by young people, as they inform actions and perspectives. However, such comparisons would have, first, to address the large range of interpretations and forms of practice of street culture within relevant communities and between countries. Second, Klein's (2011) argument asks for applying the same methods preferably in regions that lack violence research. This, however, motivates that political, environmental, structural, or other factors that shape the environment in which these norms emerge should also be acknowledged. Against this background, our study is guided by the research question: *Does the Code of the Street operate equally in different contexts than that of the US?*

To answer the research question, a comparative research designs was chosen, which includes the perspectives held by young people in relation to and because of violence. We focus on three countries: Germany, which is largely representative of an industrial country and liberal society; South Africa may be seen as an example of a highly violent and historically polarized country; and Pakistan as emblematic of an emerging democracy faced by terrorism, authoritarian forms of control built on a colonial legacy and weak economic growth. A comparison of these three very different examples promises a better understanding of the code of the street, and through extensive comparison aims to both compare and contrast the extant literature and Anderson's assertions against a far more diverse backdrop, drawing on fresh empirical data that takes seriously the dynamism of young people and their intricate relationships with the violence of their immediate surroundings. Despite being very different, the study draws on a rigorous comparative methodology, in which 30 interviews per country with young men between 16 and 21 years of age are compared, along with contextual input from individuals with whom they have frequent contact, such as social workers, local politicians and/or police officers. Using an open-coded, direct comparative framework, the study seeks to directly and significantly contribute to an ongoing academic discussion, while showing the value of cross-cultural qualitative comparative research.

The monograph is devided into 11 chapters. After the introduction, which is the first chapter, the spatial framework for our study, so-called risky neighborhoods as a specific kind of social segregated neighborhood, is developed in chapter three. Afterward, in chapter three, the "Violence related norms and the 'Code of the Street'" is discussed as the analytical framework of the study on the one hand, and the theoretical approach we want to prove with our analysis. In chapter four, we discuss the methodological challenges of a cross-cultural comparison and in chapter five, the used research design is described. Following, in chapter six to eight, the national sub-samples are described. In chapter nine, findings of the cross-cultural comparison regarding the code of the street are presented in detail. Chapter ten includes further findings. In chapter eleven, the theoretical implication for the development of the street code theory are discussed and the research question is answered.

The book as well as the entire project was only possible by the generous funding of the German Research Association (DFG). Also, collaboration in the research team was a very enriching and a grand experience for all of us. So, we decided to keep the alphabetical order of the authors on the book and the chapters, which reflect that it is a product of the entire team without putting someone ahead. We also want to thank Ricky Rontsch, Rahat Shah, Asif Hayat, Yann Rees, Elisa Ribbe, Jörg Hüttermann, and Sabine Passon, who supported the project over a long period of time. Furthermore, we thank the students of the course "Theoriegeleitete vergleichende Forschung am Beispiel des Code of the Street" [Theoretical guided comparative research using the example of the Code of the Street], presented by Sebastian Kurtenbach, at the faculty of sociology, Bielefeld University (Germany), during the Winter term, 2017/2018. We also want to thank Elijah Anderson for his theoretical background to the code of the street, which served us as a useful conceptual basis for a cross-cultural comparison of street norms and a fruitful approach, which is valuable in developing a general approach.

# **References**


#### References 5

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

# **Chapter 2 Risky Neighborhoods as Specific Type of Social Space**

**Sebastian Kurtenbach**

Neighborhoods, defined as geographical and social units below the city level where people live (e.g., Galster 2001: 2112), are places of daily experiences, especially for immobile groups like children, elderly, or juveniles. For those groups, their neighborhood is a place of personal belonging, and daily experiences within the neighborhood can have a significant impact on their personal life and norms. Norms are defined by Coleman as "ordinarily enforced by sanctions" (Coleman 1990: 242) and "for the norm to be effective there must be an effective sanction to enforce it" (Coleman 1990: 269). Based on the assumption that humans like to live in balance with their environment (Kurtenbach 2017a: 60), we assume that the perception of violence and deviant behavior within such a context leads to coping strategies regarding irritations and an acceptance of violence as a way to deal with situations. In this regard, neighborhoods become disadvantaged, if violence and deviant behavior, like drug dealing, are a part of the daily sphere of experience (Sandberg and Pedersen 2011; Wilson 1987). To analyze the relationship between the individual and its neighborhood, with an emphasis on male juveniles as the focus group of this study, the classical ecological approaches are discussed first. Second, a short overview of the context effect as the macro–micro-link is provided. Third, the literature of social–cultural influences of neighborhoods is reviewed. Fourth and last, the implications for the empirical study are discussed.

# **2.1 Segregation and the Neighborhood as a Precondition for Risky Neighborhoods**

Segregation, the disproportional distribution of groups within a city is one of the classical topics of urban studies. The scientific research about it begins with the seminal work of the Chicago school of sociology in the early twentieth century. Preceding this, reports of travelers such as Engels (1971) made clear that in the industrial city, the poorest and the richest live close to, yet separate from each other. The early studies showed a wide range of approaches about the same problems of a growing and industrialized city in an immigration country. Robert E. Park, one of the founders of the Chicago school, described figures of marginalization and disorganization on the streets, using journalistic methodological approaches (Park 1928). However, the basic assumption of the researchers of the Chicago school was that a city can be described as an ecological system and so they called their perspective "human ecology" (Park 1936). From this perspective, neighborhood as "natural areas" (Park 1984: 6) tend to be not only ethnically homogeneous but also in behavioral patterns, whilst interacting as an ecological system that forms the entire city. This clear macro-sociological perspective supposes an influence of the individual by the broader context, which we discuss as neighborhood effects (Dietz 2002; Kling et al. 2005; Wilson 1987). Influenced by the work of Simmel, Spencer, Tönnies, and Durkheim (Shils 1996: 90), the work of the Chicago school brought together social–structural and social–cultural dimension on a spatial, mostly geographical level; what Park called "physical structure" and "moral order" (Park 1984: 4). This serves as the basis for studies about human behavior in relation to their social and physical environment, like the social (dis)organization approach (Bursik 1988; Sampson et al. 1998; Sampson 2012; Shaw and McKay 1969) or the broken-windows theory (Wilson and Kelling 1982; Haney 2007; Keuschnigg and Wolbring 2015).

Against this background, it is not astonishing, that the study of deviant behavior and crime in urban contexts was one of the primary topics of the early years in Chicago school (Hardyns and Pauwels 2017). For example, in his classic study, Thrasher (1936) analyzed data of 1,313 gangs in Chicago and described different types of gangs (i.e., diffuse, solidified, conventional, and criminal). In their groundbreaking work, Shaw and McKay (1969) analyzed crime and indicators of disorder at the neighborhood level. They showed that crime, poverty, and fluctuation are correlated. In their deeper interpretations, they claim that the level of social disorganization of a community explains the occurrence of youth violence. From this perspective, poverty and crime are imbedded in specific spatial settings which make its occurrence more probable. This is backed up by older ideas of the Chicago school of sociology, such as those of Burgess (1984: 57), who named inner-city neighborhoods, where new arrivals as well as the poorest of a city live, places of "lost souls". Those social–ecological studies had a significant impact on urban research, even until today.

However, the most essential point is that place matters for individual development and that neighborhoods are a useful unit to explain individual outcomes. In line with the studies of the Chicago school, Bronfenbrenner (1979) developed his framework of the ecology of human development which was highly influenced by Lewin's (1951) field theory. Even here, the basic idea was that a child uses the resources of its environment for its own development. However, social stratification, like the family, schools, and the neighborhood, was separated from each other. From this perspective, individuals are embedded in interconnected social spaces with their own normative structure and resources. Furthermore, people learn from their environment how to solve challenges and develop their own strategies to do so.

Even a combination of the two classical approaches, the social–ecological work of the Chicago School and the human ecological perspective of Bronfenbrenner (1979), reinforced the idea that neighborhoods influence individual outcomes such as norms and patterns of behavior. Thus, it is important to notice that segregation creates specific kinds of neighborhoods (e.g., those which are violent and poor and where individuals are confronted with disorganization and cope with it by developing their own social rules). However, this claim is a theoretical one and the broader empirical informed discussion about *neighborhood effects* begun with the work of Wilson at the end of the 1980s.

# **2.2 The Consequence of a Neighborhood Effects on Individuals**

In his study, *The Truly Disadvantaged*, Wilson (1987) indicated that parts of the African American community in many US cities live in segregated poor and violent neighborhoods. Effects of deindustrialization and welfare reforms as well as policing strategies had a disadvantaging impact on the inner-city poor black community. The important point is that the residents of those neighborhoods were not only disadvantaged by macro-forces, but by the situation in the neighborhoods as well. Restricted resources, such as a very limited marriage pool of responsible men for single mothers, as well as poor education had an additional negative impact on the life perspectives of humans in these inner-city communities (Wilson 1987). Absent positive role models provide the impression to minors that unemployment, illegal, or low-paid part-time jobs are normal and part of their own future. Thus, they assimilated to their neighborhood instead of leaving it.

The underlying assumption is that the community is confronted with a disadvantaging effect which is created by living jointly in a neighborhood. This claim provoked an intensive debate about neighborhood effects. Further studies used a broad range of methodologies to identify and explain different kinds of those. However, this perspective on neighborhood is that it links the macro- and microlevel together, and so, it was easy to link it with Coleman's approach, published in the same period, who also worked at the University of Chicago (Fig. 2.1).

Usually, the theoretical and empirical challenge is to specify and estimate the neighborhood effect. Therefore, different theoretical concepts or models were formulated. For example, the role model, which stresses that children and juveniles do learn patterns of behavior from older people in the neighborhood (Wilson 1987). The network model asserts that behavior is learned from peers in the neighborhood (Crane 1991). The model of relative deprivation follows the assumption that neighborhood effects are a result of the comparison between the self and the environment; if the perception is that the own position is poor, alternative pathways to success are developed (Kawachi et al. 1999; Merton 1938). The model of environment-related

**Fig. 2.1** Micro–macro-model of neighborhood effects

learning shows that individuals change their norms to reduce stress (Kurtenbach 2017a: 247).

Those models are often translated into empirical multilevel analyses. For example, Galster et al. (2016) focused on the relationship of neighborhood and school performance for low-income African American and Latino juveniles between 12 and 18 years (N = 764). They used data from a natural experiment in Denver, which allowed low-income households who live in poor areas to move to better-off neighborhoods. The main finding is that juveniles (especially African Americans) perform better in school, and after they have moved to a better neighborhood. In another study, Kulis et al. (2007) analyzed the relationship between neighborhood characteristics and alcohol, cigarette, and marijuana use. Therefore, they analyze data of a survey (N = 3,721) and the census data of Phoenix. One of their findings is that neighborhood characteristics, the crime rate, and length of residence predict substance use (Kulis et al. 2007: 287). Those studies use the neighborhood characteristics as an independent variable to explain variance for an outcome at the individual level, using different kinds of regressions. In addition, cross-sectional as well as longitudinal designs are common in this research area. These studies provide a strong contribution to stressing the importance of neighborhood as an analytical unit which affects the life of humans. However, those studies cannot provide an understanding of how and why specific patterns of behavior are developed and in which dynamics of day-to-day practices those are embedded.

Thus, another perspective is common in the broad body of literature of neighborhood effects. In contrast to multilevel analyses, the focus in neighborhood analyses is more on the dynamics within neighborhoods. For example, Goffman (2014) shows, based on a long-term ethnographic project, that male juveniles in segregated African American neighborhoods in the US suffer under harsh policing strategies and exclusion from the labor market which might encourage criminal careers. Pinkster (2014), in attempting to explain why middle-class households are located in poor neighborhoods and how they perceive their environment, conducted 59 in-depth interviews with residents in Amsterdam and The Hague (The Netherlands). The study shows that the respondents did not rate the problems in their neighborhood high and but rather foregrounded the economic reasons. With rents cheaper in those neighborhoods, residents could save money for other purposes. At the same time, the interview partners claimed that they created social distance from the rest of the neighborhood by social practices such as avoiding public spaces (Pinkster 2014: 823). Kurtenbach (2017b) too focused on those coping strategies in challenging neighborhoods. Based on qualitative interviews with experts and residents of a poor neighborhood in Cologne, he outlined the coping patterns of long-term residents with their environment. In line with Pinkster, he finds avoidance and distance as coping strategies, but also frustration and resignation among residents.

Both approaches, the multilevel as well as the neighborhood analyses, show that neighborhoods have an impact on the life chances and norms of their residents. Neighborhoods are a useful unit for analyzing how individuals and especially vulnerable groups such as poor, single mothers or male juveniles, who perceive exclusion, cope with everyday life. The underlying assumption is that neighborhoods as collective units do have a normative structure, often claimed as street culture which structure both influences individuals or groups as well as being something with which they have to cope. This social–cultural dimension of neighborhoods runs in parallel with the social structural dimension, which is usually the focus.

# **2.3 Normative Structure of Neighborhoods**

The normative structure of a neighborhood is the perceived set of shared norms of the local population and is conspicuously documented by election turnouts, the attitudes toward sanctioning of deviant behavior as well as social protests. However, three concepts of spatial norm structures are prominent in the literature: collective efficacy as an explanation of how a community acts normatively, legal cynicism as an approach to understanding how a community reacts to a perceived unfair trail, and spatial threat as a conglomerate of theoretical ideas as to how individuals cope with perceived danger in their social environment. All three concepts are discussed more in detail.

# *2.3.1 The Collective Prevention of Crime: Collective Efficacy*

Collective efficacy was formulated in the 1990s at the University of Chicago, especially by Robert J. Sampson and tested by data of the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN) (Sampson 2012: 71−93). It is in line with the classical approaches of the Chicago school of sociology and social–ecological studies in particular, which had the differences between neighborhoods as its ambit. Those differences are not only social structural but also sociocultural in nature. This means, for example, that not only does the average income differ between neighborhoods, but also the shared beliefs and norms, and these spatial circumstances have an effect on individuals.

Collective efficacy follows the basic assumptions that a more organized community has lower crime rates. Starting from this point, Sampson et al. (1997) link two lines of the discussion to each other: perceived trust on the one hand, and the willingness to intervene on the other hand. They embedded their concept in the theory of methodological individualism (Coleman 1990), which means that every explanation has to deconstruct to individual behavior, and which overcame the critique that strong social bonds in a neighborhood have to be established to act as a community. Their argument is that no real contacts with the neighbors are needed; rather a positive perception of the neighbors (e.g., trust that they are willing to help). Their own willingness to act would subsequently increase.

One of the most cited studies about collective efficacy was published by Sampson and Raudenbush (1999). They match census data with data of a survey as well as data of structural participant observations at the level of 343 neighborhood clusters in the city of Chicago. The structural participant observations took into account signs of physical disorder such as trash on the ground, as well as social disorder, such as loitering groups (N = 23,816). Collective efficacy is constructed out of the survey data, which included questions on trust in their neighbors as well as their willingness to intervene in criminal situations in the neighborhood. The results indicate that collective efficacy has a limited effect on crime in the neighborhood. Since then, this effect has been replicated in several studies (e.g., Gibson et al. 2002; Kleinhans and Bolt 2014). Sampson and Wikström (2008) compare the effect of collective efficacy in Chicago and Stockholm, arriving at the same result: the higher collective efficacy is, the lower is the crime rate: neighborhoods with a lower level of collective efficacy do have higher crime rates.

Furthermore, collective efficacy is used in international studies. Empirical analysis shows mixed results in Germany. Häfele (2013) analyses the relationship between collective efficacy and the perceived sense of insecurity in neighborhoods. He used data of a mail survey in Hamburg and matched them with data from structural participant observations (Häfele 2013: 134). The results of the multilevel regressions show that a low level of collective efficacy predicts a high sense of insecurity (Häfele 2013: 189). However, he does not find a link between collective efficacy and the perception of risk. He explains this unclear relationship—that physical incivilities such as trash on the ground can enforce collective efficacy—by claiming that the local community stands up against such kinds of disorder and that collective efficacy is just a part of everyday life. Furthermore, Blasius et al. (2008) use collective efficacy to explain the disadvantaging effect of neighborhoods in Cologne. Their finding is that the higher the level of poverty in a neighborhood, the lower the collective efficacy. Even here, an interplay between social and normative structure of a neighborhood is observable.

Moreover, studies using the concept of collective efficacy outside of Europe come to mixed results as well. For example,Messner et al. (2017) used the scale of collective efficacy in a survey about crime perception on Chinese neighborhoods. One finding is that collective efficacy might have a cultural component, which had thus far been overlooked in the literature. Furthermore, Leslie et al. (2015) demonstrated with a survey in Agincourt, Mpumalanga (South Africa) that collective efficacy has a significant decreasing effect on heavy drinking in communities.

To sum up, the empirical findings on collective efficacy brought to light various results for the development of an analytical framework of risky neighborhoods. First, there is the basic assumption that neighborhoods or communities are able to develop shared norms and ways to respond to specific actions, such as crime, collectively. However, this requires trust and the willingness to intervene in criminal situations by residents of a neighborhood. We assume, second, that such collectively perceived responsibility is limited in risky neighborhoods, and that rules how to act are developed by groups and individuals, because the local collective is not strong enough or do not share the same norms.

# *2.3.2 The Collective Reaction to Discrimination: Legal Cynicism*

In contrast to collective efficacy, legal cynicism means the reaction of shared beliefs that the police or legal system is an inadequate agent to solve problems. The concept was suggested by Sampson and Bartusch (1998: 778) as a means to explain the "anomie about the law" in neighborhoods. They argue:

Anomie in this sense is conceived as part of a social system and nor merely a property of the individual. Normlessness and powerlessness tend also to go hand in hand, breeding cynicism about the rules of the society and their application, regardless of individual values. We thus maintain that tolerance of deviance and anomie—especially the component related to what we call 'legal cynicism'—are district normative structures that do necessary operate in concern. (Sampson and Bartusch 1998: 782)

Thus, legal cynicism is related to specific characteristics of a neighborhood, namely, a low socioeconomic status, the concentration of a stigmatized minority, and the poor reputation of public services, like the police. The approaches premise that those deprived characteristics of a neighborhood shape the collective norms of a community within a city. To test the concept—using data from the PHDCN—Sampson and Bartusch calculated three different measures: tolerance of deviance, legal cynicism and satisfaction with the police (Sampson and Bartusch 1998: 788) and conducted multilevel regressions of individual and neighborhood data to explain these measures as dependent variables. They show that legal cynicism is explained by concentrated disadvantage at the neighborhood level as well as poverty, gender, and family type (Sampson and Bartusch 1998: 797).

However, legal cynicism is incorporated into several studies about place-related crime. For example, Carr et al. (2007) use the theoretical framework to explain why residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods in Philadelphia do not call the police in the case of crime events. The police have a poor reputation and past experiences left the impression that the police do not respond to the real problems within the neighborhood. Kirk and Matsuda (2011) used the data of the PHDCN to analyze the effect of legal cynicism and collective efficacy on arrest. The results of the multilevel analyses show that neighborhoods with a high level of legal cynicism and self-reported criminal offending have low rates of arrest. They explain the effect: "We suggest that, in highly cynical neighborhoods, residents are less likely to report victimizations or crimes to the police or to cooperate with the police in an investigation because they perceive little benefit in doing so" (Kirk and Matsuda 2011: 460).

In sum, like collective efficacy, legal cynicism as a social–cultural concept takes its place with the usual socioeconomic characteristics of neighborhoods to explain deviant behavior. Both are concepts of collective norms. Furthermore, the probability that perceived, shared norms have an impact on the interpretation of violent situations is quite high, but the range of both concepts is limited because differences in behavior between individuals are not specified. Also, explanations of how residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods cope with their environment have to be taken into account.

# *2.3.3 Individual Patterns of How to Cope with Perceived Risk: Spatial Threat Approaches*

In contrast to collective efficacy and legal cynicism, the spatial threat approaches focus on individual behavior as a reaction toward its environment. They are not a single theory; rather a bundle of concepts that explain how individuals react toward the social environment, such as the neighborhood. For example, in their classic study, Jahoda et al. (1960) showed that in a declining industrial town in Austria in the early twentieth-century individuals coped through different but equal patterns with poverty. Through intense fieldwork, they point out that four groups of people are observable (i.e., unbroken, resigned, frantic, and apathetic). Even this classic study, which harks back more than 100 years, hints that people react differently toward the collapsing social and normative circumstances of their community. Some migrated, if they could, others become depressive or even aggressive and yet others remained optimistic and still followed middle-class values. Important to note is that all these patterns are rational from the point of view of the individuals (Bourdieu 1980:47). So, the reactions of people toward a threatening environment have to be interpreted based on their perception of the environment and their ability to behave in their social circumstances.

Macro-driven explanations why individuals have to develop specific kinds of behavior and what those look like were also formulated by Wilson (1987) and Wacquant (2008). Recently, Kurtenbach (2017b) showed that, even under conditions of a western welfare state, people develop specific patterns of behavior when they perceive their neighborhood as threatening and themselves as vulnerable. Based on 44 qualitative interviews, he showed that residents developed specific kinds of coping patterns if they perceived their environment to be deviant. Based on his data, he finds frustration and resignations as well as avoidance and distancing from the environment as common response. Sharkey (2006) developed the concept of street efficacy, which means that "adolescents with high street efficacy are more likely to expend greater effort and creativity to avoid violent confrontations, selecting social settings, peer groups, and activities that provide them a better chance of doing so" (Sharkey 2006: 831). He tested his assumption using data of the PHDCN and found clear support for his concept: juveniles develop a deep knowledge about their neighborhood, allowing them to stay out of trouble on the streets. Both latter studies suggest specific strategies as reactions to the environment but also avoidance strategies toward violent situations. The alternative is that one does not develop routines for coping with the environment, rather one developed individual norms, such as those that Anderson suggests in his concept of the code of the street; these are discussed in Chap. 3 in more detail. From this point of view, the neighborhood shapes the norms of an individual if it is perceived as being dangerous in a way that violence is perceived as a normal strategy for coping with environment-related challenges.

Altogether, the discussion of collective efficacy, legal cynicism, and the spatial threat approaches showed that the environment does have an impact on the norms and behavior of individuals. The normative structure of a neighborhood might influence the way male juveniles behave in violent situations. Furthermore, they develop coping strategies which are not limited to this specific group.

# **2.4 Risky Neighborhood: An Analytical Concept**

All in all, the review of the literature demonstrated that risky neighborhoods are marked by a spatial concentration of poverty and a lack of trust in and social control of its residents, as well as high crime rates and violence in particular. Furthermore, a lack of trust in public services, such as the police, is observable and forms of physical incivilities are seen in the public sphere. So, on the one hand, risky neighborhoods have features that promote deviance such as crime and an absence of social control; on the other hand, this framework promotes a normative structure which enforces the development of coping strategies for handling a threatened environment, or more specifically, promotes a unique constellation of conflicts. On the background of the literature of the spatial threat approaches, different patterns are observable, ranging from maintaining middle-class values to a high relevance of specific street-related knowledge to avoid either violent situations or the contact with the neighborhood as a whole, to the learning of deviant behavior as a normal way of acting. So, risky neighborhoods promote the development of deviant behavior of vulnerable groups, such as male juveniles, what we propose as a neighborhood effect.

Nevertheless, the literature review provides some evidence for the concept of risky neighborhoods. However, two dimensions have to be considered: first, the neighborhood level. Here—as the concept of collective efficacy strongly suggests—the local community might avoid violence either intentionally or through social control, but so too avoid practices to sanction deviant behavior. If this is missing, crime and violence rather occur in public spaces. The second approach is the group-based concept; this is where the code of the street comes into the game. The main claim—as provided in greater detail in Chap. 3—is that male juveniles in particular develop a specific set of norms for coping with their environment, which they perceive to be threatening. One part of this concept is that informal rules are formulated for regulating violence. This includes rules to avoid extensive levels of violence for all group members. Those rules may include the regulation of the use of weapons in fights, the number of members to a fight or when a fight should stop. Naturally, the level of violence and the rules can vary between macro-contexts, such as nations, but weapons provide a level of security if a community is not able or willing to react.

However, this picture has been cobbled together by empirical findings in urban and criminal studies, but not examined in a broader setting yet. Thus, some questions remain open. We cannot be sure how the interplay between social spaces, peer groups, and violence-related norms work. Furthermore, we need to clarify how the use of violence for solving problems, on the one hand, and the possible widespread middleclass values within those neighborhoods, on the other hand, are perceived by residents of risky neighborhoods and juveniles in particular. Also, moderating effects, such as of the peer group or of the public space as simultaneously a safe and dangerous area, are unclear. This study aims to shed light onto these questions.

In all, risky neighborhoods are defined as social spaces where groups might come into conflicts without or with the reduced probability of sanctioning for violence by the community. The survival within such a risky neighborhood is guaranteed by the development of coping strategies within the neighborhood and social rules of behaving in violent situations as a specific kind of street culture. This has empirical implications. We propose that, first, the higher the level of disorder is, the clearer the level of perceived threat. Second, the lower the perceived sanctioning of a local community toward violence, the clearer the informal rules of how to cope with the risky neighborhood becomes. Third, the clearer the informal rules of how to cope with the neighborhood, the clearer the rules of how to act in violent situations. Conflicts between juveniles in risky neighborhoods are characterized by *symmetric conflicts*, which means that even if a young male enters into a fight, he and his enemy know specific kinds of rules of fighting that limit the probability for serious injuries. In contrast to this, *hostile spaces* are those where only one group is in power and the local society accepts the violence of that group, but sanctions violent behavior of the other group. Those conflicts are *asymmetric* and without informal rules. Xenophobic violence is such an example (Kurtenbach 2018). The third type of social space with a specific kind of tolerance for conflicts is *self-regulating spaces,* which have a high level of collective efficacy (Sampson et al. 1997). In those places, residents follow socalled middle-class values and recognize that in each other, which builds trust among each other. Those social bonds help to intervene when deviant behavior occurs in the neighborhood to ensure that collective norms are upheld, independent of ethnicity or age of the deviants.

To extend the theoretical basis for the study, the state of the art about violencerelated norms and the code of the street is reviewed further below as well. The concept of risky neighborhoods serves as a spatial framework of the analysis, the code of the street as the group-based framework for analysis. The combination of both might provides a deeper understanding of the dynamics beyond youth violence and prove the claim of the code of the street as a general concept as a means to analyze and understand youth violence in risky neighborhoods or will show its limitations.

# **References**


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# **Chapter 3 Violence-Related Norms and the "Code of the Street"**

**Sebastian Kurtenbach and Abdul Rauf**

Youth violence remains an important topic in urban sociology and sociologists seek explanation to investigate the link between space and action. Furthermore, youth violence is associated with disorganized communities and risky neighborhoods as well as to individual socio-demographic factors. However, the scope of this chapter is on the interplay between individual norms and influences of risky neighborhoods. Therefore, literature about violence-related norms and the code of the street, as a specific concept, which takes the social and spatial environment into account, is reviewed. The goal is to formulate empirical markers of the code of the street, for use in the empirical section of the study.

# **3.1 Violence and Norms: An Overview**

Before discussing the basic conceptual assumption of violence-related norms, three important terms need a definition.<sup>1</sup>


<sup>1</sup>The concept, "norms", has been defined in Chap. 2.

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2019

W. Heitmeyer et al., *The Codes of the Street in Risky Neighborhoods*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16287-0\_3

15 and 24 years old for statistical consistency across the regions. However, for sample access and comparative analysis, the age group 16–21 years old is the focus of this study.

3. When youth perpetrate acts of violence against victims this is called *youth violence*. This kind of violence can be in the form of physical injury, damage of property, use of force to hurt people physically or their property, vandalism, emotional blackmailing, sexual offences, mental torture, provocation, gazing, and bullying (World Health Organization 2016). For this study, violence committed in the age group 16–21 in form of physical abuse, cursing, sexual offences, vandalism, disrespect, and humiliation of nonviolent people and is referred to as youth violence. Any retaliation in response to the inflicted violence that cannot justify a claim of self-defense is also considered as an act of violence for this study.

As already stated, the understanding of youth violence requires a neighborhood and individual-level explanation. For instance, youth violence can be explained by analyzing neighborhood processes that influence personal norms during adolescence. On an individual level, young people have a various motive for engaging in violent behavior, including gaining respect and honor. Thus, we find a broad range of explanations for youth violence in the psychological as well as in the criminological literature. Through these lenses, we focus on the literature regarding violence-related norms. These norms are rules that govern one's behavior within a social situation (Mahalik et al. 2003: 03) and include the endorsement of a normative belief in acceptance of antisocial behavior that includes aggression and violence. Anderson (1999) illustrates the contextual effect of neighborhood-level street culture—the *code of the street*—in governing interpersonal interaction. Various accounts explain the reciprocity of acceptance of violence-related norms among young males, including social ecology (Lilleston et al. 2017), masculinity (Mahalik et al. 2003), playing aggressive games (Krahé and Möller 2004), and peer group association (Seddig 2014).

Additionally, the role of family is considered paramount to understand why adolescents are prominent participants in violent situations. The family provides emotional support and parental upbringing plays a major role in behavior development. Family adversities, including poverty, family stress, disorganization, and parental conflict are associated with antisocial behavior and violence (Labella and Masten 2018). Through an ethnographic study of inner-city neighborhoods of New York City, Dunlap et al. (2009) revealed that children described physical assault from parents, particularly from their mothers, as an "expression of love" and thus as a deserved punishment. Dunlap et al. (2009) proposed that these daily experiences and violent socialization prepared the children to operate successfully in the street culture.

Anderson (1999) identified two types of families—*decent* and *street*—within the impoverished neighborhood. *Decent families* instill middle-class values and counteract the influence of street code. By contrast, children of*street families* are cultured with street etiquette to survive on the streets. Moreover, the presence of role models mediates street culture. Anderson (1999: 180) argued that the male role model is a primary source of social control in risky neighborhoods. Regarding the effect of neighborhood culture to individual norm, Stewart and Simons (2010) suggested that the presence of traditional role models mediates neighborhood structural effects on adolescent violence. Similarly, Nowacki (2012) examined the influence of family attachment and adoption of the street code among youth by using longitudinal data of the National Youth Survey. The result showed that family attachment reduces the acceptance of street code for both boys and girls. However, Drummond et al. (2011) found inconsistency between positive family characteristics and acceptance or rejection of street culture. They articulated that *code-switching* can be an explanation for this inconsistency. At this point, Lindegaard and Zimmermann (2017) show, using the example of townships in Cape Town, that the ability of code-switching has a protective effect on male juveniles.

Another component of youth violence in risky neighborhoods is substance abuse. Substance abuse is a symbol of the extreme dynamics of social marginalization and alienation in the inner city and in the shaping of everyday life on the street (Bourgois 2003: 2). Also, substance and alcohol use is considered an important part of contemporary street culture. Bourgois (2003) argues that youths from impoverished neighborhoods of the inner-city face "cultural assault" outside their neighborhoods. In response to it, young people search for personal dignity and respect in the street culture of inner-city neighborhoods, where alcohol and drug abuse is a major part of street culture. Consequently, the adoption of street culture leads them to selfdestruction (Bourgois 2003). Moreover, studies have illustrated the drug abuse and violence nexus. Goldstein's (1985) theoretical framework explains the relationship between drugs and violence in three ways: the psychopharmacological, the economically compulsive, and the systemic. Psychopharmacological violence is a violent behavior by the substance user as a result of short- or long-term ingestion. The drugs alter the consciousness and behavior of drug abuser and he or she behaves differently. In psychopharmacological violence, the drug user can be predator and victim of violence at the same time. Economic compulsion violence involves violence committed by drug user for monetary purposes to fund their drug addiction. Generally, drug abusers are not motived to act violently, however, social context and the victim's behavior leads to violence and crime.

Violence is an inherent part of the illegal drug economy including competitive and systemic violence. The dispute over territory between drug dealers, punishment for failing to pay for drugs and homicides of rivals are examples of competitive and systemic violence, respectively (Sandberg and Pedersen 2011: 121–135; Reuter 2009). In order to understand drug-related violence, Copes et al. (2015) analyzed the narratives of 30 incarcerated carjackers in Norway. By following Goldstein's tripartite framework, the participants articulated that violence is commonplace in drug-prone areas and the use of violence is justified. The storylines of offenders followed the Goldstein tripartite framework to understand the link between drugs use and violence. The narrative "*it wasn't the real me"*' showed the empirical support of psychopharmacological violence when drugs become a substantial justification for the use of violence. Similarly, *"expected violence in drug areas"* is evidence of systemic violence, where the violence is an integral part of drug-prone areas and it is considered instrumental in sustaining these areas. Other storylines were about "*addicts are deserving victims*", which gave perpetrators the excuse to use violence and blame the victim for drug-related violence.

In "Code of the Street", Anderson (1999: 55) argued that the drug trade and culture is everywhere in impoverished inner-city neighborhoods and abandoned buildings become hotspots for "crack" users. This is the environment in which children are socialized and become engaged in the drug trade (Anderson 1999: 199). Also, youths involved in the drug trade often relate themselves to the ideology glorified in rap music, which instigates the embrace of an oppositional culture and incites the use of violence. Applying the *code of the street* to understand criminal behavior, including gun carrying and drug trafficking, Allen and Lo (2012) found that the adoption of code-based beliefs is a significant predicator of drug trafficking and gun carrying behavior among their sample of high school students and correctional inmates in the age group 15–19 years old. In sum, the empirical review indicates that the street code and drugs nexus is complex. Research showed that street-oriented youth engaged in the drugs market to maintain their glorious lifestyle. Thus, drug abuse is a way of resistance to mainstream culture and find dignity in street culture and drugs abuse (Bourgois 2003).

In order to understand the micro–macro-link of violent behavior, the code of the street provides a multilevel explanation thereof. At the individual level, Anderson categorized individuals and families into "decent" and "street" when assessing adherence to the street code. According to this thesis, individuals who internalize the code behave violently. However, at neighborhood level, socio-structural disadvantages lead to the street code, which operates as an emergent sociocultural property of the neighborhood collective that shapes the residents' behavior in certain urban spaces regardless of the individual's norms (Bruinsma and Johnson 2018: 48). For instance, decent individuals who do not embrace the street code, still situationally use the street code for survival in conflict situations. Thus, the code of the street explains both accounts of individual- and neighborhood-level spatial variations of violence in various contexts. In the current study, the code of the street as a theoretical framework is chosen to understand spatial patterns of violence-related norms and behavior in risky neighborhoods in a cross-cultural comparison. Hereafter, the code of the street is described in greater detail and empirical results are discussed, as well as empirical implications.

# **3.2 Code of the Street**

Twenty years ago, in 1999, Anderson's groundbreaking book, *Code of the Street* was published. It was based on the intensive ethnographic study of an African American neighborhood in Philadelphia in the 1990s. The core of the idea is that male juveniles, particularly, develop a specific set of norms to cope with a threatening environment. In this regard, it brings together space or risky neighborhoods with violence-related norms and can serve as a proper framework for the cross-cultural analysis of youth violence, by putting it into spaces.

The code of the street is thought to be an old human rule (Anderson 1999: 84). Thus, even if it is developed and tested mainly in the US context, it is treated as a general theoretical approach that explains youth violence independent of geographical location. However, there are also clear hints in the seminal work of Anderson that the code is a reaction within a specific context, like during an uprising and in spatially concentrated drug markets, in periods of deindustrialization (Anderson 1999: 28–29) and in contexts of racial discrimination (Anderson 1999: 88). Furthermore, it is more a description of cultural practices on the street as an explicit theory (Sandberg and Pedersen 2011: 45).

Many studies cite, criticize, or use the code as an analytical framework. It is not our intention to contribute to the discussion if the code exists, but to test if it works outside of the US. If it is true that it is a general rule, we should be able to find the code, as Anderson describes it, in different countries. Otherwise, we will find more culturally specific parts of a street code and that the original theoretical description of the street code, with its elements of the code of the street, is limited to specific contexts only.

# *3.2.1 Basic Assumptions of the Code of the Street*

The code of street is a promising approach to understanding youth violence, particularly in risky neighborhoods. Anderson argues that the concentration of disadvantaged, social isolation and discrimination in an inner-city neighborhood spawns an oppositional culture specifically among youth whose norms and values are alienated from mainstream society. In this culture, the interpersonal relationship is governed by a street code as "a set of informal rules governing interpersonal public behavior, particularly violence. The rules prescribe both proper comportment and the proper way to respond if challenged. They regulate the use of violence and so supply a rationale allowing those inclined to aggression to precipitate violent encounters in an approved way" (Anderson 1999: 33). In inner-city neighborhoods, the street code is centered on respect. Subsequently the residents, particularly young men and women, campaign to gain respect that regulates public interaction, particularly through violence. Possession of respect safeguards persons against interpersonal violence on the street. Moreover, the lack of trust in police and other state institutions and prolonged deprivation lead to the emergence of *street justice* as a component of the code of the street. Moreover, it emanates from *people's law*, where personal safety becomes the individual's responsibility (Anderson 1999: 16). The street code prescribes a certain and prompt "payback" as a retaliation for assault and disrespect.

Anderson argues that violence and street codes are place-related phenomena and not limited to African American neighborhoods only (Stacer 2014). In inner-city neighborhoods, its conditions lead to the social division of residents as "streetoriented" or "decent" depending on the degree of alienation from mainstream values. Individuals or families that embrace the street code and reinforce it are labeled as *street*-*oriented* (Anderson 1999: 66). They tend to react violently when faced with disrespect or threat. Many of them lack a proper education and are proud of their lifestyle, e.g. as a drug dealer. They tend to have little trust in police and institutional officials. Thus, they are alienated from middle-class value systems and uphold their violent reputation in public. Conversely, decent families have hope in the future and tend to accept middle-class values and inculcate their children with these values. Anderson (1999: 180) argues, that in inner-city neighborhoods, the traditional male role model is important and seen as the head of the family. Moreover, he exhibits a striking image on the street of inner-city neighborhoods and shows that he can protect his family. Young male members from decent families understand the dynamics of the code and have the ability to do code-switching.<sup>2</sup>

# *3.2.2 The Code in the Socialization*

At an early age, children go through social shuffling processes on the street that challenge the early socialization at home. Subsequently, children from decent families become familiar with the code of the street and change their personal orientations toward street culture. Children observe the street dynamics and are fascinated with reputation, which is based on toughness and the willingness to fight (Anderson 1999: 135). In the inner-city poor neighborhood, the environment is conducive to learning, street code (Anderson 1999: 137). In these contexts, children learn to anticipate the situation and react accordingly. Sometimes it leads to conflicts. Later, adolescents feel insecure on the street and try to contract identities by abusive talk and outright aggression or violence. Similarly, the street-oriented home environment reinforces what they learn on the street. Older family members educate them about how to protect themselves in a different situation, even punishing children if they are unable to show aggression in public (Anderson 1999: 142).

Children, particularly without supervision, gain street knowledge at an early age. They are attracted to the street life and socialized in an arena where street-oriented and decent families' children shuffle between codes. Street knowledge becomes a source of power in the impoverished neighborhood. Moreover, youths believe that street knowledge safeguards them on the streets (Anderson 1999: 186). Subsequently, young people with street knowledge embrace the street code and it is believed that the most effective way of gaining respect to embody strength on the street is by taking another person's possessions. Even though the manifestation of the nerve to carry out the rules of the street code can be life-threatening, street-oriented youths accept this risk in lieu of gaining respect and prefer death to disrespect.

In poor inner-city neighborhoods, street culture diffuses across the boundaries of schools within neighborhoods. The school environment induces children to learn

<sup>2</sup>However, it is not clear how code-switching works and what the difference between code-switching and different social roles are.

street knowledge for personal safety (Anderson 1999: 139). Over time, children are apt to embrace the street code as it is in compliance with the school environment and prevails in most of their society. Consequently, schools become primary staging areas for children in neighborhoods. School environments equally affect children from decent and street-oriented families. However, family background, peer association, and role models are strongly associated (Anderson 1999: 142). These settings reinforce the beliefs of street-oriented children, whereas children from decent families learn to switch codes, which means that they follow the code of the street in one situation and are able to exhibit more decent manners in another. In the beginning, children adopt the street code for self-defensive in their schools and neighborhoods. Over time, adolescents internalize the street code and street peer association encourages involvement in street activities.Mingling in school makes encounters with streetoriented children inevitable. In some severe cases, street-oriented children may bring knives and guns to school to threaten people (Anderson 1999: 192). A competitive environment emerges where children campaign for respect. In impoverished neighborhood schools, children seek respect on the street rather than through academic achievement. Children are prepared to fight and defend themselves in any situation. Consequently, violence is always a possible way to resolve the matter. Moreover, material goods are important for self-esteem and young people show a particular lifestyle to maintain respect. In school, decent children also follow street-oriented lifestyle and it is difficult for teachers to differentiate among decent and street children. Hence the school teachers regard them all as street oriented (Anderson 1999: 193).

Generally, children and juveniles may acquire knowledge at an early age and internalize these values over time. In their campaign for respect, youth manifest and promote a self-image of manhood in staging areas by challenging others. The possession of material goods, including branded clothes and jewelry, endorses the respect and stimulates the disrespect process. In the campaign for respect, reputations are challenged again and again by others to gain more respect on the street. Material goods like branded goods and golden chains serve as symbols of status (Anderson 1999: 39). Young people own these material goods to impress others, despite the risk of being robbed by others. Furthermore, taking possession of a girlfriend or material goods is seen as winning pride or winning a trophy. In the case of a successful assault, the victim loses respect until he or she regains it by a forceful retaliation. In some cases, young men are protected because of street-corner groups and family members (Anderson 1999: 148).

Young people search for their identity in inner-city neighborhoods. At different stages of life, they try to follow different roles but some of these attempts do not work. In impoverished neighborhood schools, along with social isolation and alienation, teachers' and administrators' behavior shape the youth's identity. Decent children are more likely to switch the code as they realize that they will not get recognition from teachers and administration. In this aspect, mainstream society's values have a little regard for inner-city society and young people find the code of street more tempting as a way of life in the neighborhood. In this situation, there is a dilemma for the decent kids, as they find there is tension between what they learn at home and experience on the street. Street-oriented peers become important agents of socialization for decent children. These children develop an ability to code-switch and behave at home and in public spaces differently, as it is important to gain street knowledge and adopt the code of the street for survival in the inner-city streets (Anderson 1999: 138).

# *3.2.3 Manhood and the Code*

Although Anderson (1999) also mentioned that young women campaign for respect by winning love and giving birth to children. Nowacki (2012) showed that girls of inner-city neighborhood embrace the code of the street as eagerly as their male counterparts, the code of the street is largely an account of male young. However, Anderson (1999: 185) argues that the major concern of youth in inner-city neighborhoods is to gain respect and acquire manhood identity. Respect and manhood are two sides of the same coin, meaning that young people need to show self-confidence, physical strength, and the ability for a prompt violent response, if necessary (Anderson 1999: 186). If a male person is unable to reflect an identity of manhood in public, his and his family's safety is at risk in the neighborhoods.

It is the staging area, a spatial character of inner-city neighborhoods, where the code of street sprouts and develops among youth. It is a place of self-representation that is mainly dominated by young male residents of neighborhoods, where they hang around. Anderson (1999) mentioned three different types of staging areas. It might be the local liquor store and bar and the staging area might be inside or outside on the corner of street. The second type is small business areas in neighborhoods and the third an event activity, including multiplex sports events and concerts. Even young people from other neighborhoods come to the staging area to present not only selfhood, but to present their neighborhoods. In staging areas, people incite each other and some respond to insults with violence. In the clash, challenging statements make situations worse; participants want to draw back. In this situation, when bystanders are not willing to break up the standoff, there is the risk of knife and gun use. Most of the time, the conflicts are not resolved on the spot. In most of the cases, the victim may wait to become better off and then retaliate for the disrespect of the past.

# *3.2.4 The Code as Decency Dilemma*

"Decent" families or individuals face a dilemma. On the one hand, they try to follow middle-class values and on the other hand in public spaces they need to follow street values. This dilemma is shaped by macro-driven dynamics. As stated before, long-term unemployment and welfare dependency, discrimination and an underground economy demoralize the residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods. Anderson (1999: 2) described that deindustrialization left many unskilled and semiskilled workers unemployed. The presence of an underground drug economy provided them with alternative financial resources. The drug economy ushered in the violence in the society and rules of the street became the operating normative system of the neighborhoods. In this environment, violence is used to gain respect and extends security on the street.

Most children encounter the streets and they prepare to keep themselves safe on the street at an early age, which is true for children from "decent" families as well. They recognize the situation and learn how to watch their back in society. Later, in school, adolescents start the intuitive process of gaining a sense of self and the self of the future (Anderson 1999: 195). In their attempt at self-discovery, they try out the different roles of the decent and the street to make sense of them. In schools, teachers' inability to distinguish between decent and street children creates in adolescents' a sense of lack of appreciation at school, thus alienating them from school. The result is that they invest in the street code and seek respect there. Older street peers become a role model for these adolescents who campaign for respect and want to see themselves as visibly different. In this situation, adolescents of decent families face a dilemma as they develop their identity beyond the family. Street life is antagonistic to family socialization and street life becomes more attractive and at that age their neighborhood peers are far more important to them. Consequently, decent youth engage in street life, dreaming of gaining self-worth and respect in the neighborhood.

# *3.2.5 The Code and Violence*

Anderson (1999: 27) claims that inner-city neighborhoods have higher levels of crime, homicide, and violence. Moreover, these neighborhoods are characterized by widespread joblessness, welfare dependency and an underground economy. He depicted a vicious cycle of joblessness, drug use, and alienation. Owing to the longstanding discrimination and prejudice, young people fail to get jobs. In these distressed settings, drug dealing becomes an attractive and easy way to make a livelihood. Moreover, young people are fascinated by the glamorous lifestyle of drug dealers. In these destitute environments, drug trade becomes an everyday life activity. In the absence of a regular economy, people will then work in the underground economy, which emboldens the oppositional value system in that society.

Anderson's thesis provides insight into the accounts of youth violence in innercity poor neighborhoods, specifically those of Philadelphia in the USA. Anderson (1999: 69) hinted that the code may account for youth violence generally. Since then, some empirical studies attempted to elaborate on the concepts in different contexts. However, some writers contested Anderson's thesis, for instance, Wacquant (2002) pointed out that there is ambiguity about the concept of a code of the street. He argued that it is unclear whether the code is value orientation or scripts of behavior and how it originates in the inner city. He also questioned the agency of individuals to embrace or oppose the street culture in the neighborhood. However, there is ongoing debate from both camps. But the question remains whether the concept of the code is sufficient to explain youth violence in different settings.3 Garner (2018) criticizes, that the code of the street has its focus only on norms and that in the original work Anderson did not reflect his data in context of the history of the region where he did his research.

# **3.3 Empirical Findings of the Code of the Street in Further Studies**

Recently, there has been a resurgence of interest in investigating street life using Anderson's framework. A body of scholarship attempted to gauge the validity and generalizability of the thesis. Nevertheless, most of the studies have been conducted in US contexts. Through a review of the literature, we clustered the studies into four themes: empirical, family, safety-related studies, and those which take identity into account.

Before diving in detail into a discussion about the code of the street, one structural finding of the studies, using the street code approach, needs to be mentioned. Anderson describes in different parts of his book the specific circumstances under which those codes occur and talks carefully about the elements he found in his data, on the one hand. On the other hand, in some parts of the book he claims generalizability of his concepts, without having the material at hand to do that, which limits this thesis to an assumption, which needs to be proved. Now the structural finding is that the street code concept was often used unquestioned or with just a minimum of reflection and more of a pragmatic concept worthy of study. For example, some studies are using the street code concept, only with neighborhood data, like the percentage of African American males, aged 35 years and older who are currently married, out of the total African American male population aged 15 years or older (Parker and Reckdenwald 2008: 718). However, the moral believes, which are the most important part of the theoretical approach, are not considered, neither these studies take into account in what kind of household children live. For example, it is often not discussed if it is a single-parent family where the child grows up, if the parents even take care of their children or if the child grows up with its grandparents, etc. All these factors need to be assumed but cannot be measured with data about the social structure of a neighborhood only. Furthermore, those indicators can differ significantly in their meaning between neighborhoods, cities or countries. Other scholars leave the street completely and try to find out if the code operates among 245 undergraduate students (Intravia et al. 2017: 964). We do agree that the street code concept as articulated by Anderson is a useful approach to explain violence, but, as Anderson claims himself, that the social structural and normative context matters for the code of the street, and its explorative power is embedded in the interplay of space, peers and individual beliefs and circumstances.

<sup>3</sup>See also Andersons (2002) response as well as Wilsons and Chaddha (2009) comment.

# *3.3.1 General Findings About the Code of the Street*

Some scholars tried to assess the quantitative generalizability of the code to explain youth violence in various contexts. Using the National Youth Survey (NYS), a U.S. annual survey of youths aged 11–17 years, a panel survey of self-reported delinquent behavior conducted by the Behavioral Research Institute, Brezina et al. (2004), analyzed the data to assess the quantitative validity and generality of Anderson's thesis. They used three waves of data collection. The first wave in 1977 was conducted with a total of 1725 respondents and one parent per youth was also interviewed. In the second and third waves, 1655 and 1626 youths were interviewed. However, research focused only on a male sample of 918 respondents. They created a causal model that links social position, perceived opportunity and victimization, and parental supervision to violence-related beliefs and behavior among youth over time. Their results show that future violent behavior is associated with socioeconomic status and mediated by supervision. Moreover, association with aggressive peers and perceived victimization are subsequent factors in the development of violent behavior. The study extended its generalizability of findings of the street code in different neighborhoods. However, the study used secondary data and failed to give comprehensive explanations, including unclear associations regarding code-belief and race, and contextual explanations of code-related beliefs.

Brookman et al. (2011) examined the elements of street culture in the UK by interviewing convicted violent offenders. The study was designed to capture a variety of aspects of street violence by using purposive sampling in six prisons. The sample consisted of a diverse group of respondents, including 80 males and 30 females with an average age of 28 and 24 years, respectively. The findings suggested the major factors resulting in the adoption of violence in street culture, being: street justice for disrespect, as a safeguard against perceived retaliation, the confidence to revenge personal matters, and maintaining the street culture reputation through violence. In the study, the narratives of offenders supported the existence of the code of street in UK streets, as suggested by Anderson (1999) in Philadelphia, USA. The study broadens the generalizability of code of the street outside the USA and extends it to both males and females.

It has already been mentioned that children learn street culture or the code of the streets via their family and street socializations. In poor inner-city neighborhoods, adolescents learn from adults who live in their neighborhoods. In everyday interactions, adolescents shape their identity and follow a street script. Lauger's (2014) ethnographic observation in Indianapolis confirmed these processes of socialization. The study included 55 interviews, of which 54 were males ranging in age 13–45 years old. The sample included active gang members as well as former street gang members. The personal violent stories shape the script and transmit street culture among street gangs and street-oriented adolescents and that street culture establishes an expectation to behave violently in particular situations. The study provides accounts of the transformation of street violent culture among children and how it is internalized through street socialization. The study points out that socioeconomic disadvantaged factors lead to violent behavior, which is one of the major arguments of Anderson's thesis. He claims that structural socio-economics cultivate violent behavior among the youth. Furthermore, the study showed how a neighborhood-based normative structure, or its absence, leads to a violence-centered way of socialization of youth in these risky neighborhoods.

# *3.3.2 Code and Family*

Stewart et al. (2006) attempted to explain violent behavior among African American youths in distressed neighborhoods relying on Anderson's thesis. They combined both structural characteristics, like cultural family and racial discriminatory factors to comprehend the adaptation of violent behavior and the code of street. Therefore, they used data from 720 African American adolescents from 259 neighborhoods, collected from two waves of the Family and Community Health Study (FACHS). This is a multi-site investigation of neighborhood and family effects on health and development, in Georgia and Iowa. Findings suggest that neighborhood disadvantages contribute to the adoption of the code of the street, and family characteristic like street-orientation and racial discrimination are mediators for engaging in violent behavior among African American adolescents. The results followed Anderson's hypothesis by upholding the code of street. In another study, Stewart and Simons (2006) analyzed the relationship between the adoption of the code of the street with neighborhood characteristics and family type by using data of a mixed gender sample of 780 adolescents (10–13-year-olds) from families from two waves of the FACHS from 1997 and 1999. Findings affirmed Anderson's thesis that neighborhood disadvantage, discrimination, and violence are strongly associated with the adoption of the code of the street and family characteristics. Moreover, the adoption of the code of the street may support violent behavior among adolescents.

It is well explained by Anderson (1999) that children learn the code of the street at an early age. The patterns of development of street culture are mediated with exposure of structural disadvantages in neighborhood and peer. To test this thesis, Moule et al. (2015) employed FACHS data of 879 people by applying group-based trajectory modeling for analyzing developmental patterns and stability of individuals' street code beliefs through emerging adulthood. The age of the target youth, which included 45% female in both the first wave of data collection (1997) and last wave (2011) was between 10 and 12 years and 21 and 26 years old, respectively. Findings showed slight stability over a long period of time. Depending on risk factors, five trajectories of street code developed. Male respondents who faced discrimination have a stronger belief in street crime. Moreover, racial discrimination, parental monitoring, neighborhood crime and being male are significant factors in the development of code of the street beliefs.

In neighborhood streets, children interact and play in a group where street-oriented and "decent family" children mingle together. In these streets, children develop social bonds and share a pool of common knowledge, negate and affirm and follow what they see at home and in the street. In this street socialization, peer group is influential in adopting street culture in risky neighborhoods. Regarding the reciprocal effect between peer group association, acceptance of norms and violent behavior among adolescents (13–17 years of age), Seddig (2014) used the data set from German longitudinal sociological and criminological study "Crime in the Modern City (Crimoc)". An integrative approach—a "structural dynamic model" combining assumptions from various theories like anomie, control theory, and social learning—was used to examine peer group influence on violent behavior. Findings explained a mechanism, which indicates that delinquent peer group association and acceptance of pro-violent norms, for instance, approval of offences like violent, property and vandalism offences, and behavior is self-reinforcing over time and delinquent peer groups are apt social milieu to learn violence-related norms. Furthermore, structural dimensions, like gender, education, and migration also influence peer group association and normative standards regarding pro-violent behavior. Consequently, peer association is significantly associated with the acceptance of violence-normative systems.

Earlier it was explained by the Andersons (1999) thesis that social and structural factors like poverty, the absence of guardians and mistrust in state institutes induce street culture among African American adolescents in inner-city neighborhoods. Besides, "street families" have little expectations for the future. Therefore, they have a strong belief in the code of the street. Drummond et al. (2011) used the Mobile Youth Survey (MYS) to explain violent behavior pathways among adolescents aged 13–19 years from 13 neighborhoods. The study used a longitudinal dataset from 2004 and 2005 to measure the effect of parenting, a sense of community, peer association, and hopelessness as contributing factors to adopting the code of the street among youth. Results suggested positive parenting, a sense of community and neighborhood are mediating factors for the adoption of the code of the street and violent behavior. Moreover, hopefulness is significantly important to predict the adoption of a street code and violent behavior among youth.

Generally, the absence of guardian or traditional role model most likely leads to developing a code of the street and eventually to violent behavior. Parker and Reckdenwald (2008) examined the relationship between absences of traditional role models and violent behavior. They used a large dataset of three different resources, including the Uniform Crime Report, Census of Population and Housing 2003 and those of the Federal Adult Correctional Facilities. The sample consisted of 199 cases of 17-year-old offenders. Analysis showed the presence of the traditional male role model in urban areas could reduce the rate of violent behavior among African American youth. In disadvantaged neighborhood, it offers social control that prevents adolescents from adopting the street code. Consequently, a role model is an important figure to mediate the relationship between structural disadvantages and violent behavior. Anderson delineated two types of family—decent and street family—which can influence the development of the street code. As is mentioned above, in the street family structure the absence of a guardian figure leads to engaging with the street code. Thus, the street code and family relationship are twofold.

# *3.3.3 Code as a Strategy to Gain Safety*

In his work, Anderson argued that the adoption of the street code increases safety and prevents future victimization in distressed contexts. According to the street code, adolescents show violent behavior not only to gain respect but to deter others to prevent future victimization. Stewart et al. (2006) aimed to understand the relationship between the street code and victimization in socially disadvantaged neighborhoods. Their study used a longitudinal sample of 720, mixed gender African American adolescents from 259 neighborhoods collected through the FACHS in 1997 and 1999. Findings show that there is a positive relationship between the code of the street and victimization in high-violence neighborhoods. However, the level of violence in neighborhoods mediates the level of victimization. Findings thus negate the thesis of Anderson, which states that adoption of the code may reduce the level of victimization. Similarly, Matsuda et al. (2013) demonstrated that gang membership and adherence to a violent belief system are linked. Using a diverse sample of 2216 respondents in seven cities, the researchers attempted to understand gang membership and behavior outcome. Results showed that gang membership is significant to the adoption of a violent belief system and leads to violent behavior among youth. Matsuda et al. concluded that adoption of the code makes youth more vulnerable.

In a socially disorganized neighborhood, Richardson and Vil (2016) investigated ways in which low-income persons manage relationships with peer groups, gangs, and schoolmates to avoid victimization. This study explored the complexities of decision-making in adolescence by conducting interviews with 15 African American adolescents aged 12–16-year old in an inner-city neighborhood. Most of the adolescents kept weakened ties with street adolescents to stay safe. Moreover, some of them isolated themselves from street culture to avoid victimization. Similarly, Intravia et al. (2014) aimed to investigate the relationship between police discrimination and adoption of the street code and how characteristics of neighborhoods mediate this relationship. A longitudinal study used a sample of 963 adolescents with age ranges 10–13 and 12–15-year olds from the first and second wave (1997) of the FACHS data, respectively. This study endorsed Anderson's (1999) thesis; perceived police discrimination is a contributive factor to embracing the code of the street. Nonetheless, in neighborhoods with high levels of violence, adoption of the code of the street is well pronounced.

Taylor et al. (2010) compared attitudes towards the code of street-related violence among different contexts and groups. Their study used data of the Gang Resistance Education and Training program consisting of a racially mixed sample of 1659 males and 1666 females from multi neighborhoods in seven cities. Results show that the support/acceptance of the street code varies considerably across racial/ethnic groups and gender. Males are more committed to the street code-related violence than females. It also different across geographical sites. In large cities, youth showed more attitudinal support for street code-related violence. Nevertheless, the findings show racial and ethnical contextual differences. These findings are unclear about a correlation between the adoption of the code of the street and safety. Some studies showed that adoption of the code of street makes youths more vulnerable and others, like Anderson, proposed that the motive to adopt the code of the street was to gain safety on the streets in these neighborhoods.

# *3.3.4 Code and Identity*

Recently research on identity, culture and youth violence in inner-city neighborhoods has helped to understand how the street code influences the identity and behavior of youth. Holligan (2015) interviewed 37 young male offenders (16–18 years old) about past experiences. Narratives of the offenders depict the presence of the code of the street, articulated as by Anderson (1999), in Scotland. Historical and cultural development of the code of the street is imbued with retaliatory justice and masculinity behavior in disorganized neighborhoods. These narratives of the youths indicated that following the street code and presenting a violent image was justified to ensure survival on the street.

The way the code of the street works in an intimate relationship was studied by Barr et al. (2013). They used a sample of 218 couples from the fifth wave of the FACHS. Findings showed that street-oriented males are more dissatisfied with their intimate relationship compared to their female counterparts. Adherence to the code of the street reduces the commitment of males and females in romantic relationships. Furthermore, research tried to explore how the code of the street is embodied in the everyday life of adolescents living in inner-city communities. Kubrin (2005) analyzed the contents of 403 rap songs from 1992 to 2000 to understand music culture and identity. He argued that rap music and the street code are constitutive components of street culture inner-city neighborhoods. Analysis showed a clear relationship between the street code and rap music. The lyrics clearly portray different themes of the street code. Moreover, rap music constructs a violent social identity by referencing images of toughness and the willingness to use violence. Furthermore, the lyrics clearly describe the rule of street culture, like not "snitching" and the use of violence as a response to disrespect and as retaliation.

# **3.4 The Code of the Street as the Analytical Framework for the Empirical Analysis**

The abovementioned empirical studies show that the *code of the street* is instrumental in explaining youth violence in risky neighborhoods. These studies include the quantitative validity and generalizability of the street code in other contexts outside the USA. Various studies discussed diverse aspects of the code to understand the dynamics of youth violence. This validity and reliability allow us to use this theoretical framework to understand youth violence in three different contexts. Through careful scrutiny of the work of Anderson, nine main aspects of the code can be discerned, which are also used in the empirical section of the study in Chap. 9. The dimensions of the code are as follows:


These dimensions are interrelated and operate together in the street code. However, the causal pathways are not clear and it is questionable if causalities can be identified clearly. In this study, we seek to investigate various dimensions operating in three countries. Therefore, the themes will be used as a starting point for the analysis.

# **References**


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# **Chapter 4 Comparing Violence-Related Norms**

**Simon Howell and Steffen Zdun**

# **4.1 Introduction to the Field of Cross-Cultural Comparison**

Youth violence, violence-related norms, and the relationship between the two has received considerable attention in the literature (see, for instance, Hawkins et al. 1998: 106–146; Mercy et al. 2002: 23–56), with particular attention being paid to these concerns as they occur in urban settings (see, for instance, Dahlberg 1998: 259–272), with a broad swathe of these touching on the topics when focusing on socioeconomic exclusion and poverty (Resnick et al. 2004: 424–434), social marginalization and structural forms of isolation (Herrenkohl et al. 2000), and in terms of political disenfranchisement and powerlessness (Braga et al. 2001: 195–225). These topics are in themselves fairly extensive debates, encompassing factors ranging from economic development to problem-orientated policing (Resnick et al. 2004; Braga et al. 2001). Presenting an exhaustive list of these larger debates would have little analytical utility, and so in this chapter, we undertake a selective literature review of the most salient works and arguments as they are applicable to the central concepts and cohorts, particularly as they pertain to violence-related norms and the countries in which the empirical research was conducted. While many works make mention of how there may be forms of resemblance with other contexts or places (Farrington 1998), far fewer substantively engage with these comparisons or the reasons for their existence at the macro level (Zimring 2000), and even fewer do so, using fresh empirical data drawn from different cohorts (Osgood and Chambers 2000).

As explored in the first section of this chapter, there are of course a number of works that consider and utilize that methods and methodologies of cohorts of young people and violence (both behaviorally and conceptually) are on the whole inversely related to the distance between places or groups compared (Osgood and Chambers 2000). Perhaps one of the most significant barriers to comparative research, especially in a qualitative capacity, is the difficulty in maintaining methodological rigor while drawing on data that is often subjective and itself changing, with a variety of novel conceptual approaches having been experimented with (see, for example, Brookmeyer et al. 2006). The merits and requirements of qualitative comparative research have been debated for some time more broadly—indeed, so much so that the debate on the whole encompasses a range of fields and disciplines—and while directly applicable to this book, we here primarily focus on those works that are relevant in terms of conceptual purpose or place. As such, while a detailed engagement with the primary concerns is engaged with specifically in chapter four, the second section of this chapter provides a brief overview of this as it directly relates to comparisons of youth violence and violence-related norms. Indeed, relevance and utility are frequently central to the wider debate on qualitative forms of comparative research, derivative of the aforementioned concern with rigor and analytical focus (see, for example, Tremblay 2006). While these concerns are explored more holistically in relation to the fieldwork and analysis conducted here in chapter nine, the penultimate section of this chapter traces out the primary features and works of this ongoing debate. With these in place, finally, the chapter sharpens focus on Anderson's *The Code of Streets* (1999) and its place in the literature as both source of and tool for analysis (as seen, for instance, in Brezina et al. 2004), before the following chapter presents the text's salient features and their place in the current analysis.

# **4.2 The Need for Comparison**

Researchers from a range of disciplines in the social sciences and humanities have been interested in violence as a social issue for several years, although particular focus has been paid to the subject in the US and UK. However, while there has been a significant amount of research on urban youth violence in these and some other industrialized countries (see, for example, Blumstein 1995; Carlie 2002; Decker 1996; Decker and Weerman 2005; Hazlehurst and Hazlehurst 1998; Klein et al. 2000), comparative analyses have been limited to those countries which share broadly similar socioeconomic, political, and societal configurations (see, for instance, Brookman et al. 2011; Gunter 2008; Zdun 2008). Resultantly, analysis which seeks to compare dissimilar contexts or countries have been limited by this 'western' bias (see, for example, Junger-Tas 1996; Zimring 2000), despite many countries in the 'global South' featuring far higher levels of violence, as expressed for instance in terms of homicide rates. Moreover, such a bias in analytical focus is also visible in terms of the vast majority of analyses focusing on urban contexts, even with regards to populations living in highly developed countries or contexts (Osgood and Chambers 2000). While such studies are sorely needed in and of themselves, the possibility of further comparative analysis by which to understand the wider parameters, drivers, and perhaps even predictors of youth violence remain untapped. Moreover, such perspectives and comparative results are especially valuable to policy makers and in informing government planning at the macro level, in which such differences and dynamics must frequently be accounted for. This has two significant consequences, which principally informed the research agenda underpinning this book.

In the first instance, and as Klein (2011) notes, the lack of comparative research on violence among young people in high-risk urban neighborhoods is in general one of the primary issues related to the study of violence itself, and a principle reason for the subject remaining insufficiently addressed. This is echoed by a number of authors, from a diverse range of disciplines (see, for example, Dahlberg and Potter 2001; Dodge 2001). An implicit result of this 'bias', despite it rarely being made explicit, is that contemporary violence-related research typically engages with the related concerns in a singular manner—such as with respect to individual cities or countries—with comparative or cross-cultural studies remaining far rarer and frequently limited to quantitative overviews (Krug et al. 2002). Klein (2011) further argues that as a result of substantive comparisons, even with regards to well-developed research areas such as with regards to gangsterism (Rios and Vigil 2017), has resulted in a paucity of knowledge that is often filled by deeply embedded assumptions (Welch et al. 2002). While more limited in academic studies, such stereotypical portrayals of young people and violence find endless caricature in the wider media, film, and advertorial industries. In short, the lack of comparative analysis and data (such as with regards to longitudinal frameworks, geospatial/political comparisons, cross-cultural reviews, and methodological variances) has inevitably resulted in well-worn and hackneyed assumptions finding further proliferation, however undeliberate (Males 1996). An immediate example of this can be seen in relation to gangs and gangsterism, the majority of the depictions of which are based on idealized understandings of urban black North American gangs as they existed in the 1980s (Klein et al. 2000; Males 1996; Welch et al. 2002). Despite innumerable other configurations, forms, and types of gangs being possible, these 'non-hegemonic' forms are only now coming under sustained analytical focus (Bushman et al. 2016). Moreover, for many, neither drug trafficking nor violence itself are their principle concerns and their structures, rituals, and symbolism may be entirely different. While such assumptions remain intellectually inappropriate and politically dangerous, it is only by further studying other youth cohorts and, moreover by comparing them, that alternative understandings can be generated. Such a concern is not simply academic, as such research informs the manner in which state responses may be structured, as well as informing legislative frameworks and rehabilitation efforts (Albrecht 1991; David-Ferdon et al. 2016). Comparative studies can furthermore be plumbed for dynamic responses that are, in their very design, cognizant of diversity, and difference. Comparative research, in this guise, has for instance generated important understandings in mapping out structural inequalities in African and South American cities (Taylor 1997), and provided the basis for a number of strategic responses to high levels of violence and abuse (Polèse and Stren 2000).

Second, Klein (2011) draws attention to the need for such knowledge to be generated using comparative methodologies/methods that are rigorous and consistent. As such, the ongoing study of young people, violence, and the norms related to both cannot then be solely informed by the preceding literature, but must aim to further define and refine the body of knowledge by undertaking fresh empirical research and by drawing on research from other disciplines and perspectives (Bushman et al. 2016). Furthermore, it is primarily through comparative research, especially in understudied or new contexts, that more nuanced understandings of the underlying drivers and reasons for youth violence can emerge (Turner et al. 2016). Such comparisons are however both difficult to undertake empirically and methodologically, although recent contributions do show the importance of such efforts (see, for example, Atienzo et al. 2018). Direct comparisons of very different contexts, for instance, may result in the artificial characterization of similarities solely so as comparisons can be undertaken (Cohen et al. 2016; Morrel-Samuels et al. 2016). As a result, many qualitative comparative methods have been questioned, with several authors expressing considerable doubt over their plausibility and rigor as a whole (see, for example, Cassidy et al. 2016). While we focus more extensively on these concerns in chapter four, it is worth noting here that we do not aim to dispel such doubts but rather aim to show that accurate comparison is possible if the right conceptual tools and markers are employed (McAra and McVie 2016). Conceptually, for instance, a norm is applicable to a cohort despite their differences and thus possible to compare even if the subjects are themselves very different (Heise and Kotsadam 2015). Such a model, we argue, can be understood as a comprehensive rather than as a singular approach, and explicitly aims to engage with and understand difference as both a key generator of social phenomena and as an essential tool of analysis—rather than exclude difference, as we hope this book shows, it is difference itself that can form the basis of study.

# **4.3 Shared Methodological Concerns**

The term 'violence-related norms' is employed here in a broad sense, and as such refers to the norms, attitudes or beliefs held by an individual in relation to violence (including symbolically, ritually, behaviorally, and conceptually) as employed by a number of authors cited here and touched upon in the following chapter. We have termed this a "comprehensive" definition as it is not limited to an individual concern with behavior or normativity, although these are important facets, but also seeks to understand when an action, experience, attitude or belief is understood to *become* representative of violence (Jewkes et al. 2015; Ozaki and Otis 2017). Such a distinction is important to clarify from the outset, as the distinction may inform when, how, and why individuals may pursue specific actions or hold certain beliefs, and further provide a rationale for their decisions and give insight into how they may view and respond to those they deem a threat or enemy (Wright and Fagan 2013). Violence-related norms may, in this last format, help serve as guides to behavioral patterns or practices, and further offer avenues which can be strategically formulated in the development of critical responses to violent or destructive actions, especially insofar as individuals may justify their actions by understanding them in terms of these norms (Brookman et al. 2011; Seddig 2014; Wilkinson 2011). Gaining insights into such drivers allows, at least in the context of policing, for predictive modeling. While there remains the danger of profiling, when correctly used in a critically selfreflexive manner, such knowledge becomes a useful tool with which to further engender community safety. Considering the centrality of this concept and its extensive use throughout the book, it is then important to both acknowledge and review its own analytical heritage. While the broader literature on norms is vast, we here primarily focus on the body of work pertaining to the structuring effect of norms, their role in positionality, and their use as markers of cultural capital (Bourdieu 1980: 81–96). In following Bourdieu's thesis then, violence can act as a sociocultural marker with which to indicate and demarcate an individual's knowledge of and ability to meet implicit social distinctions, and in doing so, is empowered through the process of acquiring legitimacy. Such 'capital', while not monetary, is vital and as powerful in defining the space from which to project a legitimate identity. In contexts such as those studied, where respect is itself a potent symbol, the importance of such cultural capital is magnified. It is perhaps for this reason that violence, and acts of violence, become established as cultural norms and become embedded in the daily habitus of many young people.

Moving from a macro- to micro-oriented perspective, Foglia (1997) argues that norms prescribed through the legislative architecture of state are a primary means by which adolescents and their behaviors are understood and regulated. Indeed, in terms of deviance, such a distinction is made legally tangible by differentiating between adolescents and juveniles, the latter of which is also emboldened with various moral scripts (Ryan et al. 2013). Such structurally embedded norms also then act as the points from which various forms of disciplining surveillance may take place, and as a result, the location of pushback or dissent (Caldwell 2011). Examples abound, with more obvious examples including the use of slang terminology and language (both in response to formal language practices and as a means of preventing access to social networks), dress codes or practices, tastes in music and other forms of art, and so on. Such examples are also used to symbolize and are indicative of deeper structural norms relating to gender distinctions/expectations, class divisions, and racial disparities (Fattah and Camellia 2017; Kimani 2007). Embedded in such practices are also norms which signify more nuanced distinctions, often only visible to those who possess the requisite knowledge to engage with the in-group. Of particular importance here, and which emerged frequently in the data collected for this book, include norms related to respect, beliefs, violence, and public forms of behavior. In many instances, such distinctions were also the primary means by which social organization and hierarchy were entrenched, and individual status and reach accorded (Jewkes et al. 2015). The use of violence, in speaking to the latter, is a particularly potent means by which such authority can be expressed, especially in terms of an individual's willingness to forgo norms and employ more extreme forms. In such instances, it may be argued that violence may in itself come to constitute a form of entertainment or indeed leisure (Carlie 2002). Along with material possessions, furthermore, the spectacle of violence can itself become a means of defining both tastes and cultural capital more broadly (Dowdney 2002). Violence can then not only become a means of acquiring economic capital but a means of acquiring and indicating social capital, thus making it a potent and important tool in contexts in which either or both of these are scarce.

The use of violence, and the strategic negotiation of violence-related norms so as to empower or protect, does not operate in isolation but rather is informed and informs a multitude of embedded scripts through which the individual is constituted by, and constitutes, themselves (Kimani 2007; Jewkes et al. 2015). Gender dynamics as such are a primary concern in the literature and indeed were reflected in the fieldwork for this book, although often by negation. The feminine and women, it seems, exist in relation to masculinity as either targets or as property (Rebellon 2006). In such a guise, violence, or the strategic use of the threat of what may be considered violence, is a mechanism by which to both project a masculinized identity while also a powerful tool with which to instill obedience, as has been noted before in the South African context for example (Hatcher et al. 2014). The conscious and purposeful use of violence-related norms is however not solely limited to direction be men, and as other authors have investigated (see, for instance, Brookman et al. 2011), groups of young people whose membership is exclusively reserved for females are a feature of numerous societies and cultures, however hard they may be to access in terms of research (Chesney-Lind and Hagedorn 1999; Ness 2004). Some such groups, furthermore, will use violence as a mean of addressing gender disparities and as a weapon by which to establish themselves in relation to groups primarily constituted by men (Connell 1995). It is for this reason that some research has noted the extreme levels of violence that these female-based groups are willing to enact—by taking violence to the extreme, they construct for themselves a hypermasculinized identity with which to compete with male-dominated groups positions (see, for instance: Goffman 1977; Zaluar 2012). Such differences are visible within groups of young men too, with many using rhetoric that invokes feminine concepts in order to delegitimize and provide structure to the in-group hierarchy (Dardis et al. 2015). This is especially problematic, and has the potential for extensive harm, in societies in which violence has become more widely endemic. South Africa is here a paradigmatic example, in which violence-related norms have come to structure not only acts but relationships, the result of which is extremely high levels of sexual violence, rape, and domestic abuse. In contrast, father figures may be idolized as paradigms of imagined masculinity (Enzmann et al. 2004; Zdun 2007b), in which success is both deemed legitimate economically and in terms of longevity (Gilmore 1990).

Beyond this, Kersten (1996) points to the culturally different interpretations of masculinity and assumes that the legitimate interpretation within a given culture defines that culture's hegemonic and subordinate masculinities. In many instances such scripts are both reproduced and highlighted through the use of various symbols, motifs, and rituals, ranging widely in form from the wearing of jewelry, to tattoos, owning specific brands of clothing which are deemed fashionable, other material objects such as cars or weapons, the ability to consume a large quantity of substances such as drugs or alcohol, and so on (Dinges 2005; Dowdney 2002). It is important to note that while the material objects, acts, or symbols may vary greatly across cultural contexts, countries, and societies, the logic of their acquisition, display, and use follows a singular logic in which status is bestowed on those who are able to meet and perform the scripts associated with such objects, and those who cannot are positioned as weaker and may be subject to various forms of violence and antagonism as a result. Also, the motives for violence may be many and varied, and the construction of masculinity may be only a superficial justification for using it (Bereswill 2003). The study of masculinity is of course very advanced, and there are a number of methodological lessons that can be drawn from such analyses, as is explored in the following chapter. Such studies have also been particularly effective at informing policy and legislative prescriptions, and have resulted in more inclusive and just frameworks in a number of countries. Furthermore, and as a result, preventative and/or responsive strategies vary widely in form, focus, and purpose (as documented by DeGue et al. 2014).

The same too is often applicable to the use of age as a marker of identity, although it should be noted that this also has a material realization in that older males tend to be stronger than their younger counterparts (MacYoung 1992). Problematically, the use of violence as a symbolic marker of status may result in such individuals and groups conflicting with the legislative sphere and law-enforcement agencies around them. The need to demonstrate a willingness to engage in and perpetuate forms of violence, qua symbolic marker of status, increases the prevalence of risky forms of behavior, and ultimately the likelihood of imprisonment. This is especially concerning when prison itself becomes a marker of masculinity, of status, or as a rite of passage. In the South African context, for example, the primary prison gang has provided the symbolic narrative and markers by which the 'street' gangs are now configured. While this process has lent legitimacy to these gangs, it has also transmitted a framework in which structural violence is endemic. Age, and the status accorded to older individuals, is of course a feature of a wide number of societal and cultural configurations (Nydegger et al. 2017). It is as such important to remember that while individual acts or forms of expression by young people may seem different, often these are structured by very familiar logics that underpin the design of a society more broadly. Such deeper structural frameworks are of course also useful for analysis, and it is precisely these that this book draws attention to and compares. The use of age as a defining feature and ordering principle, and its relationship to violence and risk taking, has of course been noted widely (see, for instance, Boers et al. 2006; Bottoms 2006; Moffitt et al. 2002; Sampson and Laub 1993; Stelly and Thomas 2005). Moreover, it is important to note that even in relation to relatively simple norms, as exist around concerns with age, these are neither static nor immutable.

As has been noted previously, groups of young people are invariably heterogeneous in form, may be temporary in terms of formulation, and indeed may only exist when individuals inhabit shared spaces that are recognized by the group as the "stage" on which actions not used in other arenas become legitimate (Klein et al. 2017). Furthermore, such groups and individuals do not exist in isolation from the contexts which they inhabit, and these contexts may both shape and are reflected in the configurations that the in-group adopts. In point of fact, the empirical data collected for this book is remarkably consistent in refracting deeper concerns and structures that define the broader societies in which the work was undertaken. What may be deemed deviant or criminal behavior by these groups then may, for those undertaking them, be forms of defense against perceived or real threats. Such groups then, may not only be concerned with delinquent behavior but may actually exist as a means of resilience against systematic forms of violent exclusion or repression (Murray 2008). In certain instances, such is the power of these groups that individuals who attempt to remain beyond them may face social sanction or the threat of violence (Langa 2011), while others may also find the basis for their friendships with others under threat (Zdun 2008). As Zdun (2007a) has noted, young men who explicitly reject the violence of peer groups may either become subject to such violence, or may selectively draw on the narratives created by the group in order to defend themselves and as a form of protection. One can of course question whether such configurations are the basis for 'true' friendship, but much like the use of violence itself, such examples may be born out of necessities created by the world they inhabit. These are, in short, violent contexts and cultures which often require a culture of violence in defense (Wright and Fagan 2013).

Such "cultures of violence" have themselves been subject to interpretation and debate in the scholarly literature. Waldmann (2007), for example, provides a broader definition of the term so that it encompasses the impact that systemic forms of violence may have on the structures of a society and frames the daily behaviors and rhythms of life for those who exist amidst it (Lee et al. 2014). Using the case of Colombia, he shows how the violent acts perpetuated by resistance movements and the state military have become normalized and accepted by broader society. In so doing, such behaviors find symbolic use and acceptance, filtering into the behaviors and expectations of individuals so as to further increase the overall prevalence of violence-related acts and crimes in the society (Koepke et al. 2014). Such a conception may however lose analytical utility in the process of broadening its scope, so that the relevant actors and forms of violence are so generalized in conception that they lose the explanatory power in understanding individual actions. The result is a portrayal of society in which violence has not only become an everyday part of life, but a part of the everyday actions of individuals, a general picture of which is not particularly accurate.

An alternative, perhaps more focused, explanation of cultural violence is outlined by Stickley and Mäkinen (2005), who use the example of the former Soviet Union to explain their definition of a culture of violence. They argue that a culture of violence is one that presents a framework in which actions can be not only understood, but deemed appropriate as a form of response. Their analysis then focuses on the manner in which violence-related norms are formed, the product of violent acts becoming so frequent that they become normalized and then morally framed as an appropriate means by which individuals may respond to one another. As they note, the normalization of violence is itself often superseded by a history of state reprisals and oppression, so that state violence provides the generalized basis on which non-state violence becomes embedded and ultimately accepted as legitimate. In such instances, state violence may make illegitimate those institutions usually mandated with the legitimate use of violence, such as the police. As a result, individuals and the collective turn inwards and seek to develop their own structures by which to resolve conflict and disagreement (Zdun 2007a). The reconfiguration of such institutional structures, and the movement away from a state which through its oppression becomes seen as an enemy, may result in violence becoming the de facto tool with which to limit conflict and harm. Placed within a normative framework in which state-sanctioned violence is seen as illegitimate, non-state violence becomes legitimate if only because it is one of the only means by which individuals can negotiate confrontation.

Violence is of course not limited to solely behavioral outcomes, but may itself be entrenched within and further perpetuated by semiotic systems. In this vein, Cobb (1993) draws on examples from Chile to reveal how violence can become established as the constitutive element of state power. As such, it becomes entwined with state identity and so is further proliferated forcefully by a culture, artificially defined by the state, in order to self-reflectively legitimate its own violence. Violence thus becomes generative of further violence, in which the parameters which constitute the norms of a society may be widened and thus make legitimate ever more extreme examples. Such a culture of violence is consciously created and manipulated, and so can be both immediate and artificially designed, such as seen in examples across the world following coups or regime changes. Fortunately, such cultures are often personalitydriven by a single and very powerful leader, and once removed from a controlling position, quickly ebb away.

Williams (2001), on the other hand, defines a culture of violence as a product of acceptance of tolerance for acts which may themselves become more extreme over time. In antagonistic or unstable societies, such a culture is especially problematic as it may serve to actively increase the levels of violence amongst a population so as to destabilize and isolate a specific cohort or group—apartheid South Africa is here an immediate example. Drawing on examples of racism from North America, he shows how violent acts, such as lynching, became normalized and acceptable by being packaged and disseminated using communication channels that were already perceived as legitimate, such as the press. In such a guise, a culture of violence relies on the creation and magnification of artificial differences so as to delegitimize one cohort and legitimate the actions of another. As such, strategic rhetorical descriptions are, however, carried by channels that may otherwise be legitimate; they become portrayed as objective facts when in fact are thoroughly strategic. As in all the above other conceptions, what is important to note is that a culture of violence is a product of the positioning of specific actors and acts so as to normalize what would otherwise be seen as forms of violence, and in so doing, make such acts acceptable.

Of final importance is a cultural-based understanding of violence, as coined by Riekenberg (2003). His analysis seeks to find a midpoint between state and nonstate forms of violence. In so framing violence as epiphenomenal on community configurations, he argues that cultures of violence can become generational, the accepted outputs that may have been relevant once, which remain accepted even when the wider society may have changed. Such acts may also centrally feature in the construction of historical narratives, such as those expressed in oral histories, and imbued with legitimacy because they are framed as constitutive cultural knowledge and passed on by legitimate narrators, for example by the elderly, of such a history. Riekenberg thus raises the interesting and often neglected aspect of violence related to narratives, and the importance of symbolic metaphor and myth-making in further perpetuating norms which may allow for or encourage violence. As shall be explored, such traditions are employed by gangs and have come to form the core means by which to express a shared identity (Sutterlüty 2002).

# **4.4 Comparing the Literature on the Three Countries**

In addressing the need for more comparative studies that specifically highlight the perspectives held by young people in relation to and because of violence, our focus on the three countries can be understood thus:


A comparison of these three very different examples promises a better understanding of violence and the violence-related norms which define and make meaningful violent behaviors, rituals, symbols, and cultures. Through extensive comparison this book then aims to both compare and contrast the extant literature, and Anderson's assertions, against a far more diverse backdrop, drawing on fresh empirical data that takes seriously the dynamism of young people and their intricate relationships with the violence of their immediate surroundings. Before undertaking a more detailed comparative analysis, based on the empirical findings drawn from the three countries, it is important that a brief, albeit structural, overview of the contexts is developed. While these pictures are further developed in the following chapters, one might begin by individually noting the broad economic, political and social configurations which make each different from the other.

Recent studies show that violence-related norms are more significant and central in Germany amongst cohorts of young people who reside in and/or are from homes in the lower economic strata. As a result of their economic position, they are however more vulnerable and more likely to come into conflict with the law (Zdun 2007a). Overall, the sense of social deprivation, linguistic alienation, and pervading concern with economic insecurity are drivers of violence, whereas respect, recognition, honor, and the ability to distinguish oneself are the primary structural facilitators of young peoples' membership to groups that employ violence in a systematic manner (Klein et al. 2017; Zdun 2008). Spatial and ethnic segregation in Germany's urban areas further entrenches these differences, and may indeed act as triggers for the further sense of alienation that young people may feel and express through antisocial forms of behavior themselves justified through artificial cultural claims (Roberts 2014). While the country is still widely perceived as relatively equal in socioeconomic terms, perhaps a result of both its economic growth and significant social welfare expenditure, many young people who live or have grown up in areas economically segregated from broader urban areas are more likely to have difficulties in school—thus undermining their potential ability to join the formal economy—and are more likely to engage in delinquent behaviors so as to occupy themselves and because alternative activities by which to garner recognition may not be available to them (Zdun 2007a, 2008; Seddig 2014). Parental neglect and a lack of parental responsibility as well as the institutional failure to compensate for individual deficits with regards to child rearing have further magnified these issues, with only a relative minority overcoming these hurdles. Indeed, the international school achievement test, PISA recorded far more defined relationships between academic performance and socioeconomic background in Germany than any other OECD country (Ray and Margaret 2003), which is of particular relevance to ethnic minorities and unintegrated Germans.

South Africa is regarded as an extremely violent society, with crimes such as homicide remaining very high, despite decreasing for a time with the onset of a democratic political dispensation. For example, from April 2015 to March 2016, 18, 693 homicides were recorded in that 12-month period, with the total crimes recorded during the same period standing at 218,3001 nationally (SAPS Crime Statistics 2017). South Africa is regarded as a developing country, yet such general development masks the high levels of inequality that structure the urban areas, with 48% of people living below the poverty line in 2008 and the richest 20% of people earning approximately 70% of income (National Planning Commission 2011: 8–9). Inequality typically mirrors artificial racial differences derived by the apartheid government, having first been institutionalized during colonial rule (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999). Such differences have been structurally embedded into the fabric of the physical and social context, and have proven difficult to redress despite considerable efforts by the postapartheid dispensation (Manganyi and Du Toit 1990). Such failures have magnified the levels of antagonism towards government agencies and services, bringing individuals and communities into conflict with the law—the result of which is overcrowding in prisons and an overburdened criminal justice system (Marks et al. 2016). Violence in such a context has both historical roots and contemporary need, the result of which is not only high levels of predatory forms of crime but very high levels of interpersonal violence, such as domestic abuse and rape (Fleming et al. 2015). In terms of violence-related norms, some studies have engaged previously with the attitudes of criminals (Irish-Qhobosheane 2007; Segal et al. 2001; Zinn 2010) and in reflection of rationalizations by those who commit violence against women (Wood and Jewkes 2001). There is however a need for far more research to be undertaken in this context, although this can be limited by the difficulties associated with doing so.

The literature on violence in Pakistan primarily focuses on forms of collective and group violence in relation to ethnic, religious, and political divisions. Empirical research and statistics related to youth violence are almost nonexistent, despite the fact that Pakistan has high prevalence levels of violence and violence-related criminal acts (Haleem 2003; Lindholm 1986; Marri et al. 2006; Wilke et al. 2011). The paucity of research may on the one hand be the result of research frequently focusing on the more well-studied political violence, while on the other, may be a result of the difficulty in undertaking empirical studies. Those that have been undertaken do however show that the use of violence is rapidly becoming more acceptable, especially among younger cohorts who use it as a strategy by which to garner economic resources and power. According to Marri et al. (2006), of the total number of violent acts recorded in the city of Peshawar, some 62% were committed by the 20–39 years age group, while a similar age cohort (20–40) committed 74% of the total violence in Karachi (the largest city of Pakistan) (Chotani et al. 2002). This age group is ironically also understood to be the primary pool from which victims of violence are drawn. A study by Farooq et al. (2010) reveals that victims of violence in Rawalpindi (the adjacent city to the capital Islamabad) were primarily between the age of 16 and 45 in 77% of recorded incidents. Despite this, Pakistani society is heavily focused on familial relationships and forms of control, yet despite this, such features have become reflected in a manner which justifies the use of violence by young people (Yousaf 2014). Some research has however been completed on aspects relating to gender-based violence (see, for example, Ali et al. 2015; Aslam et al. 2015). This is primarily due to the significant levels of poverty, illiteracy and the limited opportunities for social engagement between young people, and are a major source of violence in high-risk neighborhoods (Iqbal 2008; Yousaf 2014). Rapid urbanization has further magnified these concerns (Vogel 2013). In terms of violence-related norms, there is little literature on the topic, accepting those that touch on the subject in relation to violence against women and honor killings (Amnesty International 1999), although the latter primarily occurs in rural arenas. Beyond this, there is little if any comparative empirical research on the topic.

This book primarily focuses on young men living in urban contexts. The literature on cities is in itself noteworthy and can provide a useful lens with which to view violence and violence-related norms. In some cities in Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin America, criminal–political relationships have advanced to unprecedented levels of complexity and sophistication. The rhetoric of international policy increasingly emphasizes the convergence of certain trends, both licit and illicit. In economics, globalization is seen as a force that has brought the world together, broken down borders and facilitated a much freer exchange of goods and ideas. In development sectors, the emphasis is on cultural linkages, global norms, the movement of people, and ideologies. On the negative side, however, the growing links between organized crime and terror groups are often highlighted, as one example of detrimental convergence. The interconnections and overlaps between politics, business, and criminal networks are another. These channels, these forces, both negative and positive stretch out through the countries in which they are situated, but often reach far beyond political and social boundaries, whereby large cities connect with each other in a myriad of ways.

In all cases, rebuilding linkages between citizens and the state is the only means by which the alternative governance framework can be redressed. The central message of the 2011 *World Development Report* is that "strengthening legitimate institutions and governance to provide […] security, justice, and jobs is crucial to break cycles of violence". While this message is preceded by the acknowledgement that "confronting this challenge effectively means that institutions need to change", it is still these institutions that are seen as the fundamental drivers and facilitators of any strategies. However, while possessing the structures and institutions, the *World Development Report* emphasizes that these countries and cities often do not possess the power and influence (or to put it differently "the reach") needed to effect substantive change (World Bank 2011). Not only are these societies far less rigorously structured, far more dynamic and fluid, and often still under contestation, but they are often still highly interdependent with neighboring countries, regional conflict systems, or subject to transnational forces. At the local level, all of this suggests that simply putting visible signs of "government" or straight forward provision of services into communities that are under the control of organized crime and terrorist groups will not be effective in addressing governance deficits, unless the issue of legitimacy is considered. Instead, a new framework of responses is required that will explicitly address the alternative or competing governance structures that these groups represent (Reitano and Hunter 2016). Such a framework will necessarily require data drawn from comparative research, such as presented in this book.

There is a need to shift away from either accommodating criminal interests wherever they manifest or trying to outgun them with militarized, "security first" approaches. Rather, the challenge for urban institutions will be to find ways to realistically engage in supporting communities and citizens both nationally and locally to build viable and trustworthy propositions of governance (Whaites 2015) and to provide the necessary oversight and transparency that will prevent these being subverted by illicit interests. The way that the international community supports service delivery, development, and governance, and engages in efforts to counter organized crime will need to be rethought, with a focus on genuine governance and a better understanding of how legitimacy is earned and retained. It is in this light that cities can easily be seen as fragile, and at times may seem to be unable to effectively engage with the global criminal networks operating in and undermining their stability. Such drivers do not operate in isolation, and are increasing enmeshed with and shaped by global forces, resulting in new forms of fragility both in terms of structure and identity itself. However, and as systems-based ideas frequently highlight, such environments are also vital spaces for the creation of new opportunities. Those communities that have become unstable—far from equilibrium one might say—may often seem to be teetering on the brink of disaster. However, it is precisely because of this instability that opportunities exist for quicker and more substantive reforms. Those communities that are very stable are also slow to change should a problem or concern emerge, however communities that lack this stability may become pilot sites for important projects, the effects of which can be measured more rapidly and more genuinely than in more stable environments. It is critical then that difficult situations, complex dynamics, and unstable communities are not isolated and forgotten because of the risks they present but are seen as opportunities for leadership. To make effective changes in these places is critical for city governments, but requires an understanding as to why they are unstable, and prioritizing projects aimed at championing their efforts to become safer and better places to live.

This brief review of the literature on high-risk youth, however, portrays an unsettling picture of the literature in which the study of violence-related norms has remained side-lined worldwide. There is a direct need then for the comparison of violence-related norms in different urban contexts and different social conditions, not only in preparing violence mitigation policies and systems, but also as a means of producing an analytical framework with which to understand the differences between societies and the mechanisms by which they may operate, so that they might be understood in the wider context of an increasingly interconnected world.

# **4.5 Functional Comparisons and Codes**

Violence, violence-related norms, and indeed the crime that may be generated as a result of these are not strange or alien to any society, however there remain significant differences in the forms, levels, intensity, and focal points of such phenomena, who may undertake to commit them, respond to them, and whether such actions are legitimated through the sovereignty of the state, exist in opposition to it, or indeed beyond it (Whitt 2014). In reviewing the worldwide literature, it does however seem that the in the main most violence and most street-based crimes are committed by a considerable minority of the wider population. Despite this, the fear or concern that such limited actions may cause can be felt by the whole of the society in which they occur. One need only look to the individual countries on which this study is based to note that while it is a minority of the population that is engaged in violence and violent forms of behavior, they have captivated the national media and form a staple of the daily news reporting cycle. More importantly, it is also clear that violence by these groups is driven by social alienation, economic exclusion, and political disenfranchisement, so that such actions become a violent reprisal in the quest for social recognition, power, and purpose (Zdun 2007c). Formulating new responses to such behaviors and norms cannot be the sole preserve of policing, but rather should aim to focus on institutional arrangements that can impact on and reshape such norms themselves, such as community-based interventions and responses. It is only when their histories, shared identities, and reasons are understood that such situations, all too often seen across the globe, can be prevented. The same can and should be said for gender, and the undermining of patriarchal and heteronormative structures.

To sum up, one can say that all the norms listed in this section serve the *functional, status*-*guaranteeing character* that violence has in such contexts (Rimal and Lapinski 2015). That is why those who reject these norms are themselves violent to those excluded from the in-groups (Zdun 2007a). As Miller already noted in 1958, it must be assumed that the starting point for most conflicts in such contexts are personal, but their final purpose is aimed at garnering a reputation by which to identify, and be identified, by the larger community. Felson (1987) further cements this teleological pursuit in the use of the concept of *routine activities*. He assumes that encounters between motivated perpetrators and suitable victims, in the absence of mediating or protective agents at a given time and within a given space, increases the likelihood of violence. From this, it follows that particularly people who are interested in engaging in conflict deliberately put themselves in situations and go to places where they expect their need for conflict to be satisfied, thus defining through practice the norms (Morris et al. 2015). Since these are usually likely to be locations where they meet other people who are also interested in conflict it is not surprising that many conflicts take place between like-minded members of street cultures (Kennedy and Baron 1993).

According to both explanations, it is no surprise then that a large proportion of conflicts occur with other street-based groups; this reduces the risk of attracting the attention of state law-enforcement authorities, which would impair the functionality of violence and expose those involved to the risk of being arrested and sentenced. Where the opponent and victim come from the same cohort the risk of an incident being reported to the police can be expected to be lower, because the respective reactions can be better estimated. This applies in particular because the general empirical finding that perpetrator and victim often know one another will also apply in such milieus (Atehortúa 2002; Fattah 1991). It is important to note that both the use of mimesis and the resulting mimetic rivalry, as well as the employment of strategies aimed at scapegoating rival groups or individuals, is certainly not limited to marginal deviant groups, but may indeed be the fundamental basis for western societal configurations (Girard 1986). At one level, these can be the many conflicts that occur between friends, relatives, and acquaintances. On another, it may be that the perpetrator and victim can know one another because they live in the same area, attend the same school, or belong to conflicting cliques. As well as bearing potential for conflict, such constellations also make it easier to estimate whether a particular person is suitable as an opponent or victim (Zdun 2007d). Topalli (2005) notes, however, that to naively assume that street-based youth groups would never report one another to the police nor betray one another, present such behavior in the guise of a "social-romanticizing of thieves' honor". In so presenting such groups, one may inadvertently be causing violence to the self-same groups who commit violence. Such concerns, both methodologically and with regards to methods, are now further explored and engaged within the following chapter.

# **References**


Goffman, E. (1977). The arrangement between the sexes. *Theory and Society, 4*(3), 301–331.


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# **Chapter 5 Research Design**

**Sebastian Kurtenbach and Muhammad Zaman**

# **5.1 Contextual Factors of Data Selection**

This chapter describes the data sampling and methods of the study that were used. As mentioned already in Chap. 1, risky neighborhoods in Germany, Pakistan, and South Africa were placed in the scope. In order to investigate the issue of youth violence, the research team selected a sample from those cities well known for youth violence in the three different countries. The choice of the study location was challenging due to diversity and heterogeneity of the nation-wide population. Making the choice was subjected to understanding the grounded societal and economic conditions, the welfare structure of each society, the legal conditions, and specific risky urban neighborhoods in culturally different countries. Furthermore, it was important to identify the localities within the urban metropolitan cities, which were perceived as being more violent compared to the other locations within each country. The research team wanted to investigate the street norms and its connection with the violent behavior of the young people, while keeping in view migrant populations (for instance in Germany), ethnicity, language, and economic disparity (in the case of Pakistan) and compositions of organized groups/gangs (like South Africa). Indeed, there was a pluralistic environment to compare these societies. The population was also difficult to compare with different languages and ethnic diversities in a single country (examples Pakistan and South Africa) where people had unique cultural identities within geopolitically defined boundaries and peculiar economic backgrounds and social inequalities.

The magnitude, type, and nature of violence were also expected to vary across these three countries. Germany has the lowest level of officially recorded violence. Although founded that rightwing extremism existed in Germany (Sabbagh 2005) and further that increased rightwing populism creates a social climate hostile to foreigners (Kurtenbach 2018a; Piatkowska and Hövermann 2018), this was not the case in the neighborhoods we selected. Similarly, incidents of intolerance and extremism were also reported among the migrant populations of the country. Against this background of a low level of violence in Germany as well as the low level of reported violence among youth in the German selected neighborhoods, these neighborhoods serve as a reference point—a starting point on a continuum of levels of violence—at least from a methodological point of view, to compare this with the varying situations in the other two countries. It was reported that some ethnic and religious people and places in Germany were marginalized. Ethnic minorities and migrants were excluded from mainstream society (Zdun 2007). It was also noted that the gap between the rich and poor was increasing among the German migrants and ethnic minorities, and this could be the reason that some of the young people were inclined toward deviance and violent activities or simply that they had time to spend on the street in the urban neighborhoods of Germany. They were also the victims of apathy, inclined toward delinquency due to an identity crisis, humiliation and lack of meaningful engagement, less parental interest in their children's socialization, and institutional lassitude to engage young people. All of these factors lead to the establishment of some parts of the city, which were seen to be risky urban neighborhoods in Germany.

On the other hand, Pakistan was among the countries affected by intolerance, radicalization, extremism, and terrorism. It was "ground zero" for the "war on terror." Collective violence (in terms of bomb blasts and street crime) was more common compared to violence committed by individuals. Although reported violent crimes are on the rise in Pakistan, regrettably there are no available records to distinctively classify which incidents of violence are or have been committed specifically by youth. In the field of academic research as well, only few homicide studies were conducted from the medicolegal aspects (Chotani et al. 2002; Farooq et al. 2010). Particularly, the last decade has been full of incidents of bomb blasts, killings, abduction, and street crimes, but there were scarcely any reported cases of the youth violence in Pakistan, except ethnic violence (Haleem 2003). Medicolegal studies, nevertheless, were limited to road accidents, fights, and reported every kind of homicide, without any classification or rural–urban distribution. Similarly, youth violence was not part of any of the political, social, and economic disparity debates. However, it was reported that parts of Karachi had gang violence (Layari gang war, Uzair Baloch gang and Muttahida Qaumi Movement affiliated gangs); however, they considered themselves "groups" rather than gangs. The mobility of the average citizen was even restricted in parts of the city, whereas other areas of the country did not experience any territorial control. In any case, the risky urban neighborhoods were not the focus of any of the sociological investigations or they were difficult places in which to conduct studies.

The level of the youth violence was reported to be high in South Africa. Parts of the South Africa were termed as "no go areas" for the security agencies. Gangs had territorial control and leadership of each gang was the unofficial authority of control in its territory (Mbembé and Rendall 2000). One could identify the recognized gangs in South Africa, whereas this phenomenon was almost nonexistent in the other two countries of this study (Germany and Pakistan). Although South Africa is middleto high-income country on the African continent, it nonetheless has a high rate of homicide and organized gangs. Racial inequalities were still high despite the fact that apartheid period ended in 1990s (Ballard et al. 2006). Mistrust and the colonial legacy play a dominant role in South African society. The country has variations **Table 5.1** Neighborhoods in Germany, Pakistan, and South Africa


aThis locality was quite inaccessible due to military operation in the area and the research team replaced it with the Bari Imam neighborhood of Islamabad

in language, race, and ethnicity. However, these gangs were not mixed and more divided on the racial, linguistic, or ethnic lines. Often, they were organized under the leadership of gangsters who control the territory. However, we do not know much about the non-gang-related street violence and the norms beyond it in risky South African neighborhoods, which are in the spotlight of this study. South Africa was known for its violent gangs among these three different countries, cultures, and economies.

Keeping in mind the variations among these three societies, it was observed that there were more differences between the three societies than similarities. Thus, researchers selected only places which were closest to each other in terms of economic, social, and violent conditions in order to understand the *commonalities*. It was observed that young violent people were visible in each locality in the urban neighborhoods of these three countries. Both violent and nonviolent young people were either students or they were out of school and engaged in groups, which we may term as "loose gangs" and "lose groups" in Germany and Pakistan, or formal gangs in South African context (Kynoch 2005).

We selected different cities within each country, and within them, risky neighborhoods (Table 5.1). The profiles of the neighborhoods are described in the countryspecific chapters, being Chaps. 6–8. However, we do observe a high level of variance between these neighborhoods, regarding violence and ethnic diversity, which reflects the differences at country level as well. However, all neighborhoods are hot spots of violence within their cities. Particularly, South Africa and Pakistan were important to understand variations as well as commonalities.

This study is qualitative in nature as it deals with deviancy and specific street and cultural codes (Anderson 1999; Ross 2018). Thus, the research team conducted in-depth interviews, and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with both violent and nonviolent youth and gathered expert opinions from key respondents. The FGDs were conducted in the initial phase, and the purpose was to understand the given conditions and pretest the tool for data collection. However, the adolescents were observed to be portraying themselves as descent and socially accepted individuals during formal interviews in the presence of their fellows. They were bragging about being conformists, loyal to family, and affirmative of social norms. No one from the respondents in the group setting was willing to share real insight into violencerelated norms. After two FGDs from each country, it was decided that face-to-face interviews and expert opinions were more appropriate, compared to FGDs.

# **5.2 Sampling Strategy**

The researchers faced a number of challenges to determine the exact number for the sample for this study. Initially, we decided to take not less than 30 in-depth interviews through stratified, quota but purposive sampling. Some of the respondents would be interviewed through snowball sampling, if necessary. However, the recruiting for interviews was different between the countries. In Germany, community youth centers were the places where the interviews were done, while in Pakistan and South Africa more informal ways were needed to conduct the interviews. The ages of the interview partners were between 16 and 21 years. Although it was our intention at first, it was not possible to guarantee that we would have a mixed sample that would include participants who had criminal records. Respondents did not talk openly about it before the interviews or behaved phony in front of their peers. Thus, the interviews were single interviews in a private atmosphere and thus the juveniles could talk openly about their beliefs and biography and it turned out that some more reserved youth did indeed have a heavy record, while others had never had contact with the police. Therefore, every interview begun with a clarification of the goal of the study and then small talk about school, hobbies, the Dictaphone already switched on with the knowledge of the interviewee. After such a "warm-up phase," which took between 5 and 15 min, the interview started by talking about the interview questions.

The researchers were also interested to include ethnic, linguistic, racial diversity along with their status as migrants and native respondents in order to make the data more representative and reflective of different social categories to maximize the validity and reliability of the research technique. Thus, the research team selected migrants (mainly EU countries, Turkey or of Arabic origin) from the German sample. The number of migrants in the German sample is quite high, 28 of the 30 interview partners have a so-called migration background, which means that one of their parents did not have German citizenship or were born in another country. This reflects the ethnic composition within those segregated neighborhoods in Germany, especially in migrant arrival areas (Kurtenbach 2018b).

From Pakistan, the research team selected 15 Pashtun respondents and 15 of Punjabi origin adolescents who were gathering in the risky urban neighborhoods in the three localities (Bari Imam and France Colony of Islamabad and Dhok Matkial in Rawalpindi). Although the Punjabi population proportion was higher in Pakistan (around 53%) compared to the Pashtuns (about 15%), it was in-line with the literature that indicated that both the higher reported delinquent acts and higher homicide rates were observed among this ethnic group. Additionally, the sample areas have a representative population from both Punjabi and Pashtun ethnicities. Nonetheless, the research team from Pakistan was unable to find other ethnic representations in the study areas. They were not present in the study locale, nor could they be accessed during the study period.

In South Africa, it was quite challenging to select the sample. The researchers decided to conduct the interviews from the black (20 interview partners) and from the colored population (10 interviews). It was observed that there were rare cases of the white population engaged in youth-related violence in the urban neighborhoods of South Africa, and their overall population size was also limited (Steyn and Foster 2008; Thomson 2004). However, black youths were reported to be highly inclined toward youth gangs and their population size was high (Sawyer-Kurian et al. 2009).

Also, interviews with up to 10 experts per country were conducted, to understand the local cultural and social context of the youth violence, as well as the country-specific law and order situation. For instance, police often deal with the young deviants in every country and they control the area and their role is to manage and minimize criminal and deviant acts. However, their role and dealing with young people was different in each country. The role of police to deal with and control deviant youth was dominant in Germany. This role, though, was limited in Pakistan and South Africa, where the police were perceived as an oppressive institution to control people as per its colonial legacy, and did not hold moral authority to deal with crime and violence. Street youth, in contrast to the main population, do not obey law enforcement agencies and the criminal justice institutions, as per Anderson's code of the street. Elders were considered more responsible to control and manage the daily affairs, conflict and violence in Pakistan. Only in extreme cases was the police considered an option to deal with the adolescent violence.

The research team entered into the field and established connections with the interviewees after introducing themselves formally. They briefed them about the study objectives and got their permission to conduct interviews. Gatekeepers (in the Pakistani context) assisted to build a rapport with the respondents and it eased the interview process due to the confidence instilled by this process. A number of interviews were recorded with the permission of the respondents. Meanwhile, a number of interviews were only documented based on the verbal conversations as interviewees did not permit their voices to be recorded. Particularly, five interview partners (three from a Pashtun background and two Punjabi) abandoned the interviews and refused to have their conversations recorded in Pakistan. They were reluctant and felt uncomfortable. Similar experiences were also recorded in Germany and South Africa.

# **5.3 Interview Guidelines and the Analytical Strategy**

The research team developed a comprehensive interview guideline, out of the theoretical discussion contained in Chap. 3, and which reflects the core elements of the code of the street. This included requests about daily activities of the juveniles, delinquent or peaceful actors, and involvement and engagement in violent or nonviolent acts. Also, questions about family relations and their involvement in violent acts, law enforcement agencies, and trust or trust deficit were included in the semi-structured talks if needed. Finally, questions about the perception of the neighborhoods were included. Retrospectively, the interview guideline was an appropriate instrument for the interviews and it portrayed a broader picture of the code of the street. The interview questions are included in Table 5.2.

Based on intensive debates on project workshops, the research team developed an analytical framework for the study. It is in-line with Anderson street code, and it portrays the street norms related to the young persons' violent behaviors. The purpose is to evaluate and investigate the street code in order to understand the risky neighborhood and public spheres in three countries. Therefore, the data analysis was done in two steps, through coding by using MAXQDA 18 software. First, deductive coding of the core codes, listed in Table 5.2, was made. The purpose was to compare the most important elements of the code of the street in all three countries and to evaluate this approach at the same time. Findings of this step are presented in Chap. 9. Second, inductive coding was done to figure out additional, violencerelated norms or justifications. The interviews from each country were coded in a separate MAXQDA dataset, to avoid that the findings of one country overlaid those from another or that a category was claimed through, which might not be true for more than one country. All interviews were coded by the four-eye principle, which means that a minimum of two researchers coded the material and controlled each other. This guarantees the validity of the coding. If necessary, a third researcher was asked to clarify contentious passages. Choosing this complex way of data analysis for comparison allows a cross-cultural comparison of violence-related norms and attitudes, evaluates if the code of the street is operating equally in every context. Furthermore, also additional categories were added to discuss street violence in risky neighborhoods, which are discussed more in detail in Chap. 10.

# **5.4 Ethical Concerns**

This study insisted on getting the permission of the interview partners, ensured their anonymity, confidentiality, and a careful analysis of the data. We were very conscious of the need to manage these principals of the research ethics. We got permission from the respondents to discuss the street code. A number of respondents were willing to talk about it. Similarly, some respondents declined to discuss the issue or they left and declined to complete the interview. In any case, we maintained the confidentiality of the respondents and did our best to make our respondents comfortable and protect their privacy in-line with the research ethics. Furthermore, in Germany respondents received a 20 e stipend, but in Pakistan and in South Africa we avoided to go with money into risky neighborhoods, because of safety concerns. In Pakistan, we provided food, drinks, and snacks in order to talk and discuss the issue in-line with the local cultural context. It was improper to provide money to the respondents as per local customs.


**Table 5.2** Interview questions and empirical codes

# **References**


#### References 69

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indicate if changes were made.

# **Chapter 6 Description of the German Context**

**Sebastian Kurtenbach**

Despite economic prosperity, technological advances and a strong rule of law, youth violence is becoming a public concern in German society. Although the numbers of violent crime are in decline, nevertheless over time it has been observed that violence is increasing in severity. Furthermore, it is well observed that there is an unequal geographical distribution of violence across neighborhoods. The disorganized neighborhoods are contexts with a higher probability of becoming a victim of youth violence compared to other neighborhoods. Those areas are often socially segregated and ethnically diverse. In the literature, those neighborhoods are so-called disorganized, because the local population is not able or willing to prevent the violence. Those risky neighborhoods are the spatial framework of the study. We propose that an interplay of specific dimensions of a neighborhood are useful to describe the neighborhood characteristics that we are looking for. These are:


Hereafter, the four neighborhoods are described in which the interviews were conducted. Therefore, three datasets were used. First, census data. Second, interviews with ten experts, like social workers, police officers or shop owners. Third, notes from the field diary were recorded of participant observations. Afterwards, the German sample, as well as a general description of the neighborhoods from the perception of the interviewed juveniles is presented. Last, differences between the German neighborhoods are highlighted to understand the variance within the sample before coming to the comparison in Chaps. 9 and 10.

# **6.1 Neighborhood Selection and Description in the German Context**

In Germany, four neighborhoods were selected a priori, but controlled by census data. These neighborhoods face issues regarding high poverty and low safety and for some of the migrants a dead-end in integration. The neighborhoods are located in the cities Dortmund, Duisburg, and Berlin. Dortmund and Duisburg are part of the Ruhr-Area, in the west of Germany, which is a former industrial area. With the decline of the coal and steel industry between the 1950s and 1980s, the area, as well as both cities, went through a dramatic process of economic change; from heavy industry to high-tech industry, like robotics, science, higher learning institutes, and services, like logistics. Both neighborhoods in the Ruhr-Area are classical working-class places. In Berlin, two former working-class districts were selected, but the districts are so large that smaller neighborhoods in the areas were chosen in the sampling. Also, for the description of the neighborhood, ten interviews with local experts, like politicians, shop owners or police officers were conducted. Below all three neighborhoods are described more in detail.

# *6.1.1 Dortmund-Nordstadt*

Located close to the Dortmund Main Station, with nearly 60,000 residents, the Nordstadt neighborhood is one of the largest socially segregated neighborhoods in Germany, but also the largest solid pre-World-War II neighborhoods in the Ruhr-Area. It is divided into three sub-neighborhoods, Hafen, Nordmarkt, and Borsigplatz, but the social structure of all neighborhoods differs significant from the rest of the city. The population of the neighborhood is characterized by high poverty levels, with an unemployment rate of 24.1% (data: 31 December 2015), but also a habitat for many poor immigrants from Romania and Bulgaria, who do not have access to payments of the basic welfare system. (Kurtenbach 2017) More than 27% of the population are non-Germans and this foreign population is highly mixed, but with a large Turkish and Arabic component (data: 31 December 2015). Form a classical point of view, the neighborhoods show implications of disorganization in so far as the rate of inand out-migration is high. Through a great deal of non-German signs, the ethnical diversity is reflected in the public space as well (Kurtenbach et al. 2019). The physical surroundings show a lack of investment in many real estates as well as a lack of green space in the neighborhood. Furthermore, the public space shows incivilities, but also the air is highly polluted, because the bus station for several big streets are located in the Nordstadt neighborhood. With regard to the safety dimension, the Nordstadt neighborhood shows a concentration of violent crimes, with 17.8 delicts per 1000 inhabitants (Dortmund: 5.6) in 2015.1 An interview with a police officer pointed out that Nordstadt is also an unusual environment for the police, because violent situations occur frequently, and youth violence is an ongoing issue in the area. A local shop owner pointed out that the local drug market is still a problem in the main commercial districts of the neighborhood.

# *6.1.2 Duisburg-Marxloh*

Similar to the Nordstadt, Marxloh is a former industrial neighborhood, but it is located on the fringe of the city. Even with 19,179 residents, it is smaller than Nordstadt, but the challenges are quite similar. The unemployment rate is 22.8%. However, the immigrant population is dominated by Turks and not as diverse as in the Nordstadt, but an immigration of poor migrants from Romania and Bulgaria is observable as well (Kurtenbach 2017). The domination of Turks in the non-German population is also reflected by written signs in public spaces, where Turkish is the second-oftenused language after German (Kurtenbach et al. 2019). The in- and out-migration in Marxloh is higher than the city-wide average. The public space shows clear signs of disinvestment and incivilities and also a lack of green space is observable. However, the infrastructure is good, with a well-known commercial strip, which is famous for its Turkish wedding clothes as well as restaurants.

# *6.1.3 Berlin-Neukoelln*

Neukoelln is one of the 12 districts of Berlin and with 167,206 residents as big as a suburban city. The size of the neighborhoods makes evident that much variance is located in the area, which differ from very affluent to poor neighborhoods. Based on census data, as well as two interviews with local experts, three neighborhoods were selected. The Herrmann-Street neighborhood, a gentrifying neighborhood, with a Turkish and Arabic community under pressure of the housing market; an ethnical mixed, but very poor and violent neighborhood, called White neighborhood (Weiße Siedlung), and the Sonnen Center neighborhood, with a dominant Arabic community. This neighborhood is also poor and characterized as a hot spot of youth violence. The public space in Herrmann-Street neighborhood is limited to some playgrounds, but it lies directly on the former Tempelhofer airport, which is one of the biggest public places in Europe nowadays. Also, some of the houses are renovated and mod-

<sup>1</sup>The calculation based on the police districts and statistical districts of the municipality. These two areas are differing from each other and the police district is bigger than the Nordstadt neighborhood. So, the number is overestimated.

ernized, others are old and show signs of disinvestment. Weiße Siedlung and Sonnen Center are both high-rise housing estates from the 1970s, but the Sonnen Center does not have more than five-story apartment blocks, compared to the Weiße Siedlung, where apartment blocks may have more than ten floors. Both neighborhoods show signs of disinvestment, but have several playgrounds located in the neighborhoods. Furthermore, the crime rate is high in all three neighborhoods.

# *6.1.4 Berlin-Wedding*

Wedding is part of the inner-city district, "Mitte", and has a population of 85,527 residents (Mitte: 373,944). It is located in the north of Berlin and is a classic working-class area of a capital. However, two neighborhoods were selected, based on demographics and an interview with a police officer. One is the area around the Osloer Street and the other called Lynar. Both neighborhoods are poor, ethnical diverse, with a large Turkish and Arabic community, and both have a rate of high in- and out-migration. Both neighborhoods show clear signs of disinvestment and a lack of green public space. Also, the crime rate is elevated.

# **6.2 Description of the German Sample**

As the neighborhood description showed, all areas are characterized by indicators of a risky neighborhood (Chap. 2). The description of the sample of the interview partners needs to be described next. Altogether 30 interviews were conducted in youth clubs in the neighborhoods. All interviews were taped and transcribed afterwards. The interviews had to be anonymized to protect the privacy of the interview partners. Also, the interview partners received a 20 e allowance for their time. After this process, the interviews were coded, by using MAXQDA 18, starting from the nine categories drawn in Chap. 3. Thereafter, six additional categories as well as nine subcategories emerged from the material. Furthermore, the coding followed a foureyes principle, so every interview was coded and controlled by a second person afterwards. In unclear cases, the code's passage was discussed in detail. Table 6.1 shows the list of the used codes.

Nearly all of the interviewed juveniles had a migration background and struggled with their identity, a perception of discrimination, as well as a feeling of being disadvantaged, because of the poor reputation of their neighborhood. Table 6.2 provides an overview about the distribution of the interviews over the four areas.


aFriends and family were coded together because the interview partner often mentioned friends and family in a close connection. The number has been counted only once


# **6.3 Code of the Street in Germany: A Closer Look into the Neighborhoods**

Before comparing the results in the Chap. 9, guided by the codes, a general description of the perception of violence at the neighborhood level is provided here. The intention is to describe differences and similarities at the neighborhood level, because they vary with regard to poverty, crime, and mobility. Furthermore, a better impression of the sample is possible by understanding the different frameworks.

# *6.3.1 Description of the Violence-Related Norms and Neighborhood Perceptions in Dortmund-Nordstadt*

The interview partners from Nordstadt are a diverse sample; the participants have either a German, Bulgarian, Arab, Northern African and Turkish backgrounds or a mix of these. All of them have had experiences of violent situations, often as a perpetrator. These situations often found root in situations of disrespect and caused an immediate reaction. Social control was never mentioned, but there was a strong identification with their neighborhood. Nordstadt was perceived as a source of pride on the one hand, on the other hand, it was narrated as a disadvantaged environment. Furthermore, rules on how to organize violent situations were well known and a way to cope with those situations. Like in Marxloh, those rules included one-on-one fights and the role of friends as a label of power, as well as insurance in case of serious violence. However, the level of street violence was perceived to be so strong, that is was common to have weapons, like pepper spray, a knife, or a knuckle duster on them. Also, Nordstadt was the only neighborhood in the German sample where interview partners mentioned the use of a gun in violent situations. Similar to the Marxloh neighborhood, the family was seen as a source of support as well as struggle and by offending the family, a harsh and violent reaction is viewed as being necessary. Also, police violence was reported several times in the interviews and so, the police are marked as the enemy and not responsible for protection. This is connected with a clear notion of masculinity, which is connected to the ability for self-defense. Even if some of the interview partners preferred a subcultural way of life in future, the desire for a middle-class life in another neighborhood of the city was dominant.

# *6.3.2 Description of the Violence-Related Norms and Neighborhood Perception in Duisburg-Marxloh*

Turkish participants were dominant in the sample in Marxloh, who are also a dominant group in the neighborhood. In Marxloh, the male juveniles perceive there to be a strong social control in the public spaces, especially if they are Turkish. They know that all deviant behavior will be reported to their parents by the neighbors and the parents usually become angry about the poor behavior of their children. However, rules on how to behave in public space to avoid conflict are known by all of the interview partners and all have experiences of violent situation, mostly from both perspectives—offender and victim. Two patterns were observable in situations when they became violent: perceived disrespect or the need for money. The second pattern was much rarer than the first. Disrespect leads to violence, which is in line with Andersons concept of the code, but the reaction was often more indirect. Common was the narration that people who have had an argument meet up for a fight at a place without social control and take their friends with them. Those situations followed strict rules, like the duty of one-on-one fights between the parties or that nobody will be beaten up once laying on the ground. The accompanying friends guarantee these rules, but sometimes the rules are broken and a group fight breaks out. But two other issues were important in Marxloh as well. Male juveniles suffer from the bad reputation of their neighborhood, which causes a struggle for identity, because they are framed as criminals and feel unfairly treated. Those discrimination occurs when flirting via apps, like Tinder, or the use of social media, as well as at job interviews. The other issue was the perception of police violence. The juveniles spoke about very harsh and violent policing strategies, which causes anger and adds to a sense of helplessness. The role of the family was strong, as a source of stability, but also as a unit of protection and a source of conflicts between the juveniles. If the family was insulted, especially female family members, that caused an immediate and violent reaction. Furthermore, masculinity was characterized by the ability to take care of the family and bring up children in a proper and responsible way. Plans for the future were described as a house with a garden in a calm environment.

# *6.3.3 Description of the Violence-Related Norms and Neighborhood Perception in Berlin-Neukoelln*

Interview partners from Arabic countries and Turks as well as from northern Africa were in the sample of Neukoelln. However, even though the three neighborhoods differ in social structure and the form of public space, it did not impact the perception of space, which was a polarization between familiarity and hostility. Even in the gentrifying neighborhood, violence was part of the daily experience of the juveniles. However, the only mentioned connection to gentrification in the Schiller neighborhood was that it was easier to find a job in the neighborhood, because of the new bars and shops, which are scattered between the apartment blocks. All juveniles had a clear knowledge about the organization and informal rules of violent situations, like the duty to respond violently to insults against the family, the rule of a one-on-one fight, the need for friends in the background as a sign of power and the campaign for respect. However, in Neukoelln it was common for the juveniles to tell interviewers about the use of weapons in fights, like knives, knuckle dusters or blackjacks. Nearly all of the juveniles hope to leave Neukoelln to settle down in a calm and peaceful neighborhood, which is a hint that they are familiar with middle-class values. Masculinity was two-pronged: the first was the responsibility to take care of the family; the second the ability to look after your own business, which does not only mean violent confrontations, but also to put food on the table. In comparison to the juveniles in the Ruhr-Area, the interview partners in Neukoelln talked more intensely about their families. Family members, and especially female ones, are the causes of many conflicts and need to be protected and defended in the eyes of many interview partners. Furthermore, the role of resolving conflicts between members of different families rest upon family elders and their decision is respected by all family members.

# *6.3.4 Description of the Violence-Related Norms and Neighborhood Perception in Berlin-Wedding*

Similar to Neukoelln, the interview partners came from Arabic as well as northern African countries. The neighborhood has an urban character in the eyes of the interview partners (experts as well as juveniles), which includes a wide range of opportunities, like shopping facilities, youth clubs and spots in the public space to meet up with friends. However, all of the interviewees perceived violence in the neighborhood and see it is a normal part of their life. The use of weapons is not that common in the Wedding neighborhood, as has been reported in Neukoelln. All interview partners want to leave Wedding in their biographic future, if possible, because they do not see it as a good place to bring up a family. Similar to the interviews in Neukoelln, female family members, or their perceived honor, is a cause for highly violent conflicts among male juveniles. Even in the Wedding neighborhoods, informal rules about street fighting, behavior in public spaces, and the meaning of different forms of violence were mentioned. The sense of masculinity differed and incorporated the ability to fight, as well as to be a smart man who solves problems without using violence.

# **6.4 Reflection About the German Context**

The description of the German sample shows differences between the neighborhoods, insofar that in some neighborhoods the perception of violence and other problems, like an ongoing drug market, is higher than in others. Therefore, this could impact the shape of violence-related norms at the level of violence in the neighborhoods. However, this is fodder for the analysis, because, even if these neighborhoods are the same type of social space, we need to see a broader picture of the construction of the code and must respect that neighborhoods can differ from each other.

# **References**


Stewart, E. A., Schreck, C. J., & Simons, R. L. (2006). "I Ain't Gonna Let No One Disrespect Me" does the code of the street reduce or increase violent victimization among African American adolescents? *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 43*(4), 427–458.

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# **Chapter 7 Description of the Pakistani Context**

**Muhammad Zaman**

Pakistan is the sixth largest country in the world. It has a youth population of over 55% who are below 24 years of age (Yousaf 2014). These young people are without or have nominal education, technical skills, and there are few schools, colleges, and vocational training centers. A vast majority of these youngsters are marginalized and forced to live in vulnerable conditions. Many of these adolescents are either living on the streets or off the streets (Iqbal 2008). The young population is active and they need opportunities, but these are limited or unavailable throughout the country, particularly in urban slums. This cohort of youths is victims of the youth bulge phenomenon. Some of the juveniles have generated a hate for everyone, believe in homogeneity, and are supported by their kith and kin or people of their own ethnic background. These adolescents are alienated from the state and society. Some of them reject diversity and segregate themselves into their ethnic and linguistic groups. They are vulnerable and are potential victims of violent activities.

Although crime data is scarce, the few available official records in Pakistan depict an image of declining crime rates, especially in Islamabad (Gillani et al. 2009; Jalil and Iqbal 2010). Contrarily, we know that population explosion, rapid urbanization, and limited resources have not only generated "shanty towns" but also risky and disadvantages urban neighborhoods in the country.

Urbanization is increasing in Pakistan. The urban population is 39.23% and its growth rate is 3.19% per annum (World Bank 2017). The slum population was 47% of the total urban population a decade ago (United Nations 2010). According to World Bank estimates, Pakistan has one of the highest rates of urbanization and this has occurred without proper planning and management (Arif and Hamid 2009). Rural migrants move to towns in order to seek better opportunities in education, employment, health, hygiene, and a prosperous lifestyle, but they end up settling in shanty towns, in risky urban neighborhoods and disadvantages residences of the metropolitan cities or even small cities in the country. The result is marginalization, segregation, destitution, and neglect, especially for the adolescents. The dreams of the new settlers bring about their deprivation.

*Social dimension*: The risky urban neighborhoods of Islamabad and Rawalpindi (where we collected data) are poor and youngsters are unemployed. Some of the adolescents were students; others were destitute and neglected children. Some of the juveniles were also working as child laborers (in hostels, restaurants, and workshops) gravitating to such places to spend some time and fulfill their social needs.

*Diversity dimension*: Adolescents in the risky urban neighborhoods of Islamabad and Rawalpindi are marginalized, deprived, and segregated. They are conscious of their identity and they fight for the recognition of their identity. They believe in honor and respect, although this honor and respect is more important to their family and kinship network. Still, social networking (other than with kin) is increasing due to increasing social media and Internet connectivity. Adolescents encounter diverse groups in schools and colleges. However, these social bonds are secondary and kinship is the primary bond.

*Safety dimension*: Pakistani urban neighborhoods were perceived as risky and unsafe. It was common belief that every kind of deviancy and crime was taking place on the streets of those urban neighborhoods, including, but not limited to drug addiction and trading, theft, burglary, robbery, and petty theft, such as bag snatching from females, on the streets. They were not only the perpetrators of criminal activities but also victims without a social welfare system or social safety network, family and kin were responsible for the safety and development of these adolescents. Thus, dependency on the family was an important aspect of adolescence, and similarly some of the families were engaged in deviant acts.

Initially, and in the early phase of this project, we compiled four Focus Group Discussions with adolescents between 15 and 21 years of age. We found different perspectives and gleaned some important information. However, we realized that these Focus Group Discussions were not fruitful and we were getting conformist narratives. In order to get the representative data, we decided to conduct in-depth interviews. In fact, in total, we conducted 38 in-depth interviews, but eight of them left halfway, or partway through the interview and we were unable to convince them to complete their interviews in the Pakistani urban neighborhoods. The data of these interviews was not complete and, in our view, was not sufficient. Therefore, we had to exclude these eight interviews from the data.

We conducted interviews in three neighborhoods in Pakistan: Bari Imam and France Colony F-7 in Islamabad and Dhok Matkial in Rawalpindi. As with the German data, we used three sources for the data collection. First, we searched official records for data, but official data amounted to close to nothing. The official told us that they falsely construct data in order to avoid problems with their personal Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs). To have the highest arrest rate in the police precinct, it is negative indicator of the official's performance and therefore they downsize crime statistics.

Second, a rapid appraisal of likely respondents was established through the access ladder (Neuman 2014) 1. We used influential people as well as ordinary people living

<sup>1</sup>I recognize the contribution of my Research Assistants: Rahat Shah and Asif Hayat. They were helpful in the field research and supported me in the data collection.

within the community to establish contacts. We had conversations with people who have frequent interaction with young people, including barbers, auto mechanics, and motorcycle mechanics. We also communicated with experts like taxi drivers whose services are used by adolescents. Interviews were also conducted with the shopkeepers, who were sometimes vulnerable to or collaborators in juvenile activities. Meanwhile, interviews with the police officials helped to understand the law enforcement agencies. In lieu of interviews with social workers, we interviewed the local councilor and Imam, who helped to understand the level of help given to adolescents.

We recorded the data and took notes where it was possible. However, not all interviews could be recorded and we had to rely on our memory when compiling the notes.

# **7.1 Neighborhood Selection in the Pakistani Context**

Although we did not get official records from the police or the Bureau of Statistics, we nonetheless were given some indications from the police that certain areas had high crimes rates in urban neighborhoods. These were France Colony, Bari Imam, Bhara Kahu, Khana Pull, and Tarnol in Islamabad. It was easy for the research team to conduct interviews in Bari Imam because of the close proximity to the Quaid-i-Azam University where the Pakistani research collaborator was based. We were also close to the France Colony in F-7 Sector. It was possible to reach it within a couple of minutes. It was also convenient to establish the links with the community members there.

In Rawalpindi, we had a number of areas which were earmarked as high crime areas: Dhok Matkial, Dhok Hassu, Burmi Colony, and many more areas. However, it was almost impossible to approach those areas due to ongoing military operations, called "Operation *Radul Fasad*", against radical groupings in 2016 and again later on. A detailed description is given below of these urban neighborhoods:

# *7.1.1 Bari Imam*

Bari Imam is a shrine of a local Sufi saint called Pir Sayyed Abdul Latif Shah Qalandar. The original name of the village is called Noor Pur Shahan, which is better known as Bari Imam and it is village adjacent to the important government buildings. Although the total population is not known exactly, it is between 50,0002 and 60,000. This neighborhood is just one kilometer away from the power corridors of Pakistan—the offices and houses of the President and Prime Minister of Pakistan are nearby. It is also surrounded by the Diplomatic Enclave to the South where the

<sup>2</sup>Statistics in Pakistan are always questionable and one cannot rely on them because there is no system or control to provide reliable figures. These are estimates only.

majority of countries have their embassies, and the diplomatic community resides nearby. The Quaid-i-Azam University is close to the neighborhood to the East! On Northern side, it is adjacent to the last bits of the Himalaya Mountains. It has naturally growing plants, but there is no planned greenery.

This community is poor, marginalized, and segregated, as well as stratified. It is not a planned urban neighborhood and has grown up without the proper facilities of sanitation, water supply, and adequate road infrastructure. It is one of the polluted areas and one can see the sanitation water flowing on roads and streets. Garbage can be found excessively on the streets in the Bari Imam.

It is one of the deviance-ridden places in Islamabad. This locality is the hub of the drug trade. Anybody can buy marijuana, heroin, and alcohol (which is forbidden for Muslims in Pakistan). The adolescents sniff glue—Samad Bond, petrol, and become drug addicts. Young people gather there for their enjoyment: gawping at girls, watching Sufi dancing on the shrine, and using drugs. They also gather there to play cricket, football, badminton, and snooker. It is also a center for other deviant activities like theft, bag snatching, and sexual harassment.

Bari Imam has a population of Punjabi, Pashtuns, Kashmiri, and Gilgiti origin. These communities migrated from their native areas to Islamabad for better social and economic opportunities but settled in Bari Imam. It is one of the places where a number of ethnic groups live permanently but also commute to their native villages once a month or at least on public holidays. It is also a place where people who practice Sufi Islamic traditions, traveling on Thursday and Friday, come to pay homage at the shrine of Bari Imam.

# *7.1.2 France Colony F-7 Sector*

France Colony is situated in F-7 Sector of Islamabad. It has a population of about 5000–6000 inhabitants and is surrounded by upper class areas. This colony is located in one of the richest areas of Islamabad. Nearby, the France Colony is Jinnah Super Market, which is one of the elite areas of the town. However, France Colony is a risky urban neighborhood and it is one of the poorest areas. The majority of the residents are Christian, and they have migrated from various regions of the country. Many of them are from the Punjab province, and they settled here hoping for a bright future.

These residents are poor, marginalized, ghettoized, and form their own ethnic and religious community. They have mixed houses made of mud and concrete. A canal flows between the community and the water is polluted because it is the gathering point for the effluent from other parts of town. It has a really bad smell all yearround. Nonetheless, these residents are accustomed to living near the banks of the water canal. The majority have a better lifestyle compared to what they had in their native towns. They come to this slum in search of life's dreams, but settle in miserable conditions.

These residents work as laborers, like manual workers, auto mechanics, motorcycle mechanics, sweepers, and sanitary workers. If they are well off, some of these residents have shops in the Jinnah Super Market. For Christians, the community has a Church where they arrange their community and faith festivals. The Muslims of the community have their mosques. They claim that they live peacefully together and hardly have any fights based on faith.

Drug dealing is part of the slums of Islamabad. Similarly, France Colony is a place which supplies drugs, such as marijuana, heroin, *gutka* (crushed areca nut, tobacco, catechu, paraffin wax, slaked lime, and sweet or savory flavorings), *sheesha* (water pipe with tobacco and flavors), and the glue brand, *Samad Bond* can be found. Particularly, it is one of the places that supplies alcohol in Islamabad because Christians in Pakistan are legally allowed to drink alcohol. They have permits to produce and trade alcohol, that is, where their Muslim neighbors buy alcoholic products. A number of the interview partners reported that they were providing and selling beer, wine, and their varieties to university, colleges, and even school students. They also reported that, due to their business, they also have transgression with some of their customers.

This neighborhood also reported frequent clashes with the police because of the sale of alcohol to Muslims. Even some of the police officials buy alcohol and then blackmail the alcohol providers to supply them free of cost. In the past, some of the alcohol providers resisted and they clashed with the police officials. Since the streets of this neighborhood were quite narrow, on one occasion they threw stones at the police officials, resulting in wounds and scolding. After these incidents, police officials stand guard at the entrance of this urban neighborhood but do not dare to enter into the colony.

# *7.1.3 Dhok Matkial*

Dhok Matkial is one of the most violent neighborhoods in Rawalpindi. It is situated on the Islamabad Expressway. It is one of the unplanned but densely populated areas of Rawalpindi. It has a population of over 5000 inhabitants. Dhok Matkial has one of the most diverse populations. A number of families and youngsters came from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (including Hazara), others from Gilgit-Baltistan, Punjab, and Kashmir. Afghan migrants are also part of this neighborhood.

The population of this urban neighborhood is poor and marginalized. It has potholed streets, an open sewerage system, interrupted water supply, limited gas supplies, and some of the houses are without an electricity connection. A river, which was a clean water a decade ago but is now a sewerage stream, flows between the houses, creating bad odors. Moreover, buffalos and other animals can be found there, swimming, grazing, and drinking water from the stream. This stream was full of solid waste and garbage. And yet, many juveniles gather around the stream to play, to rest and to recreate and to practice deviant activities on and around the bank of the river.

Drug addiction and drug trading were reported frequently. It was reported that marijuana, heroin, and *gutka* were used frequently in the community. It was also reported that locally unbranded alcohol, although unfit for human consumption.

This neighborhood was reported to be center for extremists. A number of extremists, hiding in the community, were captured in military and security forces operations between 2016 and 2017. Security forces declared them to be loyal to Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. They were arrested and put into prison. However, it was generally observed that even common people were feared. They were not willing to talk about the research and a number of respondents declined the request to be interviewed.

Consequently, it was difficult for the researcher to conduct extensive fieldwork here. It was also not risk-free, as a number of the families who have closed connection with extremists were residing in this neighborhood. The data of this neighborhood is limited. We were able to document only a couple of incomplete interviews.

# *7.1.4 Lyari*

Lyari is an old town—rather it was once the downtown of Karachi, which is the business hub of Pakistan. It has a population of over 600,000 inhabitants. It was supposed to be one of the richest towns of the country in 1950s, but has since slowly and steadily turned into a risky urban neighborhood. This town has a complex history of rivalry and gang wars. Two formal gangs were reported in the town: People's Aman Committee (PAC) and Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) militant wing. Lyari has bloody clashes due to the gang war of these two groups and many subgroups. The Government of Pakistan started a security operation against the gangsters in 2013, but by 2017 it was still ongoing. For the research team, it was not possible to gain access to any of the gangster groups to obtain real insight into the gang wars. Therefore, the research team was unable to collect the data from this neighborhood.

# **7.2 Description of the Pakistani Sample**

The description of the urban neighborhoods of the Pakistani sample reflected that they were risky and disadvantaged. Altogether, we have a sample of 38 interviews from these neighborhoods. However, eight respondents declined the interviews and some of the interviews consisted only of a brief conversation. Therefore, the research team decided to use only 30 interviews. Some of these interviews—those who were nondeviant were open to the idea—were tape recorded with the permission of the respondents; however, deviant interviewees declined permission to record their conversation. We transcribed all the interviews on paper. These interviews were conducted in local languages (Urdu, Punjabi, and Pashto). The names of the respondents are anonymous in order to protect their privacy. Table 7.1 shows the number of interviews per neighborhood.

In addition to being a risky neighborhood and known as a place for deviant adolescents, Bari Imam is close to the workplace of the Pakistani researcher who has developed close connections with the respondents. Therefore, we found more respondents in this neighborhood. The level and intensity of violence were obvious in the risky urban neighborhoods in Bari Imam, France Colony, and Dhok Matkial. One


can see the violence, drug sales, and frequent fights among juveniles in these urban neighborhoods. These are epicenters of such activities in Islamabad and Rawalpindi districts. The research team offered tea, or wherever it was possible, food of the local variety, to interviewees, but not money, because if we offered money it may have attracted spurious respondents who were simply after the stipend.

The deductive coding of the interviews was done in line with the street code concept. As mentioned in the previous chapter, we used MAXQDA 18 for the data coding and analysis of the data. Table 7.2 shows the frequency of the codes.

# **7.3 Code of the Street in Pakistan: An Overview of the Neighborhoods**

The Pakistani sample, drawn from the three neighborhoods, has a number of similarities and differences with each other in order to compare the street codes at the national level. They are comparable because of the somewhat similar level of neighborhood composition, available infrastructure, the level of poverty, segregation, and linguistic and ethnic compositions, all of which portrait similarities albeit with slight differences.

# *7.3.1 Description of the Violence-Related Norms and Neighborhood Perceptions in Bari Imam*

As described earlier, local *pothwari* (a dialect of the Punjabi language) and Pashtuns (from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) dominated this neighborhood, although there is also a strong representation of people of Kashmiri and Gilgit origin. There is also an Afghan settlement. Strong social control of the family is practiced by both locals as well as migrants. Therefore, it is the family that controls the behavior of juveniles in this neighborhood. These youngsters claimed that they were obedient to their parents and elders (grandparents). They know that they can gain a bad reputation if they fight with others and that they could have to face punishment from their family, but this does not deter them from engaging in fights. Thus, they are both victims and perpetrators.

Family honor and violation of respect are important reasons to fight with others. This is similar to Anderson's code of the street. However, restoring the family honor, especially if someone asks to date one of the family females or pursues her for sexual reasons, triggers juvenile violence and this is one of the biggest reasons they fight with each other or become "enemy" of each other. A group of juveniles mentioned that they form a "group" in order to save their family honor and respect. They do not allow outsiders to approach their girls and women of the family, which is violation of their norms. If these females were to be insulted, there would be an immediate reaction from the juveniles and mostly this response was violent. Frequent fights to preserve family honor and retaliate against insults of both female and male family members were mentioned.

Notwithstanding these rules, these juveniles also mentioned that they come to neighborhood streets to find a partner, not for marriage, but just for sexual gratification. The Bari Imam Shrine is a gathering place where these juveniles are able to watch girls coming in and out of the city, try to talk to them, tease them, try to befriend them, and exchange phone numbers. But if boys from other areas come there to do the same, they fight with them. They feel that Bari Imam is their territory and no one should come there to challenge their control. Despite being knowing the family rules and being fiercely protective of their own family members' honor, females from other families were "legitimate" targets for dishonoring and victimization. This behavior was reported frequently, and it was one of the prime reasons for fights. Moreover, these juveniles went outside of their neighborhoods to behave similarly there, and, on encountering the local juveniles, fight over and for girls ensue.

Friends were supposed to support each other in fights. Rather, they are obliged to fight. If they do not fight, they were considered as cowardly, disloyal, and a cheater. As penalty for not fighting for friends, such youths were excluded from their friendship group, indicating future distrust. Moreover, no other group would include the ostracized youth into their friendship group. They used mobile phones and social media to communicate with each other. However, if they are in trouble, they avoid the use of these forms of communication in order to evade the law enforcement agencies. It was mentioned that they used media for communication, watch YouTube for fun, and share the videos through WhatsApp or Facebook and Instagram.

The juveniles were afraid of the police. They did not trust the police and perceived police officials as beings corrupt, through taking bribes, and being involved in criminal activities. Therefore, they do not report any violence to the police. Rather, these juveniles try to settle their problems through the interventions of their respective elders.

The future plans of these respondents were to get an education, become employed, and build their own house. It was also mentioned that getting marriage was a prerequisite for future plans. Some of the juveniles mentioned that they wanted to gain employment and then would abandon their violent behavior. A few of them mentioned that they preferred a criminal future life. Almost all of them wanted to have a prosperous future, with education, employment, money, and a wife.

# *7.3.2 Description of the Violence-Related Norms and Neighborhood Perception in France Colony F-7 Islamabad*

As mentioned earlier, France Colony F-7 Sector Islamabad is mainly a Christian neighborhood, with inhabitants from different regions of the Punjab as well as from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Most of the youngsters were employed but these were manual and low-paid jobs. These juveniles and their families were employed in solid waste collection, waste disposal, cleanliness, and manual jobs. Some of them were unemployed and in search of jobs. They wanted to earn money and wanted to have a better livelihood. Similarly, some of the young were dissatisfied with their manual work or low-paid jobs.

Juveniles were using drugs, including marijuana, heroin, the glue brand, Samad Bond, sniffed petrol, and drank alcohol. Being Christian, these juveniles' families have permission to produce and consume alcohol as mentioned earlier. Juveniles were using this freedom to sell and transport alcohol to Muslims who drink alcohol products. Often fights were reported between the police and the juveniles over the alcohol trade and alcohol provision to police for free. They were against police and law enforcement agencies as they considered them as their enemy. Interestingly, they also reported that these young juveniles fight with each other's customers or beautiful girls who come to buy alcohol products. These juveniles also reported that they fight for respect and family honor.

# *7.3.3 Description of the Violence-Related Norms and Neighborhood Perception in Dhok Matkial*

Dhok Matkial has a similar street code to that as reported in Bari Imam. The composition of the population is heterogeneous. Majority of the population is from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Kashmir, Afghan migrants. They also have a strong population of Hazaras and Punjabi. This neighborhood was notorious for radicle and extremists. Family honor, respect, and violation of these codes were the strong reasons to fight with each other.

# **7.4 Reflection About the Pakistani Context**

The Pakistani data and the street code reflected that a broader street code exists with its contradictions. The data reflected that there are multiple dimensions to the violence. One of the main reasons for the use of violence is to restore family honor and respect. Those who wanted to manage the conflict and violence have to accept their elders' decisions. The elders of the community have a *laissez*-*faire* authority to manage the conflict. The data reflected not only the street code but also violence, violence trends, and its linkage with state institutions, like police. In addition, we found violent groups. They do not call themselves as gangs. Rather, they call it a violent group. Nonetheless, their activities were somewhat similar to gangs. They were not hard-core gangs but may be referred to as loose gangs.

# **References**


World Bank (2017). *GINI index*. Retrieved September 7, 2017, from https://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/SI.POV.GINI.

Yousaf, M. (2014). *Prospects of youth radicalization in Pakistan: Implications for U.S. policy*. Washington, D.C: The Saban Center for Middle East Policy.

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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# **Chapter 8 Description of the South African Context**

**Simon Howell**

# **8.1 Introduction to the South African Research Context**

Contemporary South Africa remains the dominant country in sub-Saharan Africa, both economically1 and politically.<sup>2</sup> Despite this, it is also one of the most socially fractured and unequal.3 Both as a function of its political history and as a result of numerous ongoing governance concerns, seemingly immaterial differences have become translated into deeply embedded structural forms of marginalization. South Africa's predilection with racial distinctions is one such example. Under the apartheid regime, five entirely artificial racial characterizations were invented in order to justify the systematic division of society, the result of which is that long after the fall of apartheid these racial distinctions are still manifest in the economic and social patterns which structure society and indeed the physical spaces of its urban areas. There remain, in short, predominantly "black" townships, "colored" ghettos, small pockets of "Indian" areas and "white" suburbs.

Before providing a descriptive account of the specific research sites and locations, it is worth situating those descriptions in the broader configurations which serve to define South African life. Perhaps most noticeably, the country is extremely diverse and the population far more heterogeneous than many others. For instance, the country has eleven official languages, a geographically representative separation of powers,<sup>4</sup> and officially recognizes numerous African royal houses and institutions.<sup>5</sup> As touched upon, while frequently lauded as an emblematic example of democratic

<sup>1</sup>As per the World Bank (2017a) GDP Ranking Scale.

<sup>2</sup>As per the World Bank Worldwide Governance (2017b) Indicators Scale.

<sup>3</sup>As per the Gini coefficient at the time of writing.

<sup>4</sup>Cape Town functions as the legislative hub and home to parliament, Tshwane (formerly known as Pretoria) acts as the primary executive center and seat of government, located in the Union Buildings, and Bloemfontein playing the role of the primary judicial center, as it is home to the highest court in the country, the Constitutional Court.

<sup>5</sup>A complete overview is provided by the South African Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs.

rule, such diversity exists in conjunction with significant disparities. The unemployment rate is estimated by the government to stubbornly persist at approximately 26%; however, independent analyses have noted that the real effective rate may be closer to 40%.6 Nearly, 17% of the population also lives below the international poverty line, with 17 million people (from a total estimated population of 56 million or approximately 30%) existing on social grants as their primary income. Such grants are themselves of very low value, with the largest awards amounting to only USD 116 per month (or USD 3.7 per day).<sup>7</sup>

As both a product of a deeply traumatic history and the failure of the post-apartheid state to capitalize on the resources with which the country is endowed, South African society is itself fragmented, often troubled, and seemingly intersected by contradiction. It is, for instance, a "nonracial", yet a racially defined society, one of the most economically unequal in the world and yet enshrines equality in the Constitution, and one in which the oppression which characterized its history continues to define the contemporary (Howell and Shearing 2017). Despite this, however, the country and society have overcome nearly a century of racial segregation, oppressive state governance, and international exclusion. While the country's history haunts its continued development, there are innumerable examples of success, of individuals and communities overcoming adversity, and of the collective efforts of many bringing about ongoing peace.

From a conceptual standpoint, the heterogeneous structure of South African society brings into question the utility and the desirability of providing very broad generalizations or abstractions, such as have often previously been used in comparative assessments of the country before (Marx 1998). Moreover, and in contrast, it would be very difficult to access and engage with representative samples from all of the different economic levels, cultural/language groups, racial/ethnic groups, and so on. As such, the data presented here and in the comparative analysis is *not* presented as emblematic or indicative of anything broader than the communities in which the field research was conducted and indeed cannot be seen as representative of the communities themselves, for they remain very diverse.

So as to encounter the diversity of the country's people, however, the South African sample for the larger study drew on interviews with young men from two communities very different in their composition, located in two cities quite distant from one another. The first, Hanover Park, is located in the city of Cape Town and was artificially created by the apartheid state to house people dislocated by the Group Areas Act of 1950. The second, Umgeni/KwaMashu, is a large "township" on the outskirts of the city of Durban, which organically emerged as a result of urban migration to the city by those seeking economic opportunities. A more detailed description of both is provided in the following section, including an overview of the economic, socioeconomic, and structural factors that shape the communities, provide a backdrop for the lives of the young men who live in them, and inform in important ways the norms

<sup>6</sup>There are frequent disparities between official estimations and others. Primarily, these occur as a result of definition, with the government not including "discouraged job seekers" (someone who has been unemployed for 6 months) as officially unemployed.

<sup>7</sup>As per the South African Government Social Security Agency.

in which violence is understood, accepted, and used by them. With this in mind, this chapter has two overarching goals.

First, it aims to provide an account of the context in which the participants interviewed for this study live, recognizing from the outset that such an account can never be complete or definitive (Robinson 2016). Rather, the account provided here seeks to highlight a selection of socio-structural features of the communities in which the interviews were conducted, so as to provide a (limited) picture of the contextual reality faced by young people in them. In so doing, it should be noted from the outset that this selective reading does *not* seek to speak *for* participants or indeed the wider communities in which they live but rather seeks to paint a picture *about* the primary conditions which are of relevance to the wider research project. Such an account is necessarily selective, and always limited by the researchers' own experiences and backgrounds—in such contexts, and despite employing a research methodology which aimed to maximize familiarity with and make as comfortable as possible the interviewees, interviewers remain "outsiders" (Padgett 2016). It is, in short, the participants themselves who are the authority on their own lives.

Second, this chapter situates the coding comparison and analysis undertaken in Chap. 9 by providing a thick description of the contextual parameters in which the violence-related norms analyzed there operate and in which, as shall be argued, they have become dominant. In short, that the specific norms are apparent in the communities under analysis is as much a function of the context in which those norms find traction as it is a product of the norms themselves—norms relating to the use of violence as a means of control would be far less apparent in an explicitly practicing nonviolent community, for example. Such contextual information is also very useful in providing a deeper comparison between the three countries which, at least superficially, may not seem very similar. In focusing on the South African example, it is perhaps history itself which has shaped the contemporary most significantly, and it is through history that the communities under analysis were predominantly shaped.

# **8.2 Political Eviction and Economic Migrancy—The History of the Communities in South Africa**

Post-apartheid South Africa remains bound to its own history in innumerable ways. Indeed, the present context is built upon the design of difference formulated in the past—so much so that it is arguably very difficult to understand the contemporary subject matter without an understanding of how this history shapes both the subject and subjects found in the data. While often most powerful in the forms and practices that constitute the minutiae of daily interactions between people, this historical legacy is most visibly reinforced in the material structure of the cities (Lemon 2016). Despite significant efforts by the government to provide housing and decent sanitation, and despite ongoing large public works programs, the imagined differences of apartheid still find material reality (Maylam 2017).


The different "races" (as defined under apartheid) invariably live together in separate communities, for instance, and despite no longer having political capital, these artificial ontological differences are mirrored economically and culturally (Strauss and Liebenberg 2014). For instance, in Cape Town, the large "township" of Khayelitsha was established on the outskirts of the formal city to house the migrant labor pool needed daily to perform menial labor, still has a racial profile in which 98.6% of inhabitants are "black", 90.5% of the community speak Xhosa, and 18.8% are unemployed. In contrast, Rondebosch was demarcated a "whites only" zone under apartheid and yet has been more integrated since apartheid as a result of it including a national university. Despite this, 62.7% of the population are classified as "white", 84.3% of the community speak English, and the area has a far lower unemployment rate of 14.3%.8 While direct comparisons are of course difficult to make, it is clear that there remain significant differences in the composition, conditions, and character of places, and these differences influence the way in which people live, understand each other, and themselves in both obvious and subtle ways. In relation to norms relating to understandings of violence, its use, and its forms, such differences continue to provide the discursive parameters in which the norms are understood. With this in mind, focus is now sharpened on the two sites from which the comparative data has been drawn. So as to provide a comparative tabulation of the number of interviews conducted per area, the interviews can be numerically summarized in Table 8.1.

# *8.2.1 Hanover Park—Cape Town*

Hanover Park is situated on the "Cape Flats", a vast portion of land developed by the apartheid state as the primary location for "colored" communities who were to be forcefully evicted from their homes should they fall within the borders of any "whites only" zone defined by the three statutes which comprised the Group Areas Act of 1950 (Hart 1988). It had previously been only sparsely inhabited, as it is a largely windswept and barren collection of semi-stable sand dunes (McEachern 1998). However, while the apartheid state would not tolerate the "mixing" of what it defined as ontologically distinct racial categories, such an assemblage required the support of a vast workforce of menial laborers, primarily undertaken by "colored" people (Jensen 1999). Thus, to prevent "mixing" but to ensure the continued supply

<sup>8</sup>Statistics drawn from the last national census.

of labor, the "Cape Flats" were developed to house "colored" communities, while areas defined as "white" were built up and individuals of any other racial group physically removed by force from their homes. These forced evictions were violent and traumatic, and in some instances resulted in the physical structures of entire communities being bulldozed and destroyed. In one instance, that land still remains barren.

The spatial areas of the communities—such as the infamous District Six—that were bulldozed by the apartheid state were not only physically broken apart, but in the process, the social structures and ties which provided individuals both with invaluable support in the face of daily oppression and an identity were also destroyed (McEachern 1998). Moreover, existing networks of familial and social relationships that had structured and provided meaning in many people's lives were torn apart as individuals were haphazardly and often randomly relocated. Such processes negatively affected young people in particular, who could no longer draw on extended kin networks, familial matrices, and were no longer subject to informal disciplinary structures that had both provided support and a means of controlling behavior (Pinnock 2016). There were, for example, instances of gangsterism, drug use, and violent crime even in those original communities, but young men were also subject to the oversight of the community as a whole, and these groups were comparatively benign compared to the contemporary gangs found on the "Cape Flats" (Du Toit 2014).

Indeed, it is difficult to speak of young "colored" men in South Africa without mentioning gangsterism. The rise of gangsterism can, however, be directly correlated historically to the forced removals of the 1950s, and the destruction of numerous communities in Cape Town (Standing 2003). The result was a population of bored, disenfranchised youngsters whose sense of identity and community had been undermined, who spent time in groups with limited supervision, and who were faced with the violence of apartheid, poverty, unemployment, and the knowledge that their life prospects were extremely limited. Almost instantly shorn of family and friends, and with these structures no longer in place, many young people attempted to create a new sense of identity and belonging by forming small groups and associations. The net economic effect of dislocation, moreover, resulted in the production, distribution, and use of drugs arose as a key source of income, of activity, and of socialization (Chetty 2015). Levels of drug use and addiction soared. So too did levels of crime, as the youth groups came into competition for profits. Territory became economically important, resulting in spiraling turf warfare. The cyclical nature of this violence, driven by the apartheid state, further tore apart the communities, which further encouraged more violence.

While the history of the "Cape Flats" is not a moral or normative justification for the continued prevalence of gangs and illegal drugs in these communities, it is a necessary explanation. It is in the volatile aftermath of forced removals that the gangs of today emerged and gained power and allegiance. It is also here that the use of drugs became prevalent. The contemporary problems faced by these communities are embedded in their very structure and ontology. This may help explain why symptomatic responses by the police and state have been ineffective. Drugs and gangs provide, however, problematic, meaning, and reprieve in communities forged by state violence and exclusion.

Focusing specifically on Hanover Park, the community is relatively small, covering only approximately 2 km2, and has an approximate population of 35, 000 people. Of these, census data indicates that some 96.5% are classified as "colored", with 70.8% of the population speaking Afrikaans. Unemployment levels are approximately 13%, however, some 45.5% of households are headed by women, an especially important concern in relation to young men and violence. Of further importance to this cohort, data indicates that 57.8% of inhabitants have never been married, and only 25% of the community has graduated from secondary schooling—attendant to this, some 60.5% of residents do not have access to the internet, and only a third of households have access to a computer.<sup>9</sup> The community is serviced by one primary school, and one secondary school, although students may attend schools outside of the immediate borders of Hanover Park, as the area falls within the larger municipal demarcation of Athlone.

In terms of structural design and position, Hanover Park is 18.5 km from the city center of Cape Town. The primary housing units are one- or two-bedroom apartments, which collectively make up low-rise apartment blocks. Built in parallel these buildings form long cement corridors, initially designated as communal areas, but have since become the primary conduits for people moving between buildings. Because of their design, furthermore, they contribute to the high number of bystander deaths from gunshot wounds, as the bullets ricochet down these brick corridors. There is one sports ground, which is not maintained, and no functional parks or play areas. The young men interviewed, primarily reported spending their free time "on the streets," as there is no functional youth clubs, sports teams, or collective forms of organized entertainment available to them (other than, of course, the gangs themselves). There is no accurate data on religious groupings; however, there is one mosque and two small churches in Hanover Park. While contemporary crime statistics and concerns in relation to youth violence will be explored below, it is noteworthy that few of the streets are adequately lit at night, and the area is classed as a "red zone" in terms of emergency response—ambulance crews will not attend emergencies in the area unless accompanied by an armed police escort, which often delays response times.<sup>10</sup> At the time of writing, the dominant gangs who claim territory in the community are the Mongrels, Hard Livings, and Sexy Boys.

# *8.2.2 Umgeni/KwaMashu—Durban*

The second site, KwaMashu (the residential zone attached to Umgeni), is located in the city of Durban on the east coast of the country, some 1,600 km from Cape Town

<sup>9</sup>Statistics drawn from the last national census.

<sup>10</sup>See, for example, https://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/police-escort-for-medics-in-redzones-7594245

by road. Durban has traditionally played the role of one of the primary shipping ports for the country, and the closest port to the industrial heartland of Johannesburg (Maylam and Edwards 1996). Both as a result of historical development and economic necessity, moreover, it has developed in a relatively more inclusive fashion in comparison with Cape Town, displaying a more typical social configuration in which many of the poorer residential areas are nearer the city center so as to expedite labor utility. The "whites only" zones, such as Kloof and Berea, are located further away from the city and form part of a wider commuter belt (Turok 2014).

KwaMashu is as such a medium-sized "township", constituted by many thousands of informal dwellings or "shacks", with few sanitation services, tarred roads, recreation areas, or facilities. South African townships are often characterized by numerous public health and safety issues, derivative of the informal housing structures, population density, and lack of government services (Bobat et al 1998). Disease and infection rates of TB, cholera, and HIV/AIDS levels are consistently higher than in other urban settings. The majority of dwellings do not have formal access to electricity, resulting in frequent injury or death resulting from the use of illegal electricity connections or periodic fires that spread rapidly among the closely built shelters, usually caused by these connections or from the use of paraffin gas lamps/stoves that are used because the fuel source remains relatively cheap (Jürgens et al 2013).

The maintenance of law and order is difficult in "townships", as the pathways between buildings are too narrow for vehicles to pass through, are rarely accurately mapped, and even in instances where they are, frequently change as buildings are erected and destroyed. The narrow walkways and lack of street lighting make escape from detention easy for individuals who commit crime, and the darkness of these conduits lend themselves to the commitment of opportunistic crime. In an attempt to overcome some of these concerns, the apartheid government installed overhead spotlighting on very high masts; however, the shadows cast by the overhead lighting is as problematic as the lack of street-level lighting in terms of aiding criminal activity. KwaMashu further typifies the population statistics found in "townships" across the country, with 98.8% of the resident population defined as "black", 91.3% of the population is Zulu speaking, 77.5% of individuals never having been married, only some 40.7% have graduated from secondary school, and 67.8% have no access to the internet. In terms of socioeconomic statistics, 25.2% of the community is unemployed, and 38% of households are headed by females, with only 9.6% of households having access to a computer.<sup>11</sup>

As such, the low risks associated with criminal activity and the lack of formal employment contribute to very high levels of crime, which will be discussed in the following section. Illegal drug use prevalence is very high, and distributors become powerful as a result of income derivative of this. Indeed, distributors employ numerous marketing strategies, both to encourage loyalty and to increase sales. Users' primary sources of income include collecting cardboard or glass for recycling, the offering of unskilled services, begging, petty crime, transactional sex, and selling illegal substances. The illicit drug economy is dynamic, profit-driven, and yet also

<sup>11</sup>Statistics drawn from the last national census.


aFriends and family were coded together, because the interview partner often mentioned friends and family in a close connection. The number has been counted only once

regulated by market forces—it displays numerous similarities with the regulatory mechanisms that shape the formal economy (Howell et al. 2015). Users are active participants in this economy. Ironically, however, in terms of government-led developmental initiatives, KwaMashu has received far more resources and attention, and plays hosts to one of the largest government housing projects in the country. While many houses have been built, the community has not developed or been developed and remains an extremely impoverished, dangerous, and fragmented place.

In this context, young people have few opportunities, are often subject to violent crime, and may live in extremely impoverished households that lack the resources to provide an adequate developmental environment. With few resources and only a small number developing their skills and interests, the benefits of education are often reported as very distant (Adebayo 2016). The lack of legitimate sporting and cultural organizations further compounds the attractiveness of criminal enterprises, the use of illegal drugs, and the high consumption levels of alcohol. Violence, beyond the auspices of legitimate state enterprises, becomes the de facto tool by which to both defend oneself and define an identity, with its symbolic use becoming an important means by which to further bolster social position, access to resources, and a more comfortable life (ibid). As we show below and in the following chapter, the numeric overview of violence and violence-related concerns is reflected in the attitudes, beliefs, and understandings of the young men that were interviewed for this project.

As in the other countries, all interviews were transcribed and coded with MAXQDA 18. Table 8.2 shows the frequency of coding in the South African sample.

# **8.3 Contemporary Context, Criminality, and Youth Violence in South Africa**

The transformation of South Africa from apartheid to a constitutional democracy was once commonly referred to as a "miracle" or "dream". Such characterizations have become increasingly ironic (Alloggio and Thomas 2013), and the dissonance has grown between the promises of the Constitution and the lived realities of many of the country's residents (Murray 2013). The "new" South African government has yet to fundamentally correct the political, economic, and societal injustices that defined the apartheid system (Ibid). Substantive freedoms, rights, and dignity remain inaccessible to many, especially those who still live in overcrowded, poorly serviced "townships" or urban slums. For these, the "dream" of democracy has largely been deferred (Howell and Shearing 2017).

A paradigmatic example of the failure of sustainable development, development without ownership, can be drawn from the country. With the fall of apartheid, housing was identified as one of the critical developmental needs by the national government. As such, the government undertook many massive public works projects, building over 1.1 million small houses in the country, many of which were not only constructed in urban areas, but became urban areas in their own right. A study in 2000 found, however, that only 30% complied with building regulations, and they were planned and built using designs that were very similar to those used by the apartheid regime, and when built were often not connected to basic services such as water and electricity. As the result of nontransparent outsourcing processes—known as "tendering" in the country—the government wasted many millions of Rands on the projects, the housing estates that were created were not in tune with the needs of the communities, and many have now fallen into disrepair. Indeed, many of the urban areas that were either extended or created by these projects now have high crime levels, high disease prevalence levels, high unemployment, and are victim to entrenched criminal networks. Rather than initiate development, many are now extremely dangerous and impoverished areas that further undermine the development of surrounding districts. In retrospect, the project's failure was not only the result of a lack of research, local knowledge, and oversight. The project's failure is also a failure of understanding— houses were built, many thousands at a time in some cases, but few communities developed. While houses were built, parks, community centers, infrastructural and transport services, places of worship, and police stations were not. The houses were often provided in a haphazard fashion, and the people who were moved into them were taken from other areas of the country, who knew nothing of the local dynamics or environments in which they were asked to live. As such, this example illustrates the central rule above—the development of communities, and not merely places of residence, requires that local knowledge inform the processes and that community members take ownership of the projects.

It is in these communities that gangsterism and drug use are most prolific. Here, the state has been unable to provide the legitimate points of contact and services with which many disenfranchised youths might identify. The education system fails to provide a viable entrance to the legitimate economy and social support is vastly unequal to the demand for its services. Claims of "liberation" and "democracy" ring hollow in the face of endemic poverty and ongoing structural exclusion. In Mitchell's Plain and Hanover Park, drug abuse and addiction, especially to "tik" (methamphetamine), have become rampant (Kapp 2008). The gangs and "tik" are intricately enmeshed—the drug's production and distribution are a primary income source for the gangs, while the use thereof plays a role in increasing and maintaining allegiance (especially with regard to the very young). Children as young as nine have been targeted by the gangs as future members, with "tik" playing a prominent role in this recruitment process. Moreover, its distribution contributes to turf wars over economically viable territories.

# **8.4 Comparative Considerations and Concerns for the South African Context**

A principle variant between the study sites—South Africa, Pakistan, and Germany—is that of language. Such variations exist not only between the country sites (inter-variation) but also within the study sites (intra-variation). While language is of course also a means of communication, expression, and the structure by which thoughts are narrated, it should be remembered that it is far more than an assemblage of signifiers. Each signifier is, fundamentally, an interpretation of the signified and therefore language has as variation a constitutive feature of its own structure. That the translation of the signified into that of signifier requires an act of interpretation necessarily embeds variation into the structure of language use itself. Such variations are of course quite obviously spoken to when one is "lost in interpretation"; however, such variation is far more impactful than this—if language is a primary means by which reality is articulated, then variations in the interpretations of the signifiers will present variations in the signified. In other words, if we all understand what each word means in slightly different ways, the things we associate with these words will all be understood a little differently. Drawing on a familiar European example, despite there being only one Statue of Liberty, American and French understandings—not to mention perceptions—of this physical object, encapsulated and inferred when the signifier is uttered, will often be quite different.

Such considerations are especially important in the South African context. In the first instance, this is because the country has eleven official languages. Second, these languages may both in form and function be quite different from one another. South African English and Afrikaans have as their roots West Germanic origins, for example, while there are three primary branches of the Bantu language tree represented in the country. The Sotho–Tswana group (comprising Sesotho, Northern Sotho, and Tswana) is primarily spoken in the north of the country, the Nguni branch (comprising of Zulu, Xhosa, Swazi, and Ndebele) primarily spoken in the east and south of the country, and the Tswa–Ronga group (comprising only Tsonga) spoken in the central regions. While dialects of these languages may find resonance with one another, they do contribute to a heterogeneous society, the result of which is that members of the different linguistic groups share quite different cosmologies. As a result (and in terms of the study), understandings of events, processes, and narratives can vary greatly, and these local differences need to be understood as far as possible from the perspective of the participants themselves. An immediate example that is of direct relevance to the study is that of the concept of an expert—*who* an expert is, *how* they should conduct themselves, and *what* social markers they should bear can differ between Afrikaans speakers and Zulu speakers, the former presupposing that an expert is defined by the formal context and by the markers of office that they may display, while the latter define an expert in relation to their tribal position, knowledge of customary law, and formal position in the tribal hierarchy.

Derivative of the above, another important consideration is that the majority of South African citizens are dual- or multilingual and that the assemblage of official languages is colloquially drawn upon in innumerable ways to create hybrid languages that may be unrecognizable to those outside of the local cohort. Three relevant examples of this are "Tsotsi taal"—a hybrid language primarily used by members of African gangs—the three dialects of the Number—the verb of which is to "sabela"—and Funagalo—a hybrid dialect first spoken by miners in order to communicate with one another in the workplace, but now spoken more broadly. These are unwritten languages, and passed to others only through verbal communication. There are no complete dictionaries for them, and they may change quite significantly between different groups of local speakers. However, they do contribute significantly to speakers' understandings of the world and their place in it, and therefore the variances must be taken seriously in understanding how they construct and position different norms in relation to violence.

# **8.5 Reflection About the South African Context**

As has been shown in numerous, diverse fields, there is an increasing dissonance between the promises of the extremely inclusive Constitution and the lived realities of many of the country's citizens (Murray 2013). This dissonance is felt in a number of ways—the continuing (and indeed, increasing) income disparities between different groups and citizens, the increasing differences in how the state interacts with diverse citizens, and the continuing political disenfranchisement of numerous groups in the country, to name but three. While many of these problems have their roots in apartheid, the "new" South African government has increasingly shown itself unable to initiate and sustain substantive changes to the political, economic, and societal differences that defined the apartheid system (Alloggio and Thomas 2013). Substantive freedom, a right to dignity, and a right to the freedom of movement are not possible if one is unemployed and living in what the international community classifies as "extreme poverty." Thus, while the "dream" of democracy was heralded by the numerous procedural changes which structurally delineated the "new" South Africa from the old, for an increasing number of the country's citizens, who still live in overcrowded, poorly serviced "townships" or urban slums, there has been little substantive change. Indeed, with reference to the "dream" of democracy, Sharlene Swartz has argued that for many of South Africa's youth, it is now a "dream deferred" (Swartz et al. 2013).

Finally, before engaging with the data, a brief but important note of caution should be added. The use of statistical and numeric data, especially when encompassing entities as large as cities, often has the effect of decontextualizing the lives of the people that make up those numbers. While the concept of development can be articulated through many lenses—economic growth, education rates, and access to healthcare, for instance—these data can never be divorced from an important albeit often implicit normative concept, that of betterment. In the process of quantifying human life, it should never be forgotten that developmental policy frameworks, strategies, and toolkits should always be attentive to the manner in which they describe and understand the people they are intended to help. Simply pathologizing entire communities as "victims" or, with regard to security concerns, "innately" criminal, belies the complexity of the lives that make up these systems. Moreover, that policy or strategy may produce positive numeric indicators may not necessarily translate into the improvement of resident's environments in real terms. In short, to do justice to the normative impulses informing the concept of development requires that the complexity of the relationships and interactions that define peoples' lives are taken seriously. To not do so is to not only prioritize the politics of development over the betterment of lives but to reduce individuals to mere points for measurement. Forethought, care, and attention, above all else, is required for development to be reflected in substantive changes in individuals' lives, rather than simply procedural changes to the statistical models used in their quantification. Such development, as articulated by the participants themselves, will be discussed in the comparative chapter.

# **References**


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# **Chapter 9 Cross-Cultural Comparison of the Code of the Street**

**Simon Howell, Sebastian Kurtenbach, Abdul Rauf, Muhammad Zaman and Steffen Zdun**

# **9.1 Introduction into the Discussion About Findings of the Cross-Cultural Comparison**

The core of the study is the cross-cultural comparison of youth violence, guided by the theoretical framework of the code of the street. As the reports of the single countries showed, the level of violence differs significantly among the cases. It is questionable if the code operates in a general way, as Anderson claims. However, it is not our purpose to reject the concept of the code, but to determine if it is a global concept, or limited more to a specific kind of neighborhood in the US, or that only a few elements are applicable at the global level, and if so, what to consider for developing a more general approach. Therefore, we compare our data only regarding the core dimension of the code of the street. Similarities and dissimilarities are uncovered and analyzed through the results per code element and country. This is the empirical heart of the entire study.

The analysis is based on a close reading of the book *Code of the Street* by Anderson (1999). The core elements of the street code have been extracted from the book, these being: neighborhood perception, street wisdom, respect, enemy, toughness/masculinity, interpretation of symbols, friends, and perception of violence. Once isolated, we translated these elements into guidelines for interviews with male juveniles between 16 and 21 years and conducted 30 qualitative interviews in risky neighborhoods in each of the three comparative countries, being, Germany, South Africa, and Pakistan. Analysis of these interviews enabled us to compare the core elements of the code of the street in these disparate countries.

# **9.2 Comparison of the Core Elements of the Code of the Street**

To facilitate this, first, we aim to compare the data from the three countries with the original codes as suggested by Anderson himself and deconstructed in Chap. 3. Our intention is not to disprove or criticize these elements, but rather to explore whether they have applicability—and if so, to what extent—in contexts that are both geographically, demographically, and socioeconomically very different to those of Anderson's original study. Derivative of this, second, we also compare the data sets deduced from each of the three countries with one another, to highlight the similarities and differences that were found. By contextually embedding these data using the structure of the original elements of the street code, we critically engage with the literature and with the data to posit how the different violence-related norms have gained currency and legitimacy in the three contexts under focus. With this in mind, this chapter is primarily structured using the codes themselves, with each country's data then presented under each code, before a comparative analysis is extracted from these.

The analysis is structured in three parts. The first analyses the perception of the spatial framework. Therefore, the element "Social Space/Neighborhood" is discussed in detail. The second step is the analysis of the moderating elements, street wisdom, interpretation of symbols, toughness/masculinity, friends, enemy, and respect. The third section places the outcome of the street code, being the element "perception of violence" directly under the spotlight.

# **9.3 Perception of Risky Neighborhoods**

# *9.3.1 Comparison of Social Space/Neighborhoods*

In all the sites, the perception of the neighborhood in which the participants were living was a dominant theme that quickly emerged from the interviews. Such perceptions were understood internally and externally—the former a perception of *who* individuals were by virtue of being residents in a particular area, the latter relating to the perceptions the interviewees thought outsiders had of them as a result of being residents of these areas. For instance, the young men mentioned that the image of neighborhoods is represented in the media, including newspaper and social media, as well as colloquially as "risky neighborhoods." Such perceptions both stigmatized residents and undermined their ability to engage with the larger socioeconomic dimensions of the city—such stigma, for instance, could prevent them from being considered for an employment opportunity simply because of the area in which they resided. In a similar fashion, Anderson (1999: 161) cited the findings of Sherman et al. (1989) that people from "bad" neighborhoods tend to mix socially with others from equally "bad" places. Talking about the stigmas attached to them by outsiders, the young men *mentioned* that they had to face discrimination outside their neighborhoods simply because of where they lived. The findings of the study revealed that neighborhood processes influence the beliefs and perceptions of adolescents. In the interviews, the respondents reported many neighborhood processes, including for instance, unlawfulness and delinquency in areas they live. Interestingly, regardless of the high crime rates and the media's perceptions and images, young men have expressed a feeling of belonging to their neighborhoods, and in contrast that outsiders and the media paint a negative image of the neighborhoods. Respondents from Germany repeatedly acknowledged the ethnic diversity in their neighborhoods. Although, some respondents mentioned "other" ethnic groups involved in crime and drug dealing in the neighborhoods.

#### *Germany*

One common theme about neighborhoods is narrations of social cohesion and personal affiliation, built *and* articulated from a position that fundamentally invokes the space in which they live as a symbolic metaphor for the social position from which they speak.

We are well educated. Well, [you] see here everyone, we are Turkish, Arabs, let say Bulgarians, Gypsies, we live together here. […] We don't have money, we try to earn money by working. […] I would never move from here. (Duisburg-Marxloh 5)

In Neukoelln Kreuzberg I have a lot of friends with whom I am good. Mostly, I don't have good relations with guys from outside [of Neukoelln]. (Berlin-Neukoelln 1)

The definitional borders of such symbolic and physical spaces are the product of the active construction by participants, both through discursive and physical actions. Through the use of personal pronouns, the participants include other people from their neighborhood as part of the collective. However, this behavior excludes other groups, thus cementing the boundaries between the two. For instance, "new" immigrant groups were excluded thus:

(Now) there are Arabs who say, ah, I am ashamed of the Arabs. […] For me they are gypsy Lebanese. They are filthy, they do criminal acts, there are good and bad Lebanese like good Albanians and bad Albanians. (Duisburg-Marxloh 6)

[…] and now Bulgarian and Romanian are also in here. For example, they broke into our garden and stole some stuff. So, there is a corner full of these people where the streets stink of urine. […] For me it's ok but I can imagine, I would never go there as woman or someone […] without confidence. (Duisburg-Marxloh 9)

The danger of the neighborhood may thus be tangible, in that it may have very high levels of violent crime, however, the respondents also used the neighborhood's symbolic reputation as a means of augmenting their own individual identities. Personal protection through the carrying of weapons was, for instance, thus a physical requirement, but also itself a symbol of identity. Thus, being "street wise" and knowing which areas to avoid at what time is used to forestall confrontations (Anderson 1990). With specific reference to weapons in the German sample, it should, however, be noted that while many of the respondents carried weapons, none had actually used them and even admitted to not having a more detailed knowledge of how to. As such, weapons are more a foil for an external show of force, which should provide safety under the spatial circumstances of disorder. Moreover, although crime is partly perceived as rather widespread in the neighborhood, "established" juveniles are not afraid of others due to their own reputation or that of relatives/friends (i.e., they are known).

When you know somebody or when you made you a name yourself. […] When the people know you, nobody attacks you. (Duisburg-Marxloh 3)

In my case they all know me here in Wedding. […] They know my brothers and they respect my brothers. That's why they don't do anything to me. (Berlin-Wedding 4)

Meanwhile, others claim that their neighborhoods are in general rather safe or at least not more dangerous than less notorious neighborhoods in other cities.

I find they all exaggerate it. Because, as I said what happens in Marxloh, happens in Duesseldorf and Oberhausen, happens everywhere. […] I think, I stay with my opinion that all people that are not from Marxloh speak bad about my district. My opinion. […] For instance, once I was interviewed by RTL [TV channel]. They told me to speak about Marxloh. They were shocked as I said only positive things, so that they even didn't transmit it. […] My mother can go out at three o'clock in the night, well three o'clock in the morning, and nothing would happen to her, because everyone knows everyone. […] Well, I am honest, I have never heard a rape here. That's really the worst thing for me. Rape is the worst. […] I can only talk really positively about my city. (Duisburg-Marxloh 7)

However, not all youths deal in such a solemn way with external prejudice. They are aware of the negative image of their neighborhood and thus avoid mentioning their residence to outsiders and/perceive their own marginalization and stigmatization in particularly pertinent ways, both of which serve to reinforce the physical and normative isolation that the participants may feel in the city at large.

For instance, when I chat with her, I don't tell that [I am from Marxloh], because the other girls are afraid of coming here. Girls are scared to come here. They are scared to enter Marxloh. They think all people from Marxloh are criminal. (Duisburg-Marxloh 1)

Altogether, there are two approaches of living in a risky neighborhood. One is a rather stoic affirmation of positive aspects and of having found a way of coping with problems. Others are fed up with the local situation and just want to leave.

I grew up here and I would not recommend to [live] here. Well, Neukoelln is also beautiful but for me I would not be here with my future family. (Berlin-Neukoelln 4)

Neukoelln is shit, yes. I'd like to get out of here if I could. So, I was just, until my siblings have everything, their degrees. Then I would like to get out of Neukoelln and [move] to a quiet area. Also, you see yourself, only burglaries and this and that. I am concerned about my siblings. (Berlin-Neukoelln 7)

I said to my mother, we should move certainly move out from here, because we cannot bring up my siblings like this. […] I was bringing my little brother home from kindergarten, then I have seen a woman injecting heroin. […] In such an environment, it is scum here. […] That is why we must leave by all means. (Dortmund-Nordstadt 7)

#### *Pakistan*

The data of the Pakistani neighborhoods is limited to two cities, Islamabad and Rawalpindi, as mentioned in Chap. 7. Both cities and their neighborhoods are emblematic of the way in which they reflect the composition of both cities' physical and ethnoreligious composition. These neighborhoods are perceived as marginalized, vulnerable, of primarily housing people of low socioeconomic background and with significant levels of social and ethnic diversity. They are also perceived as criminal areas, illegal drugs' markets and with low or limited social and economic engagement. Like Anderson's *Code of the Street*, these areas are also perceived as a place where everyone can buy drugs like cannabis, heroin, and alcohol and they are understood to be easily purchasable. Some of the respondents reported that these neighborhoods are the center of every kind of deviancy. Interestingly, the interviewees felt alienated from this neighborhood, which is different from the German data in which our subjects felt a sense of belonging. When the one interview partner was asked a question about his neighborhood, he replied:

I tell you the truth, I personally don't like this place, because here you will confront with every illegal activity, from use of drugs and wine to sexual harassment of girls and especially transgender. Youngsters here of my age, do not go to school neither do they do any job, spend the whole day in these activities. Following girls in the street, spending the whole day while talking to their girlfriends on phone, use of drugs [remark: cigarette and marijuana] is also very much common among these guys. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 28)

This was not the only respondent who perceived these neighborhoods as risky and marginalized. Another respondent has also a somewhat similar understanding of his neighborhood. For him, deviancy and violence are an integral component of these neighborhoods. He also mentioned ethnic diversity and words for his friends:

Some of my friends are very violent, means they start fighting on very minor issue, few are very decent, and they mostly avoid making any trouble with anyone. Most of my friends are my age fellows, few are younger, and few are older than me. In our neighborhood people from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds are living but majority of residents are either Punjabi or Pashtun. Kashmiri, Saraiki and Gilgiti people are also in a prominent number. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 27)

Another male juvenile mentioned the diversity in the urban neighborhoods. Meanwhile, he also claimed that some adults there are violent as well. He notes:

There is a large number of youths in these colonies. Those you can see over here are all the youth of our colony [remark: Bri Imam]. The youth are of different ethnicities permanently settling here at Bri Imam. Some are from Punjab and some are Pathans. Along with them there are also Gilgiti [remark: people of Gilgit] residing in this area of Bri Imam. Not everyone but many of them are gunday [remark; fighter/violent]. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 24)

When the researcher asked the respondent about the role of the law enforcement agencies or family control over deviant persons in the neighborhoods, the respondents had limited confidence in the role and abilities of the law enforcement agencies that regularly policed the neighborhoods. However, they trusted family controls, but mentioned that these youngsters hide their activities from their families. A respondent revealed:

They usually keep their deviant activities away from police. The families are not even aware about such deviant activities. We present ourselves differently in front of police. They think that we are not involved in deviant activities. For example, the police are not aware about the sexual relationship between a boy and a girl. Such deviant activities are not performed publicly rather they are performed covertly. Certain people are influential, and they have good terms with the police. They are able to suppress the deviant issues once they are caught by the police. They are backed by different people. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 23)

The question arises, if there is violence and low social control, why do people live there? In the Bari Imam shrine neighborhood specifically, the people have a spiritual attachment to the shrine and prefer to live close to it. Other places are peopled for different reasons. Housing and the cost of living (food) is affordable there. Family connections and ethnic relations are other reasons that bind them to a neighborhood. A male interviewee shared his experience of living in one of the neighborhoods and mentioned his experiences of girls, family honor and his own contextual definition of respect for women. He also highlighted the role of the security personnel and experience of them. He states:

Here I come for my friends. Since I like the environment, I enjoy being here. It is the only place where one can enjoy, you know, girls come here so I gaze at them. Though none is owed and came across many girls. Since I know nowadays people's priority is money and thank God I have not been after girls. I have spent a lot of time here at Bri Imam but in my entire life I have never done anything humiliating especially towards women. Once I did something wrong by bullying a girl, supplied her for money, but such activities are not fun and secondly such acts are disgracing [remark: disrespectful] for parents and entire family and on the other hand such things result in imprisonment. That is why I stay away from such things. So, it is better to sit and gaze rather than getting involved in anything against law. Although staring and teasing is fun but nowadays we can't even tease girls because under cover personnel [remark: security agencies] are always on duty here and they arrest people found teasing girls or doing anything wrong. Last time they caught one of our friends. When a friend took away another friend's cap and ran inside shrine of Bari. The other friend got angry and shouted at the one ran with the cap and was caught by security force. He was beaten. Another friend of mine got stuck inside but somehow, we managed to escape from there. So even now we come here with same fear in mind that the security personnel now know us, and we may be caught again. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 29)

Another participant also shared his experiences and views about the neighborhood. For him, security forces keep an eye on them and they have to face a number of security checks. They mentioned the notorious reputation of their neighborhood as a facet of living there:

Yes, they're used a lot over here, as I said most of the boys are unemployed, and they have nothing better to do. Whenever we go to other parts of Islamabad or Rawalpindi, on the checkpoints the police ask us where we are coming from and when they come to know we are from this place, they thoroughly check us for drugs and other illegal substances. This is how we are known to the people and this is all because of the illegal activities going on in these slums. (Islamabad-France Colony 17)

The urban neighborhoods that were focused on in Islamabad and Rawalpindi have a poor reputation, which symbolically marks the residents in complex ways. They are considered as places of dangerous people. We noticed that there were several types of people living in those neighborhoods. Those who were natives and are unable to move to another place due to financial constraints, poverty, and unemployment. Ethnically diverse people settled in those urban neighborhoods or those who are in search of a place which is most economical and affordable. They prefer to live in these neighborhoods without considering inadequate housing or social facilities.

The neighborhoods we targeted in Pakistan were indeed risky neighborhoods with a reputation for violence, criminal behavior and an admission that deviant and normatively repugnant behavior, such as substance abuse, sexual harassment, and prostitution is ubiquitous in these neighborhoods. This engendered stigmatization by outsider citizens. Moreover, police surveillance of the areas is constant but not appreciated. Despite these factors, poverty, unemployment, low levels of education and urban migration constrain many who live there from leaving these neighborhoods, since these neglected neighborhoods are economically affordable. Some interviewees expressed the wish to be able to leave the neighborhood, while others admitted a sense of belonging—a space that afforded young people an opportunity to interact, relax, and manage their street presence.

#### *South Africa*

Social space was found to be extremely important in South African cities. This is to be expected, considering that the political constructs of the past have remained architecturally imprinted on them. As highlighted in the specific chapter, South Africa is both constructed upon, and fractured by, perceived differences constituted by a moral framework embodied through racial differences. Such differences exist because people were ultimately formulated in relation to both the production of and access to capital, as reflected economically. Such structures have come to define the physical spaces of South African cities, both in relation to their physicality and their symbolic use as part of narratives which allow access to capital, as a function of the mythologization of the ascendency of democracy and the seemingly intricate involvement of most of the population's families. As one participant noted for instance:

Yes, I am from Johannesburg, but I was never raised there because they shot my grandfather who was the first guy that brought power along with all these guys […] He was even giving private information about family business, who it involved, named a few people within the government sector who were involved etc. (Durban-KwaMashu 8)

This is of course not to say that there is a causal relationship between the two, but rather that significant correlations continue to exist and which impact on young people. Indeed, this impact is especially keen amongst young men, who are positioned qua masculinity as nascent providers and yet exist in marginal communities in which access to the capital necessary in order to become an idealized provider is not only distant economically, but geographically as well. The result, it seems, is the refraction of their focus inwards, so that the minutiae of differences between individuals become magnified, becoming the basis for conflict and violence. Gangs offer a convenient channel for the expression of this process, as they are in South Africa especially concerned with territory both as a field from which income can be garnered through protection rackets and the sale of illegal drugs but also as a symbolic field of possession which acts as a tangible expression of group identity. Such identities may be multiple and replaceable, as expressed by one participant:

The communities they live in or the friends that they have most of the time, because if their friends are gangsters, I guess they won't be as close to their friend as they would like to be. (Cape Town-Hanover Park 14)

Such differences are also couched in moral terms, so as that it is not simply the space itself that is used in the construction of an identity or group locale, but a moral one too. This is perhaps best expressed by one of the participants themselves when they noted that:

No, we're a "pure" bunch I guess. (Cape Town-Hanover Park 10)

The simplicity of the sentence belies the complexity of the social configurations which underpin it. There conceptualization of purity as morally superior is a function of the group identity narrated as being a "bunch". Such imagined purity and thus superiority provide a justificatory rhetorical strategy for the claims of superiority required in constructions of young masculinity. Intriguingly, however, such claims are themselves a product of and rely on the existence of the group in order to be understood as legitimate. Thus, when those groups disband, or an individual is expelled from a group, it is not simply that they are cast out of a group of people but in the process become seen as inferior and as morally inferior. As another participant noted:

For the past few years, there is a lot of people that come then they leave and that has affected my area because it gets quiet since them […] Because basically my area is only alive or very loudly depending on how much people there is, but for the past few years it's been very quiet. (Cape Town-Hanover Park 14)

Quiet, here, is thus a loaded term, not merely indicating that less of the in-group has remained in the area, but that the state of quietness is indicative of floundering and moral regress. In the South African context, such configurations are also given cultural weight through and because of the notion of *ubuntu* which loosely translates as "we are because they are". As an ontological framework then, and despite many young men expressing an alienation from their traditional religious and cultural practices, and implicit and engrained understanding of *ubuntu* narrates their daily social configurations. Conflicts and violence as a result of or in contestation of social spaces draw on far deeper ontological meaning than simply the enactment of symbolic forms of power, for it is not simply that such violence is an event, but a process in which expression carries with it moral weight, and in which the victim not only garners power in terms of territory but acquires a deeply embedded and perhaps even implicit cultural capital. This can be seen in the *amaVuras* and *amaVatos* gangs, who engage in symbolic acts of extreme violence through conflicts with one another. They only use knives in these fights, where they believe that the distance achievable with firearms is not what "real" men do. Moreover, when they leave the communities to attend initiation school, they seldom return to the gangs, as they feel that gangsterism is "boys stuff". By attending initiation, they become men, imbued with a social place and purpose that precludes "boys stuff". The framing of the city as the "modern" and the rural as the site of the "traditional" is further magnified and made tangible in South Africa as a result of the very high levels of urban migration, in which "home" becomes conceptualized as the place from which individuals may have come from while the city space is conceptualized as foreign and less valuable. This lack of symbolic legitimacy both creates the space for the transfiguration of identities while also legitimates the criminality and the use of violence. As one participant noted, they invoked the love of their parents and their guidance by going "home", implicitly acknowledging the city as a secondary and transient space:

A friend is important so much let me make an example like how I brought myself to you and my parents are back home I talk to you about whatever is not making me happy and you as a friend will then comfort me and give me answers as to how I can solve the problem I am having and they help come up with a solution as to what we can do to solve the problem. (Durban-KwaMashu 6)

The cultural implications of this are of course themselves important, but so too are the remedial lessons, for it shows that interventions can both utilize but must also be aware of these deep-seated ontological nuances.

*Similarities*: In all contexts, the neighborhood has been perceived as providing the stage upon which personal identities could be performed, and yet also informed how those performances were both enacted and understood by the wider audience, the city. The social space is a place of belonging, where the juveniles feel at home or which was remembered for the lack of opportunities in life. Independent from the reputation and rating of the neighborhood, it is seen as an important social unit; juveniles cope with and become violent as one coping strategy. Anderson claims that there are two types of people: "decent" and "street", with the possibility of code switching. However, the struggles of the juveniles who shape their identity in relation to their social environment points in the direction of a more complex process; how to "get by" in a risky neighborhood. This is important, because in all the contexts, those risky neighborhoods were perceived as dangerous and a personal threat. The ambivalence between home and threat, or from a more distanced view, between protection and danger, is a challenge for the juveniles, possibly creating conflicts at both a personal level and between individuals.

*Differences*: The exact personal position toward the neighborhood differs between the contexts. In the Pakistani case, the neighborhoods were rejected and poorly rated, which was not true for Germany and South Africa. At the same time, some claim that their neighborhood is a place to relax and feel comfortable. An explanation could be the strong family bonds in the traditional Islamic households, which are in an opposition toward a normless and risky social environment. However, in *Pakistan*, the neighborhoods were mentioned as an economic source conforming to legal norms. There, people earn money for the household income by trading or through construction services. In Germany, those aspects were mentioned only in one interview—in Berlin, and in South Africa, many of the participants garnered an income in these neighborhoods through criminal activity, such as drug dealing.

# *9.3.2 Reflections on the Findings About the Perception of Risky Neighborhoods*

In Chap. 2, we discussed the spatial framework of risky neighborhoods more in detail. One part of the discussion was about the spatial threat approach, which binds together a bunch of different studies, which show that individuals perceive their neighborhoods as a threat. Even this is observable in our cross-cultural comparison. The juveniles interpret their neighborhoods, which means a social but also a normative spatial framework, as a source of danger, to which they have to react with violent behavior. Even this finding is stable over very different contexts, but how they react—what the shape of the street code looks like—will be discussed in the following section. The relational starting points are close to being similar across all the contexts and with the findings of Anderson, as well as with the Germantown neighborhood in the 1990s in the US context.

# **9.4 The Shape of the Code of the Street in Cross-Cultural Comparison**

# *9.4.1 Comparison of Street Etiquette*

Street etiquette includesstreet knowledge and a code of conduct for youth in the risky neighborhoods (Anderson 1990). Anderson (1999: 64) describes the knowledge as a defensive strategy of young men to stay safe on the street. In inner city neighborhoods, streetwise families encourage their children to acquire street knowledge while decent families try to keep their children away from the street. However, decent families' children acquired knowledge of street etiquette through *street socialization* and *social shuffling* when they socialize with their peers in school and playgrounds. Adolescents of decent families also learn knowledge of code switching to present another self at home. Anderson (1999: 69) further argues that street etiquettes, as normative systems, are embedded in street codes and streetwise young men are well aware of the danger and how to prevent confrontation. It is a fundamental rule of the street code that street activities should only take place in the neighborhood and nowhere else and the street code outlines the role of perpetrator and victim in the street confrontation. In our study, young men also acknowledged that street knowledge determines vulnerability and protection on the street. The participants described that individuals with little confidence and street knowledge are vulnerable to predation. Young men with the street knowledge can read the situation and behave accordingly. So, *street knowledge* provides disadvantages for those who lack this knowledge. It incorporates the information about the street code, the police, and the neighborhood (Anderson 1999: 67). Young participants also revealed the prevalence of a tenet to settle the matter in the neighborhood. For example, young men reportedly mentioned a "one-on-one rule" to resolve the dispute among groups, according to which only two people engage in a fight without interference or assistance from others.

#### *Germany*

There is a strong belief among adolescents that street etiquette is crucial for "survival" on the street. Adolescents who have grown up in these neighborhoods are well aware of street conduct. The prevalence of violence and street activities train them how to behave in particular situations. As one respondent noted:

I keep my eyes open, for me the street is my life. […] because I am seventeen years on the street, sixteen years I was on the street […] for me the street means a lot to me, it taught me a lot. […] and I have self-confidence. I protect myself without a weapon, without anything. I just have self-confidence. […] even if two people approach me or so […] or three people. I run away. If two come, anyway I would not try to box with, I would try to get away from them, maybe, they have a gun in hand, maybe they have something in the hand. How shall I know? (Dortmund-Nordstadt 8)

In street conduct, self-confidence is instrumental for survival. Adolescents accumulate street knowledge from everyday life within their neighborhoods and street etiquettes provide them with the confidence to conduct themselves on the street and in escalated situations:

If you are living long enough in Marxloh, you know where the corners are, where you are not allowed to go. […] Because, I know the place quite well. The corners, what is going on here, the hideaways, what exists here. (Duisburg-Marxloh 5)

Another important theme that emerged from an analysis of the street etiquette was how to behave in an intensified situation and how and when to challenge your enemy. There are a set of informal rules according to which one's honor and reputation within those particular neighborhoods are maintained and when necessary, restored. In the German data, the rule for youths is to exhibit toughness through one-on-one contestation and challenging each other is a prominent rule. If there is a conflict between two persons from different groups, a fight between those two persons, but only those two persons, is inevitable, even in the presence of friends. The parties have to stand their ground to show their resilience in dealing with the situation. If this rule is broken and others enter the fray, this will result in a group fight. A young man from Marxloh described the events:

If you see, one-on-one, nobody goes on, let them to fight. Except the situation is exaggerated, we part them. But otherwise we don't interfere together. Unless you see four against one, then you go on with others, then it's a mass brawl. (Duisburg-Marxloh 6)

The narratives depicted that young men have to rely on their self-defense capabilities in the neighborhoods. Although most of the young people hang around with their friends and in groups on the street, contests are expected in the form of one-on-one confrontations. The young men from Nordstadt reported that it is important for a person to handle the situation alone:

No, definitely one-on-one. No, no, it is definitely very sneaky if more than one goes against one, one-on-one in any case. So definitely one against one, then I say, first pushing, or so, I would say, then it comes smacking then notice, then I see, if he reacts to it, if he notices: Okay, now I respect this person and I simply go out of his way, or if I, or if he tries to beat back then. (Dortmund-Nordstadt 10)

A situation, namely I was once in the city with two other colleagues, then two others came, I mean who I know as well and […] he became more and more cheeky and at some point I was fed up, he got some on his head. (Interviewer: But was that one-on-one or did a fellow join?) Yes, no, nobody joined. So, it was only me and him. (Dortmund-Nordstadt 9)

The above excerpts reflect the dynamics of informal social control in the neighborhood and a lack of willingness to intervene in confrontations. One aspect of this rule, as the young men above described it, is that one-on-one confrontations are a manifestation of manhood—a contest to see if you can successfully defend yourself.

#### *Pakistan*

Street etiquette is clearly known among young people. They believe that they are in a risky place and they have to defend themselves if anything happens to them. They are constantly aware of what happens on the streets of their neighborhood through intense vigilance. For instance, one of the respondents mentioned that some deviant youth from other parts of the city came to the Bari Imam neighborhood, where they teased the girls of the neighborhood. Consequently, elders of the street decided to form a *mohala* (street) committee in order to defend their neighborhood girls. Protecting the honor and respect of the girls and women in their neighborhood sat deep in the consciousness of these adolescents. Although friendship between the sexes is forbidden by local norms, it is interesting to note that friends always treat their friend's sister as if their own sister. If any member of the group violates this rule, he is punished. A respondent revealed his experience:

Often the youngsters fight. Once we had one in our school, which was fought on behalf of our friend, Yousaf was also with us in that fight. One of our friends was going to school, on the way few guys surrounded him, they were blaming our friend for teasing one of boys' sister. We know our friend very well he is a very gentle and nice guy and we were sure he would never do any act like this. Our friend was alone at that time, the guys took advantage of it and they beat up our friend very badly. Our friend got three stitches in the head. When we came to know about these happenings we gathered our friends and went after those guys after the school time, towards the colony. We knew they would be in the cricket ground where we often used to play after school time. We captured three of them and gave them beating of their life which they will never forget. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 28)

The above respondent further added that ignoring street etiquettes would brand a person as shameless. The violation of street etiquettes demanded a show of aggression:

If I tell you about my nature, I mostly avoid involvement in conflicts but sometimes I have to react and fight, because in our neighborhood if I always keep tolerating the aggression of other fellows so they will start considering me a shameless person and an easy target, as they did with my friend as well. But luckily after having some very intense fights now most of the guys in my neighborhood avoid making any trouble with me. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 28)

Another respondent also highlighted street etiquette at sporting events. For the respondent, it was clear that nobody is allowed to interfere with a cricket umpire He reported:

Just a few days ago we had a fight while playing cricket. When we were playing the match, a boy who was not playing the match started interfering in the umpire decisions which resulted in a fight among both the playing teams. That boy was then beaten by both of the teams. Besides that, incident, I have never had any serious fight like the other people here who have made various groups like Malangii and who have nothing better to do than teasing girls, quarrelling and taking drugs the whole day. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 2)

From the Pakistani data, it is evident that street etiquettes exist. However, the nature and intent of the street etiquettes vary from the German data.

#### *South Africa*

Street etiquette was for many South African participants subtly performed through an arrangement of verbal, nonverbal, symbolic, and embedded performances that drew on a myriad of references to both traditional, contemporary and individual characteristics. Such performances may in themselves be contradictory, but, when interpreted by the peer group for whom those actions were performed, are layered with meaning. For instance, one participant noted that:

One of my philosophies is that life is like a river so let it flow so that is how I solve like my problems, like okay let's see how it is going to happen like this then I try it in a different way cause now I know a way to do it, that's how I solve my problems I just keep changing it and trying it in different ways then I did in the first time it did not work, I try to come up with different method to the situation I am in at that time. Do not do one thing for everything. (Durban-KwaMashu 9)

Another means of expressing this code was through descriptions that also invoked other codes. For instance, one participant noted, in describing their understanding of an enemy, that:

I don't keep grudges if someone hurts me I don't pay too much attention to them, it is cool you do you I do me, so carry on doing what you doing if it makes you happy what you doing then to me something that makes me happy, if it makes you happy then you carry on doing it I am just not going to chill with you then we cut ties, those people are not my enemies they just not friends. (Durban-KwaMashu 9)

Such implicit understandings can, however, also result in the normalization of violence and personal violence, so that these concerns are referred to in a flippant or uncaring manner. As one participant inadvertently noted when speaking of a friend's addiction:

Like you don't understand addictions it's like when I meet someone I believe everyone has an addiction and when I meet someone I want to find out like what is your addiction is it could be helping people it could be whatever Sbu's is caffeine and I think he has that addiction because he understands that so I just let him be. (Durban-KwaMashu 8)

Street codes were then for South African participants very fluid and often, the result of colloquial understandings of the context in which they found themselves, both individually and as groups of friends, and thus likely to change quite rapidly. Such rapidity had the effect, on the one hand, of negating what may be considerably serious concerns for individuals, yet also allowed participants to rapidly adapt to a changing urban context with high levels of crime, violence, and personal grief. In summary, one participant noted:

Perhaps my age group respects me. I am not sure about the old people. But my age group respects me because I also respect them. It is difficult for me to see or know whether older people respect me because I don't spend a lot of time with them. I spend a lot of time with people who are my age group when we chill on the road and in our corners. You can really see that they are happy with my style. (Cape Town-Hanover Park 5)

*Similarities*: In all of the contexts and sites, specific rules were developed on how to behave on the street. The expectation is that if one follows these rules it guarantees the ability to keep out of trouble, while simultaneously making it possible to participate in the public life of the street. Following those informal rules provides safety, but causes problems for those who do not know the codes or reject them. However, these rules cause problems as well, because adherence to the rules rest with the juveniles themselves, hence the possibility of violence and dangerous situations.

*Differences*: Even if street etiquette works to keep the peace, differences are observable when it comes to violence. In Germany and Pakistan, clear rules on how to behave in violent situations are developed (e.g., one-on-one fighting only, or not using a weapon). In South Africa, instead, no such rules were operational in violent situations, with the need to overcome the opponent often the sole concern. Such a concern is symptomatic of the type of weaponry used—in which the difference between victory and defeat may also be the difference between life and death—and as noted throughout this chapter, because violence is so deeply embedded in individuals' understandings that its use is not seen as strange or extra normal. So, the range of the informal rules is related to the local culture and circumstances. Even this finding is opposite to Anderson's findings in the US.

# *9.4.2 Comparison of Symbols*

In line with Anderson's understanding of street culture, symbols, and in particular material objects that are understood symbolically, are considered significant to show power and reputation on the street. In risky neighborhoods, many of the youth carried small weapons including knives, tasers, and knuckle-dusters to protect themselves, so they said. Many of the respondents also noted that the carrying of a weapon was a potent means of articulating and performing their manhood and dominance on the street. Other material stuff included expensive brand clothes and shoes to attract attention on the street. Some of the participants acknowledged they used to give importance to expensive brands in the early teenage years, but these things later became irrelevant. Generally, most interviewees reported that expensive clothes and shoes are not related to respect on the street. Anderson (1999: 76) described that young men carry a beeper to sell drugs in the neighborhood, which become a status symbol of wealth, courage and drugs. In competitive environments, young men campaign for status by taking the possessions of others, which symbolizes winning a trophy. It includes material things like sneakers and pistols; even girlfriends can be trophies. Leather jackets, expensive sneakers, and other branded goods are considered important symbols of status and prop up the self-image of these youths. In the neighborhood, the peer group sets the standards for conduct and young men look for sex encounters to accumulate esteem among peers, each sex conquest regarded as a *notch on one's belt* (Anderson 1999: 150).

#### *Germany*

The *staging area* is an important self-representation space where adolescents not only challenge each other's social status, but also attempt to manifest their supremacy through street symbols. However, only a few adolescents believe that branded clothes, watches and gold chains are associated with respect within neighborhoods. A young interviewee said:

Of course, there are some. There are many, that buy all that brands that are expensive, and you think oh cool, such as Ralph Lauren, Hilfiger, Versace, Prada, like this, Gucci. Like this, if someone has something original, he is immediately the boss, directly a highly respected person. (Scharnhorst 3)

However, that branded clothes are linked to respect holds true only for friends and is more associated with wealth as with violence or a specific street related ability. While certain fashion items can be part of a self-representation on the street such as a gangster-style discourse, in contrast to Anderson's findings, wealth cannot be interpreted as a direct connection to the drug economy, because the drug market in Germany is not that openly organized as it was in Germantown in the 1990s. Furthermore, branded clothes are also a symbol of partial success in the legal economy and as well a sign of possible pathways out of poverty and street culture. Although tattoos are also a manifestation of street life, due to religious reasons the interviewees did not have tattoos. They believed that a tattoo makes their body impure.

No, I would never get any tattoos. First because of my religion. […] Second my father doesn't want it, because my skin is, so to speak, it is not how God made it and you changed it. (Duisburg-Marxloh 1)

In risky neighborhoods, where there is a high level of perceived insecurity, young interviewees mentioned that they carry small weapons as symbols to protect themselves on the street. Despite not really knowing how to use them, they carry knives, tasers, and knuckle-dusters, but their value is purely symbolic so as to show dominance in street disputes. None of the adolescents reported ever using a weapon in a fight, even if they had one on them. It is more symbolic of the ability to put up a fight, than a tool for using in a fight.

Well, in the past I would have gone out of the way. Today I just walk towards, because, as I said, one should be self-confident. […] you should not retreat immediately, because then the other person sees, ok he is afraid of me, he is already intimidated, is an easy victim. […] When someone wants to pinch stuff from somebody, then he makes it as easy as possible and searches for an easy victim, like it was the case with me. I was thirteen years old, a little child, and a twenty-five-year-old came to me with a knife. So you know, that he is twelve years older than me is already an important advantage and then pulling a knife, that makes it even worse. (Dortmund-Nordstadt 3)

It also levers their status and confidence on the street. Some of the interviewees claimed that they lived up a ghetto lifestyle, it being part of the intimate and local culture of their neighborhoods. However, they were aware of the fact that outsiders consider it as an asocial lifestyle. A young interviewee talking about their lifestyle:

We understand each other. But other people, who come from outside, when they see us, they think immediately, yes they are asocial, look how they dress up. Our style is like this. We dress up like ghetto. (Duisburg-Marxloh 5)

#### *Pakistan*

Symbols indicate the street norms, values, and beliefs. In the Pakistani data, some symbols that indicate violent tendencies. Though weapon and honor were linked to each other, carrying of weapons was not common prior to the 1980s. But during the Cold War era (1980s and 1990s), gun culture flourished and was promoted. This uncontrolled gun culture continued until 2015, thereafter the state decided to ban guns. Every government-run school and college had a gun culture, where adolescents frequently used weapons to show their manhood, masculinity, and power to their opponent. Violent incidents were very common in schools, colleges, and universities. However, during the anarchic period in which bomb blasts became frequent in the country, the government started campaigns to control guns and other weapons, realizing that government control of weaponry was essential. Nevertheless, weapons still can be found in risky urban neighborhoods despite the fact that security forces have launched massive and offensive campaigns to control violent extremism after the war on terror.

The data indicates that adolescents used knuckle-duster, knives and other weapons (like guns), if needed. Expensive and branded clothes and shoes are not linked with the violence nor serve as specific emblems for group membership. Nonetheless, they may be considered important among some of the adolescents who are part of the well-off social class. Additionally, some of the respondents mentioned that they use special tacit and culturally specific symbols and signs to attract women of their age. In this vein, a respondent reported:

If a girl is to be attracted, we just wink at her while following them. If a girl sees you following her twice or third, she gets that the boy is interested in her. If the girl gazes back, it means that she is also interested in you. Besides this, it is also good to have stylish clothes. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 21)

Another respondent revealed that adolescents used long nails (just like girls) in order to attract the attention of a girl. This is also an indication merely for a friendship. Adolescents also use bracelets, rings and wrist threads:

The long nails are kept for the sake of girls. They usually like long nails, thus it actually symbolizes the love for a girl with whom a boy is in love […] It represents the friendship. As long as it remains at your finger, you are in a strong bond of friendship with that individual. They have been given to me by my friends. Some people wear threads around their wrists and some use bracelets, but I usually like these rings. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 22)

Youngsters also have long hair, and long nails on their smallest fingers, imitating the styles and confidence of local TV and film stars to portray themselves as heroes to the girls. In this regard, a respondent from Islamabad-Bari Imam mentioned:

A boy having a long hair, and a long nail at pinky finger was Jay Kishan (Indian Film actor). He was wearing pant shirt. When I started to talk with him, he was not hesitant, and he started to talk freely. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 23)

Although these adolescents wanted to have a relationship with girls, they considered them prostitutes, using the term "*taxi*" to describe the girls. The adolescents running after these girls are called "*shoohda*" (means cheap/low character/heinous person). These boys and girls have illicit relationships, although both know that they will neither marry nor have a long-lasting relationship. Both of them may be interested in a physical relationship or the girl may hope for money in return for the relationship. Some of them may exchange a handkerchief as a symbol of the relationship. As a respondent from Islamabad-Bari Imam stated:

The girls are called Taxi and the boys who do such things are called Shooda […] If a boy establishes a relationship with a girl then the handkerchief is given as a sign of love to her. The handkerchief is when given by the girl to a boy then the boy would it wear around his wrist. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 24)

Meanwhile, the girls wear fashionable clothes (in local cultural contexts) to attract the boys. One respondent expressed this in the following manner:

Some of the boys use the rings and bracelets which are given to them by their girlfriends. One of my friends has three girlfriends. One of them has given a bracelet and a thread to him so he wears them around his wrist. These things are also used to show that the boy has a girlfriend. I have not used such rings and bracelets. […] Girls are more interested in watching television. They are quickly imitating the fashion as you might have observed by yourself. We should not forget our own fashion but currently nobody cares about that. I have seen a girl in this place who was wearing bilkul patla [means: transparent] clothes and her whole body was clearly visible. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 25)

Many of these adolescents wear traditional Pakistani clothes (*shalwar and kameez*). Some of them wear jeans and shirts (Western clothes) and a few earrings and bracelets. A respondent said:

I often wear shalwar qamees along with waist coat as it is our traditional dress. However, I also do wear jeans and shirts as well. Nowadays most of the guys wear jeans while they are on the street, some of the guys also wear earrings and bracelets. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 27)

Interestingly, some adolescents wear jeans and shirts, but they also wear *ta'wiz*—a locket or amulet with the prayers to avoid evils or to attract good fortune. It is also considered necessary to have good fortune to attract a beautiful girl. Conversely, another respondent does not believe in the wearing of a *ta'wiz* or bracelet as a religious symbol. Views about *ta'wiz*, bracelets, nails, and dress are depicted in the below narratives:

I mostly wear shalwar qamees [Pakistani dress]. Jeans and shirts along with waist coat are popular among boys these days in the neighborhood. I do wear ta'wiz [phylactery] but I do not wear jewelry such as bracelets or earrings. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 1)

I mostly wear shalwar qamees and when I am on duty, I follow our work place dress code. Using earrings and bracelets for a boy is not allowed by our religion, so I never wear such things. I do wear Sindhi topi [cap] sometimes. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 2)

I also wear earrings and a 'ta'wiz' around my neck. (Rawalpindi-Dhok Matkial 26)

I often wear jeans and shirts; however, I also do wear shalwar qamees as well. I used to wear earrings few months ago but then my father came to know about that then upon his orders now I don't wear it anymore. I have this [ta'wiz] given to me by my mother I keep it with myself every time. (Rawalpindi-Dhok Matkial 5)

I wear shalwar qamees, sometimes jeans and shirts as well. Most of my friends wear jeans these days; they are impressed from English and Indian movies. I don't like to wear earrings and bracelet I consider it as girlish things, a man has some traits which suits him and should adopt them rather than adopting girl's styles and fashion. (Islamabad-France Colony 16)

With reference to the street code, these symbols emanating from the data are mostly related to friendships between girls and boys. However, some do have a violent meaning. For example, a respondent revealed:

They have their own style. As you might have seen that boys have bracelet which are sometime given by the girls. They use them with pride that it has been given by a girl. There are also boys who behave like crazy people. They cut their arms with knife and another sharps thing. If one inquiry about it they will say, it is a sign of love and it also represents their courage. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 13)

We can see from the Pakistani data, that the symbols of the street code have a broader meaning. This is true for gender relation in particular. We can only understand the meanings of such symbols by putting them into the cultural context, which makes clear that the street codes are culturally framed and that they are not a general explanation.

#### *South Africa*

As has been noted above, many of the codes applicable to other conceptual or pragmatic concerns—friends, enemies, and social space for instance—are themselves also symbolic in form and in the understandings of the participants. This is not only because they represent far more than the physical entities pointed to by the codes, but because they also operate as potent forms of cultural capital. Violence, in this guise, can also be used as cultural capital, whether in its instantiation, in its symbolic use in the form of threats, or as a means of legitimating an individual or act retrospectively through a process of mythologization. Such a process and the legitimacy it sanctioned can be seen in operation in the anecdote provided by one participant, in speaking of Nelson Mandela.

I feel the same Mandela that went in there is not the same Mandela that came out and if you look at how we are as black people now our respect was buried away post 1994 you see because of what they did and they just made a decision to come and kill us slowly the following, but how I see respect is there is respect that people as respect and there is for an example look at Mandela everybody respects Mandela for what. (Durban-KwaMashu 8)

The symbolic capital of violence and the means by which it becomes normalized as a mechanism of change is of course not solely limited to the generation from which the participants were garnered. Indeed, many of the participants have been born into poverty as a result of the violence perpetuated by the state through apartheid and by the conflicts and violence that were driven by these policies. As one participant noted:

Yes, I am from Johannesburg, but I was never raised there because they shot my grandfather who was the first guy that brought power along with all these guys. (Durban-KwaMashu 8)

In the above quote, the participant clearly understands the symbolic capital of the use of violence not only as a means of generating change but as *power* itself. There are of course more empirical uses of symbols that the participants drew on in their daily lives, most primarily through the use of clothing items as a means of indicating—albeit often inadvertently only imitating—what they believe to be the symbols of wealth. The auspicious display of such overt signs of wealth is fraught with concerns that mirror the wearing of such items in impoverished communities. As one participant noted:

My financial security majority of it relies in I call her my mom but she is my aunt relies in her and my sister and also my brother relies on those guys that's my financial security, my emotional also relies in my mother but not my brother and sister it basically relies in my friends' the ones I call family, that's where my emotional security relies in, if my friends do something really bad to me then I lose respect for them. (Durban-KwaMashu 9)

The conspicuous display of symbolic forms of wealth is, however, subject to the same processes by which the norms relating to violence are produced. On such example relates to the use and ownership of vehicles, a comparatively mundane activity in Germany for instance, but one that is a dream for at least one of the South African participants. As they describe this symbolic capital:

As a man, I wish to see myself driving. Although I know it's too much for me to mention driving even before education but yes, I would like to drive a big car. So that when I come to the township, everybody looks at me. The shoe that I would be wearing, people would have to see that this guy is successful. (Cape Town-Hanover Park 2)

Lending credence to the propositions above, the interweaving of the codes in nuanced ways is critical in understanding the symbolic capital that many acts and items may have to the participants. The normative discourse in which these dreams are shaped and through which they may be realized is of course through the accumulation of wealth. The primary means by which to do so in the communities from which the participants have been drawn is via the gangs and related to this, the distribution of illegal drugs. As such, the gangs meet the need of a youth torn between the promises of a consumerist society and the stark reality of their continued impoverishment. It is for this reason that the South African Police Service's Major General Jeremy Veary has stated that the youth are "in awe of gang leaders" (April 1, 2014). Unlike the state, the gangs make plausible offers of belonging, support, safety, status, and wealth. They have filled the void left by ineffective governance and frustrated expectations. One reason for this is that the production and distribution of illegal drugs economically sustain the gangs. As has been shown elsewhere, police "crackdowns" or "blitzes" serve to reduce supply, rather than demand, thus often increasing the street price of a particular drug. The more profitable the trade, the more money and effort will be spent on sustaining that trade. This can be expressed in as simple an item as a pair of jeans, as one participant noted:

Firstly, it means that I am fashionable. I love that. I really do. When I bought it as well with the money that my mother gave me for Christmas, everyone thought that I looked good and they told me. I also saw that this is a hit. (Cape Town-Hanover Park 3)

Finally, and in spite of the draw of material wealth, many participants recognized that there were symbols that revealed a moral wealth and wealth of spirit. As one participant argued, in conclusion:

There is one that I can talk about. You see this one is educated, she is around 39 years or more. But I can say that she is still young. But she is successful. She is highly educated. She has many things in life. Married. She has everything, but she still wants more but personally I can say she is successful. (Cape Town-Hanover Park 12)

*Similarities*: We find that self-confidence and carrying improvised weapons are symbolic elements of street culture. Results show that context-related symbols, like weapons, are recognized by youth in the neighborhoods. However, in contrast to Anderson's findings, the symbols are not linked to respect or violence. Though, in all contexts, symbols are a show of force, but more so a flag of the status, they are not linked to respect and violence directly, and do not cause it. But symbols do have an ambiguous meaning. On the one hand, they should trumpet success, as do expensive branded goods or cars. On the other hand, symbols are a part of the local street culture in so far that they show the relative position of the person within the risky neighborhood with its informal rules. Conversely, belonging to street culture signifies failure in the broader society, because of discrimination, and/or because street culture overtly rejects mainstream norms.

*Differences*: The data clearly manifested that symbols need to be interpreted in relation to context. So, in Germany, symbols address peers and friends and are a sign of status within the groups. This is true for the carrying of weapons, too. Usually, juveniles carry such items, but never used them nor *know* how to use them. The Pakistani data showed that religious symbolic items are worn, which was not found in the other two contexts. Furthermore, symbols were an offensive tool to gain the attention of women of the same age group, which would otherwise not be possible because of the strict social rules. However, in South Africa, violence by itself becomes a symbol of power, which gains a deeper meaning, keeping the history of apartheid in mind. Based on this, we have to reject the assumption of a simple connection between symbols, respect, and violence, even we see some relation. The field is indeed much more complex.

# *9.4.3 Comparison of Toughness and Masculinity*

Toughness on the street is viewed in two ways by respondents. One outlook on toughness is through the rubric of masculinity, in which a privileged man who is respected by others on the street creates an image of ruthlessness. Manhood is associated with respect on the street and thus is internalized through and symbolically indicated by heightened levels of confidence and high self-esteem. In street culture, attributes such as manhood, a reputation for aggression, and status garnered through wealth and symbols might be achieved through violent conduct in public. On inner city neighborhood streets, young men manifest and utilize overtures toward masculinity in order to both gain access to and heighten their reputation. Manhood is associated with ruthlessness and the inclination to use violence (Anderson 1999: 91). In addition, a man is able to hold his nerve and manhood can also be expressed by the *possession* of material goods and by entering into relationships with particular women or girls. In inner city neighborhoods, young males perceive a real man to be someone who has street knowledge and who follows the code of the street. A reputation of toughness and hardness safeguards against future victimization. In their campaign for respect, young people are ready to behave violently. From another perspective, toughness is the ability "stand your ground"; where people have a little trust in state institutes, particularly the police, they need to be able to retaliate on their own in response to threats (Anderson 1999: 189). This code legitimates the use of force and provides a rationale for violent behavior. This may be enacted through standing up to institutional or structural forms of authority and violence, such as the explicit antagonism toward the police or other community authority figures, the defiance of the state or the destruction of public property, or the commitment of criminal acts, such as public order violations or the defacement of public buildings.

#### *Germany*

The idea of social competition is an essential feature of toughness on the streets, meaning an attitude that indicates readiness to react to insults and show strength. Failing means becoming a potential victim of social or physical abuse. As a consequence, showing toughness is a rational double strategy. It prevents victimization at the moment, whilst simultaneously building up a violent reputation, which shall prevent future victimization. The results show that the assumptions about toughness outlined by Anderson are applicable in the German contexts as well.

The weaker has virtually respect for the stronger. That's how it is on the street. (Duisburg-Marxloh 2)

Well, you should, I may say, you should not somehow show your smile too much on the street, because very often it is ascribed with weakness if you show very much smile. You should always look tough and stay tough, because then you will be seen like this, also taken seriously and also respected. Once you show your smile, then they see it as weakness. Then you have to show toughness again, for example by beating this person. For instance, I personally don't enjoy it, but everyone is fighting for his reputation, I would say it like this. (Dortmund-Nordstadt 10)

*Survival of the fittest* is accentuated in the above storylines of young interviewees, which is an imperative rule to maintain on the street. The above excerpts show that toughness is associated with respect and reputation, which also ensures security and safety. Youth described that they engage in fights and brawls to gain honor and they believe it is necessary to avoid any later assault. A young participant from Marxloh narrated what is required to stay safe on the street.

Confrontation and so. We also want to have our pride. That's about pride, about, we must do something. You cannot just turn around and say 'not so bad'. (Duisburg-Marxloh 1)

Who is a strong man? (..) Wait. No idea. Definitely not one who is hopped up on steroids or something. This doesn't count. I don't know. Maybe when someone shatters and gets up again? No idea. And says, fights on, still defends himself or runs off. No idea. For me this is strong. (Berlin-Neukoelln 7)

Both storylines show the *cyclic rhythm* of confrontation and struggle to sustain them on the street. It is commonplace that they are challenged by their peers and they must resist to be dominant in the risky neighborhoods. Only a few interviewees claimed strength and toughness could be shown by the opposite means.

Strength has nothing, has not only to do with power, but also strength is also […] Strength is, for instance, if you can give respect to one. In my opinion that's also strength. (Duisburg-Marxloh 3)

Everyone is strong in special way or though, no tough rather not, but strong, (Interviewer: In which special way are you strong?) I'm rather a quiet person. I can tolerate much, very much. But it goes in one ear and out the other. (Berlin-Neukoelln 4)

A strong man? I say, a man who does not knock out another with through a punch but with words. He, for me, he is tough. He, he can control himself. (Berlin-Neukoelln 9)

However, it has to be mentioned that this approach is the coping strategy of young men who consciously avoid and oppose the dictates of street culture in such neighborhoods. However, the protection of one's image on the streets might be related to upholding an aggressive appearance/behavior, but it also implies the undeniable readiness to protect the (image of the) family or loved ones, and sometimes girlfriends:

I don't beat girls, well, but I had a quarrel with a girl, she called me a bastard then. I hate the word 'bastard', although I know that my mother is not a whore, but so. First I put my fist into my trousers and so I was calm. Then she repeated, then I said "You better go away". Then I wanted to go and she called me a bastard again and I slapped her in the face. (Duisburg-Marxloh 2)

In my view, a strong man is, if he would defend his girlfriend from other people. (Berlin-Wedding 4)

Finally, steadfastness to one's beliefs and values might be interpreted as a vehicle for showing toughness and strength too.

So, respect, no. […] For me it is like this, I only mess up with someone who is at my level. If I realize that he is afraid of me and says, please stop it, then I can't beat him, because I see it that way, that is fear, cowardly. I will stop it. (Duisburg-Marxloh 6)

A strong man is for me a man who, in his decisions gives way to others or compromises […] But in principle one should stand one's ground. (Berlin-Wedding 7)

Another ritual of toughness is self-reliance, which means that you can resolve your matters on your own. Standing their ground was a shared narrative among the youth. If someone challenges you, you need to be able to protect yourself without reliance on others. This is also street etiquette in the neighborhood, which is explained later in this chapter. Overall, there are diverse accounts of toughness and strength, although the young participants related toughness to manhood.

#### *Pakistan*

Like in Germany and South Africa, toughness is perpetrated in the form of manhood and masculinity. It is also important to show off male power through ruthless behavior (fights and violence). A male juvenile is often on the street and is allowed to sit with male friends in public spaces. Part of his masculinity is that he is expected to work hard, earn money, show toughness and demonstrate that he has the capacity to defend and fight for family honor. The more violent a person or the greater his reputation for violence, the more he gains respect and honor. However, a female is never expected to do the same. Rather, she is expected to be submissive, loyal and remain within the *chadar* (meaning covered in clothes) and the *char devari* (to remain within the four walls of the house). In Pakistani street culture, a woman may be vulnerable to leering, teasing and abuse. A woman on the street elicits low respect and that she is without honor. Male toughness was expressed as the ability to show off power through any means. Those who are tough are not afraid of hardships or fights:

Being tough means, you are never afraid of anyone. You are ready to face any situation. And I tell you one thing this poverty makes people very tough. Because if you are poor, you have to fight for your survival from dawn till dusk. (Rawalpindi-Dhok Matkial 5)

Everybody tries to look appealing in the street and so I do. I believe a person roughness and toughness has nothing to do with how he presents himself to the world. The thing which matters is that how tough one is from the heart, if a person has very good and hard and rough physique but runs away when he is confronted with a problematic situation, this means he is buzdil [coward]. A hahadur [brave] person will face a situation even when the odds are not in his favor. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 27)

The latter respondent further elaborated that he had to fight because he didn't want to be coward and shameless:

If I tell you about my nature, I mostly avoid involvement in conflicts but sometimes I have to react and fight, because in our neighborhood if I always keep tolerating the aggression of other fellows so they will start considering me a shameless person and an easy target, as they did with my friend as well. But luckily after having some very intense fights now, most of the guys in my neighborhood avoid making any trouble with me. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 27)

If I'm alone and having a fight with some boys who outnumbers me, I will never backup rather I will face them and show them that how tough I am. And I have done this too. As few months ago, I was involved in a fight with 3 boys, I do fight with them alone and did not ran away like cowards. I never do this thing [remark: running] because I am not a spineless person or coward. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 27)

However, some respondents claimed that they did not show toughness to women and children:

Violence against women and children cannot be considered as bravery or toughness. It could only be considered as a shameless act. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 27)

Fighting produces a reputation, which in turn brings honor and respect. The adolescents and other people considered it as a value—people extend respect and honor to the toughest person. Another respondent stated:

Everyone is afraid of us and that is how we survive through intimidating others because without bullying one cannot survive in existing era, but we didn't quit our studies. If we don't study, we cannot survive because the coming era would be technically very advance. Yes, the coming era's advancement is beyond our imagination. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 29)

The case is a unique example of a clearly violent adolescent. Tough adolescents are of the view that they have territorial control due to their toughness. If someone else arrives to exhibit toughness, it is a challenge and they reply with more toughness to show who has the greater power and authority. As one respondent explained:

Everyone here wants to prove that he is tough and strong. If outsiders come to this area, these boys start conflicts with him. They cannot tolerate, even a minor disagreement between them. This situation causes conflicts between them; they consider their muhallas [remark: place] as their property. (Islamabad-France Colony 16)

To sum up, for most of the Pakistani respondents, toughness reflects manhood, the physical strength of a person, and the temperament to face hardship. It is a person with the strength to face adversity, fight with others, and to dominate the fight. It is also a reflection of a person willing to demonstrate high levels of violence to show that he has the capacity and strength to mobilize peers and engender fear among weaker people. However, some of the respondents did not agree with the above perspective of toughness. These adolescents believe in struggle, hard work, and school education. They do not want to become aggressive or tough to get recognition.

#### *South Africa*

In South Africa too, toughness as a concept is intricately embedded in understandings of manhood and masculinity and is of specific importance to young men in South Africa for a variety of reasons, ranging from the socioeconomic concern with men being placed as a "providers", to the cultural, in which rites of passage and rituals define different cohorts as boys or men. Indeed, the latter is of particular importance to young black men, as defined by the ontological strata touched upon above. Manhood is furthermore closely linked to respect in deeply symbolic ways, in which to "be a man" is instrumental to garnering respect. As one participant noted for instance:

It's based on how they act. Their attitude towards it. If they go around, bragging about it, I'm going to think there is something you can't do, so now you go around bragging, because you have a weakness, and someone can exploit that. If you throw stuff like that in my face, it gets irritating. (Cape Town-Hanover Park 14)

To show weakness or to make oneself vulnerable is viewed negatively, and as "irritating". Importantly, this judgement is made not in reference to a threat or as a derivative of acts that are to be feared, but in terms of pettiness and marginality. Put differently, the participant finds such displays "irritating" because they are symptomatic of the actions of "boys", of other young males who have yet to act in a manner representative of what he conceives as definitive of being a man. The behavior is irritating because it is pestilent rather than threatening, akin to a younger sibling attempting and yet failing to threaten an older brother.

I can define tough as something that is hard to do basically something that is tough is normally beyond you it is something that is hard for you can't do it and most of the time you can beat it and overcome all the all that comes to you. (Durban-KwaMashu 2)

Toughness is also defined in relation to the social context, or more accurately, the survivability of specifically challenging social situations that require an individual to go beyond their normal abilities or those expected by others in the social cohort. As one participant noted:

Yeah this is a tough situation you like okay I am about to get arrested but there's a way out, you have to sit down think about what you going to say and then you lie your way out of it, you got out of a tough situation and that's how you get out of a tough situation. (Durban-KwaMashu 10)

Interestingly, toughness is then similar in logic to that of an enemy, in that both are seen as ambiguous and rely on the preexisting networks within the cohort in order to have a definition, rather than be entirely alien to or outside of the group or area. Such a contextual understanding of what constitutes toughness was well narrated by another participant, whose understanding of toughness is closely related to survivability. Such a link to survival is perhaps a function of the context, in which the participants did not conceptualize life and their futures in terms of achieving goals or attaining goods, but rather in simply surviving and not dying:

It is not having the things that you need an order to live a nice life. That is a tough life. You see now, even now, I also don't have a job and I always have to ask my mother and if she does not have, I have to ask from the pension of my grandmother. I also have to try and respect them so that they can give me what I need. So that I can also be able to buy clothes. In real fact things are really difficult. Because if you look at my life, since the school failed me, it is difficult. Sine I don't have matric, there is no way for me to get a decent job which can support me. It is tough. I don't know if it is because I am born from Inanda. Yes. The life here is tough. But life is possible because anyway we were born here, what we can do. All we need to do is to push and keep trying. (Durban-KwaMashu 2)

*Similarities*: Toughness is similar in the three countries under scrutiny. In all contexts, toughness was linked to masculinity and the image of a real man. This included the ability to fight, in particular, and the absence of weakness to stay safe. However, street peers rather than family were the role models for the cultivation of this image. The idea of a violent masculinity is close to the concept of respect but is limited to subcultural contexts or behavior within friendship groups or toward juveniles (males and females) of the same age.

*Differences*: Toughness was linked to identification with the neighborhood in Germany, but not in South Africa or Pakistan. Thus, the poor reputation of a neighborhood can be reinterpreted as a source of power, but only if the neighborhood is a small environment with which juveniles have close contact, such as sports club or public schools, e.g., in sports club or in public schools. If not, the possibilities of such a reinterpretation are absent.

# *9.4.4 Comparison of Friends*

For street-oriented people, their individual loyalties and commitments to family members and friends are crucial to their understandings of themselves, others, and the norms which shape their lives (Anderson 1999: 71). In many cases, young men become involved in escalated situations *because* of friendship. In schools and on the streets, young men are likely to establish a small group of friends from their neighborhoods. They have particular expectations and stand up for each other, so as to create cohorts and groupings with which they have solidarity and thus safety.

#### *Germany*

In the *risky neighborhoods*, adolescents count on their friends, particularly in violent situations. They engage in brawls and fights for their friends and groups as well. In risky neighborhoods, young men think that trust and loyalty are important in friendship and they have an expectation that friends help in difficult situations. While talking about friendship, a young participant expressed this opinion:

Pfff […] loyalty is important, I think, that you can also trust him [friend], not that he, that I confide something to him and he betrays me the next moment, because, that one can rely on him. Yes, if I need help sometimes or he needs help, of course you also have to be there. Of course, also that you get along well, yes, that's logical, that you can have fun and simply there must be true chemistry between you. I think such things are important. (Duisburg-Marxloh 9)

Here, the interviewed juvenile highlights the mutual nature of trust and friendship. This kind of loyalty is essential for a close-knit friendship, which is important for the reputation at the street. In similar accounts by other participants, they acknowledged a sense of safety with friends in the neighborhood. Generally, adolescents clearly distinguished between friends and peers. They described friends as people with whom they have a strong bond of trust and who stand by them; a street-peer with whom to spend time and socialize in the neighborhood. Below are accounts of young men talking about their friends:

Well, one with whom you can share everything, I have only one best friend, others are chilling-peers with whom I chill. I tell everything to my best friend. He knows everything about me and with him I hang around most of time, and no matter, he always stands behind me. We also don't quarrel very often, and yes no idea, the one you trust most, that is the best friend. (Duisburg-Marxloh 2)

And friend. For me it is a difference what I feel. Because the other is not real to you. You know, the one is real, but the other is not real, you know? The one sticks together with you and the other doesn't stick together. (Dortmund-Nordstadt 8)

Clearly, these storylines depict the level of mistrust in the neighborhoods and that adolescents are wary of making friends. Some of the participants mentioned that some of their friends took their girlfriends and betrayed them. Therefore, the adolescents are very careful about choosing friends. They reaffirm their friendship and their bond in various situations. Some of them mentioned that their brothers, cousins, and schoolmates are their close friends.

In addition to friends, the adolescents belong to small groups and spend time together within neighborhoods. Most of these group are gender and ethnically mixed. After school and work, they meet in the park or youth center where they socialize with these peers and seek their identity. They gain street knowledge and the social environment generates a street lifestyle. These groups are also crucial for socialization and security in the neighborhoods.

#### *Pakistan*

Friendship was an important part of the street code in Pakistani neighborhoods. In fact, we found much of the debate centered around friendship—its meanings, composition, characteristics, role, and relationship among friends. The respondents were open to talk about their friends. A respondent conceived a friend as:

A person who can help you in your painful moments is your friend. If they are unable to help you then, they should not be our friends. Those with whom I do have a friendship, they are all good. They will surely come to help me in the hour of need. We have a strong bond of friendship when it comes to any problem. We do not care about what people say about my friends. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 25)

Clearly, loyalty is a significant component of friendship. A respondent considered it as an important aspect of their life. He reported:

I think there is no better thing in the world than having the company of good friends. The friends who are there for you in any kind of situation, who never betray you, who help you in every situation of joy and sadness are the best kind of friends. We help each other in every situation and are always there for each other. (Rawalpindi-Dhok Matkial 5)

Revenge taking is an integral part of the Pakistani street culture. Friends help each other in taking revenge from an opponent when needed, as one interviewee noted:

I have very good friends. If I fight with someone and I ask my friends for help. They will take revenge for me, same as I do for them as well. I do help them whenever they require me. Last week a Punjabi group beat our Pathan friend in school, when we came to know about that we took revenge of him. (Rawalpindi-Dhok Matkial 6)

An important characteristic of friendship is trust and confidence in each other. Further, these friends expect sincerity in their friendship relations. Trust and sincerity strengthen the mutual relations of friends. Conversely, a respondent mentioned that friendship is a voluntary act and one cannot be forced to become a friend:

A person has to gain our trust if he wants to be our friend. And for that he has to show that he is sincere with us and will take part with us in our activities and will never run away whenever we confront a problematic situation. A person can leave our group of friends anytime; you cannot force anyone to remain your friend. Everyone has the freedom to choose with whom he wants to be friend with. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 7)

Another interview partner mentioned that sincerity and commitment to friends are core values of friendship. For him:

Only that guy can remain our friend who shows sincerity and commitment to us. Not some person who runs away when we need him. So, when a person becomes our friend, we make sure that he is honest and loyal to us, and if we get to know that someone is backstabbing us, we do not keep friendship with him anymore. (Rawalpindi-Dhok Matkial 4)

A respondent mentioned that trust is a necessary characteristic for the friendship. He argued:

I have a trust in all my friends and they also trust me. I have never betrayed them, and I am always there for them in their highs and lows. It is important for all groups. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 21)

Similarly, another respondent stated:

It is the trust which keeps us united. All the friends trust each other regardless of the situation. When a friend makes a call, it is obligatory for me to get there without any questions. We're always happy to respond. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 22)

Friends rescue their friends in problematic situations. They come forward and help when a friend is in jail. They provide social, political and moral support. They provide food and arrange legal assistance and help them to get out from the jail:

If a friend of us is arrested by the police, we try to contact any influential figure to help us in this regard, if we do not get any help then we collect money among us and give it to the police in order to get him out of the jail. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 7)

However, all friends are not equal or as resourceful in helping their friends. Some friends were reported as cheaters or they were absent when their help, assistance, and support was needed by their friends. They were considered selfish. Another respondent mentioned:

A friend is the one who helps you in your need. Some friends are selfish, they will be very close to you when they need something from you, but when you need their help, they make excuses. I don't like such friends, but even if they need me, I leave my own work and try to solve their problems. I may lay down my life for true friends, but I really hate cheaters. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 8)

Friendship in Pakistani neighborhoods is not limited to homogeneous groups. People frequently mentioned that they have friendships with Pashtun, Punjabi, and other local ethnic groups. These friendships are established within the neighborhoods and on the streets. A respondent explained:

Those who are living here, we have friendship with them. They are our peers. We have been living with them for a long period of time. I was born here. I have friendship with both Pathans and Punjabis. There is no such division that if you are a Punjabi, then you must have friendship with Punjabi only. We also have different friends at school and they are from different areas. Some of them are also my friends at both school and outside of school. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 11)

Another respondent thought that these friendships are based on self-interests. They form groups to watch their interests. A respondent explains his views about friendship and groups:

These groups consist of both Punjabi and Pathan. Malangi group is largest and it has only Punjabi boys. Their group composition depends upon their interests, if they found a guy helpful to them and trustworthy, they would allow him to join their group. And if they come to know about a guy is being untrustworthy, they expel him from their group. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 26)

After the family, friends are the most important source for social and emotional support. These groups are formed to play sports, help and socially support each other in difficult times. Respect is an important component, which holds the group together. They use different nicknames, based on their physical and social attributes. A respondent stated:

A friend among us is given more respect who is always there to help other friends and who never left his friends' side in any situation. We have a friend who is very aggressive, we call him jaddu his physique is also very strong he uses to go to gym that's why most of the guys in neighborhood are afraid of him and never ever think of making trouble with him. Anyone can become our friend if he stays with us, gives us respect and helps us in every situation and who proves himself trustworthy. And we did not keep friendship with a guy who did not come to our aid when we needed him. Once I needed my friends, I called a few of them but no one came to my aid, after that I gave up contact with them, but after few weeks they came to me and apologized for their act I also forgive them. (Rawalpindi-Dhok Matkial 26)

Among the violent friendship groups, fights are common. They do not only fight with each other but also with opponents. The research teams inquired about the reasons underlying group composition and formation. Several reasons were mentioned including but not limited to having fun, idle people in need of company, school companionship, to play sports together, and engaging in deviant acts (narcotics usage, supply, and to avoid fights or get support in fights). As the respondents reported:

I have a large group of friends and they are idle like me. Some of my friends also study in schools and colleges and few of them do jobs as well, however the majority of my friends are jobless and do nothing. We spend most of the time together outside our homes. (Rawalpindi-Dhok Matkial 5)

I am a frequent visitor of Bri Darbar [Shrine]. Here I meet my friends to have fun. I come here for enjoyment. We meet friends because it is enjoyable to pass comments on nearby passing girls. Every day several numbers of girls come to Bri Imam and it provides an opportunity for us enjoy the scene [watching girls and passing comments]. There are also visitors who brought food with them [Rice] in order to distribute that among the people. We also eat it. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 21)

When asked if their family members were aware of their group and its activities, many of the interviewees mentioned that their family was unaware of the groups. A respondent reported:

They remain unaware about the conflicts. They are not being told about the issue as it stays away from home. Only the friends and group members have the information. If they receive any information by any means they we make them believe that its usual stuff not a problem. I have been advised by my family to stay away from conflicts but again there comes the friendship which is also important thing. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 21)

Another respondent concurred with the above claim. He stated:

We do not involve our families in our personal matters. I have never involved my family for such issues. Issues and problems are the part of life and it is the bravery of a person to tackle the issue with ease. If you are brave, then there is nobody that could make bow.

If the friends are informed about the personal matters, they can understand the issue. They are also ready to help you. I have friends and they are also ready to sacrifice at all times, because I have also sacrificed for them several times. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 24)

#### *South Africa*

Friends were often expressed as the most important aspect of individuals' lives, not only in terms of the companionship that they may bring, but also because it is through their association that individuals find protection, a sense of belonging, and are integral to the process by which they define themselves. Leading on from the following code, the concept of friendship was often expressed through its negation and had much to do with respect. One participant noted that:

A friend is someone who doesn't respect me it would be someone who would walk in here I am sitting with my friends and gives everyone a R5 and he doesn't give me every single day of my life not just on that one single day. (Durban-KwaMashu 10)

Such material benefits expected of friendship are not, however, limited in that manner, but rather are a means of expressing a deeper ontological understanding of friendship as an important facet of one's own identity, as noted by another participant:

A friend is somebody you are close with, somebody you spend a lot of time with. When you wake up you think of this person. You think of them when you are just sitting or when you are eating. Sometimes you wonder whether they have food to eat. A friend is somebody who seems like you share blood with. (Durban-KwaMashu 2)

Such facets can also be generative of forms of protection, and importantly, as a means of justifying one's own beliefs and understandings of the world, as touched upon by another participant:

It is important because you find a person that you can open up to, this is a person that you can trust with your life, and he is very close to you. You should not be killed by guilty conscience when you have a friend. (Durban-KwaMashu 5)

It is for this reason that friendship and understandings of truth were often linked together, as seen in the above quotes, but which was also more extensively spoken about by another participant:

#### 9.4 The Shape of the Code of the Street in Cross-Cultural Comparison 137

A friend for me is someone you speak too and you can tell everything whether it is something that is bothering you or is not going well and you seeking for advice, or it could be someone you get happy with but friends also differs because there are best friends and also just a friend a best friend is the one who you close with so much and that best friend ends up being your go to person your number your brother or sister, and you talk to that person about everything you trust them with your all and then there is a friend that you meet in class, you work with, your travel with etc. someone you don't with all your heart not like a best friend. (Durban-KwaMashu 6)

Such bonds of trust, normalized through the understanding that friends occupy a special place in another's life, and should be accorded special provisions, translate into a concern with the fulfillment of personal safety. As one participant noted:

A friend is someone you share with everything like your views, what you like, where you are visiting etc. a friend is someone you can trust so much depending on how your relationship is with the person you call a friend. You must tell that person you call your friend let's say you are in trouble that friend can help there is a true friend who is your ride or die, all your secrets you can share with your friend knowing he or she will have your back no matter what. (Durban-KwaMashu 7)

*Similarities*: The idea of friendship was similar between all contexts. Friendship is shaped by mutual trust and loyalty. Friends are a source of identity and the values within a group of friends are powerful influences on males' behavior. Moreover, friends play the role of protector in a threatening environment and seen from this perspective, friends are a type of weapon. Conversely, friends are also a source of disappointment and can behave fraudulently, especially if they do not fulfill their duties, like providing support in a violent situation, or by taking one's girlfriend.

*Differences*: The *only* important difference in terms of conceptions was in relation to the role and structures imposed by the existence of gangs. In Germany, no gang activity was mentioned. However, "loose" gangs were reported by juveniles in Pakistan and clearly organized gangs were mentioned in South Africa. Those gangs are usually very violent and friendship in those groups includes sharing economic activities, like drug dealing, and showing through violence that one belongs to the group as intended protection against future violence.

# *9.4.5 Comparison of Respect*

Respect is one of the principal codes in both Anderson's study and in the data gathered in the three countries. It is furthermore intimately tied with violence, both as a driver of violence in the name of respect or as a means of garnering respect, and inversely, in being drawn from the symbolic use of violence itself. In the inner city neighborhoods, respect on the street may be considered a form of social capital and a safeguard against future victimization (Anderson 1999: 87). However, it is challenged by counterparts through insulting and taking possessions. The common view among young males is that the maintenance of respect is important to them. They felt more disrespect when someone showed disrespect to their family, particularly to their mother or by talking about them behind their back. However, some of the respondents, particularly from Pakistan, said that if they believed that the person respected their family (especially mother, sister, or any other close relative) they showed respect to them as well. Moreover, the respondents justified violence as revenge for disrespect. They considered it as an essential act to safeguard respect and family honor.

#### *Germany*

As noted in the previous chapter, respect is the most pronounced street code that was found in the German context. Gaining respect and retaliation to disrespect are salient trajectories mentioned repeatedly by German interviewees. As such, it has an important structuring effect on the worldviews and frameworks of the interviewees, so much so that it is often a principle goal and fundamentally informs the life narratives of individuals that were interviewed. In their campaign for respect, youths portray a strong character on the street, for instance, through the manifestation of manhood and toughness. Most of the young participants believe that a violent reputation is instrumental in gaining respect on the street. There is always a dual nature to respect in this guise, with violence being used as a means of garnering respect and yet once respect has been achieved, respect can operate as a symbolic form of capital which may subsequently prevent actual violence because of an individual's status or reputation. As such, several German participants engaged in violent street activities to gain a violent image and respect. While talking about respect, a 20-year-old respondent living in Dortmund-Nordstadt noted:

[…] by now nothing happens to me, because the people know me. Because they know I easily freak out if something happens. So, I have my name [reputation], I would say, I created my name [respect]. So at first, everyone said, come, let's chase him. Frequently several persons came to me or my siblings. […] Once also, my little brother was fasting, he came to me and was crying. Then I wanted to go to the little children, because they wanted to snatch his phone, and I said, listen boys, my little brother is fasting. If I hear again, that you do something, I go to your parents and show you in front of your parents who I really am. So to speak, don't touch him anymore. […] And since then also anything [happened] again. And yes, somehow like with those 15 Bulgarians, with whom I fought, since then also nobody comes to me and to wants to fight with me or so. (Dortmund-Nordstadt 7)

The above excerpt from a young man reveals that a violent reputation is a form of cultural capital that can itself be used to gain respect and protection in the risky neighborhood. He recollects the harsh experience of being a victim of violence before having used similar forms of violence to win the respect and thus relative safety that is engendered by the reputation built on the use of violence. There is an irony here, but one that reveals one reason for the prioritization of respect—once respect is garnered through the use of violence, it allows for a relatively peaceful future existence. Thus, he notes later that his violent encounters engendered a reputation in the neighborhoods and he believes that it safeguards him and his family. Similar accounts were reported in other neighborhoods as well. The symbolic capital drawn from the use of violence must periodically be shored up or redisplayed to cement the reputation upon which respect from others is derivative. As already stated, disrespect is repaid with violence, particularly an affront to one's mother. An interviewee explained the following account when he was asked how to respond to disrespect:

Teach him respect. Well, I mean not hitting him directly or so. But […] when one is disrespecting parents, I am more aggressive. Therefore, give him a slap for respect. Not boxing him. But such a slap. (Berlin-Wedding 4)

The narrative of a young man argued that the consequences of insolence are to teach the perpetrator a lesson through violence. In a similar fashion, another interviewee shared a story that happened to him:

Disrespect itself, for instance, also leads to violence. For example, today a little child has offended me several times indirectly. Why are you so tall? I told him several times to stop. Also told him differently, more strictly. Then he even got one. But such a slap for respect, so that he shall respect the older one. So, just disrespect can cause violence. (Berlin-Neukoelln 6)

The narration formulates the rule of respect and disrespect legitimating violence. The adolescents affirmed the prevalence of the rule of respect and that those who do not follow the rules, deserve punishment, which results in violence. The subject of the most significant insult—mothers—reveals that the use of violence is not somehow divorced from the context in which the individual finds himself. In general, the adolescents accentuated the need to show respect to family members and older people in their neighborhoods. An 18-year-old young interview partner illustrates that by the following comment:

I know many other teenagers, we were taught all by our parents, we are all polite. All are polite, how we talk, help elderly people, nothing. But sometimes, when we see that others are disrespectful, we also get a bit nervous. We also say, what are you doing. Help Mr. So-and-so, he doesn't have much money, what are you doing. That's how we are. Yes, the others maybe, other teenagers don't do that. They have not been taught respect, respect by their parents. (Duisburg-Marxloh 1)

In the narration of this young participant shows the civility and respect toward the elderly. This respect is derivative of the knowledge and acknowledgement of a larger chain of being and so as an acknowledgment of their own life histories. Most interviewees understand respect in normative ways and positively in relation to mutual respect. Thus, a young man notes:

Respect should be for parents and oneself, for example, it is mutual, if you want respect, you will have to respect. (Dortmund-Nordstadt 10)

Mutual respect, based on the acknowledgement of potential violence that could be perpetuated against one another, becomes a crucial means of building alliances and even friendships. Overall, the accounts of the young participants showed similar broader perspectives about respect, albeit with various individual idiosyncrasies and perspectives. "Diss me, and I will show you who I am" is the most accentuated theme by youths in these neighborhoods. The narrations indicate that the maintenance of respect protects them in their neighborhoods and constructs a ruthless reputation. Other viewpoints of young interviewees about respect is more normative, which rests on a moral relationship with others and regarding others respectfully, particularly their mothers and the elderly.

#### *Pakistan*

Respect is also an important aspect in the Pakistani street code, albeit narrated through a somewhat different cosmology. It is primarily linked with the family as a whole but is however not limited to or understood as solely derivative of an individual person. Particularly, respecting women (mother, sister, and wife or other female members) is a significant code of the street. The adolescents become aggressive when they see any kind of disrespect for any of their family members. It is the prime duty of a male to protect the respect and honor of his family in general, but of the women of his family in particular. If a man is unable to protect his family, he is considered as "*buzdil*" (coward), which is a negative sign of masculinity and manhood. Respect then is not only symbolically linked to violence but is a key mechanism for the display of masculinity. An aggressive person garners high respect. Further, the level of aggression and status of a person to protect physically is of great importance. If a young adult is able to demonstrate high levels of aggression in response to a show of disrespect against any family member, he is considered as "*bahadur*" (a great man). In return, he enjoys more respect and honor. Similar to the German data, respect is an important and clear code of the street and has a mutual nature. Here are some of the extracts from the data:

[…] for us dignity, honor and respect are the main things. And if someone harms my dignity and self-respect I cannot tolerate it. (Rawalpindi-Dhok Matkial 26)

Respect is respect. If someone does not respect me, how would I be able to respect him/her. If someone doesn't respect you there is no point respecting him back. If someone does not answer to your Salam, it is considered as disrespect. For example, if I am on date with a girl and she disclosed the secrecy to someone else this would be a shameful act for me because my friends will say "He has been disgraced by his girlfriend". This is a shame for me. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 27)

Respect is also essential for the membership in groups. In this regard, some interviewees underline the central role of the group leader. Thus, one respondent argued, that the leader is responsible for passing norms of respect. For another respondent, the respect for a senior member is the utmost and only indicator of being part of the group. In the case of deviancy, deviants are expelled from the group. For deviants and nonconformists, life on the street becomes difficult. They are marginalized and may become a victim of the harsh behavior of their erstwhile group. Opponent groups are already against them and they experience hostility from all sides. Consequently, they may apologize and become a part of the violent group.

PST (one of the groups) has its member and they respect us, but those who are children (chotay) are not aware of it. They are harshly treated so that they can obey the senior members of the group. The group leader is responsible to pass the norms of the groups to the members about who should be respected and who should not. If they do not learn they are made to leave the groups. It again becomes difficult for those members to live freely in this area. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 21)

He who follows the members of the group is suitable. If he accepts the senior as his senior and follows the norms it means that individual is suitable to become the member of the group. Inside the group respect and obedience is essential. If the members are obeying each other it means they are respecting each other. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 22)

For me respect is that people do not call me with bad names. If you are a thief or a robber or do drugs people have no respect for you. There should be acceptability of an individual among the peers, neighbors and friends. If an individual is respected, then it is the ultimate respect of the family. If you are deviant, you have no respect. (Islamabad-France Colony 16)

The adolescents were asked how respect can be earned. One person clearly mentioned that respect is earned through whatever means. It could be either respect for respect, money for respect or the use of force and violence to show physical strength and create fear among others to gain respect. Another respondent expressed these views:

Respect is a very important thing but not everyone gets it neither everyone gives it. Most of the time you have to earn it either by your efforts or by force. Guys who are very much violent are given more respect in the street by fellows and peers. If a guy does not want to play with us or make a bet on the game or he avoids violence so then we have nothing to do with him. He has his own life and own choices, we don't force him. But I think noble people have no such place in this neighborhood because here respect is given to those who are more violent and aggressive. (Rawalpindi-Dhok Matkial 26)

It is pertinent to mention that respect also has levels. It was asked who earns the highest respect in risky urban neighborhoods. The answer indicates significant characteristics of respect:

The guy who is the toughest among us, who is always there for other friends in times of need, who never runs away from fights and who fights like a man, is given much respect and honor. We have a friend we call him fouji (solider) is a very nice guy but he is short tempered as well, he is habitual of starting fight with other guys over very minor things like if someone is stalking his girlfriend, he will start beating that guy. But with all that we give him a lot of respect because he fights for us. He has helped me many times and I also try to help him back whenever he needs my help. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 27)

Another respondent reported a more egalitarian understanding of respect among his friends:

We all friends are equal, there is no such inferiority or superiority. However, other boys on the street have formed groups in which they have chosen their leader. They remain in the group all the time and mostly fight as a team with other guys. Their leader is mostly the toughest guy among them who is very good at fighting. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 28)

It is visible that there is hierarchy of relationships (despite of a respondent's disagreement) among members of the group. The hierarchy is based on age-based seniority, physical strength, toughness, shortness of temper, courage, daring, and not being cowardly. However, this is not the only reason to get respect. Resources and money accumulation are also important indicators of gaining respect.

I want to earn money so that I can have a healthy life. If you are poor, this means that nobody will respect you. I am thankful to God that I am working and earning, and it is difficult for them who don't. Even the family members are not ready to accept them. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 21)

The respondents believe that they have to accumulate money in order to gain respect. Those youngsters who have money and resources, receive respect from everyone—members of the group, family, and everyone on the street. However, if a person does not have money, he is perceived as a person that requires the minimum of respect.

Respect for women, children and elderly people is important and it is the norm in local society. A person must always demonstrate respect for elders (parents, grandparents and elderly people) as well as elder brothers, sisters; in fact, anyone older than oneself. Much like the German example then, respect for one's own history and heritage—marked through the respect of elders and traditions, for instance—remains as important as individual respect garnered through the use of violence. If someone deviates, others may impose sanctions. They may fight or become violent with each other. Similarly, if a person experiences disrespectful behavior toward his family, he becomes violent, because he does not want to lose face due to the disrespecting behavior of others.

I do respect my parents, not only my parents but every old man and woman. If I tell you about my toughness, you can get the idea from the fact that I started working and earning when I was only 8 or 9 years old. I have faced so many difficulties in very harsh situations, I have spent days and nights without food, all those situations have made me strong. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 1)

Once we were sitting here near Bri Imam [shrine] there were two girls sitting with their mother. Few boys were teasing those girls. I went to them and told these boys not to do that. They taunted me and said why are you getting angry, are these girls your sisters? I said I have no relation with these girls, but I also have sisters like them at my home. Then those boys called their other friends and they warned me to mind my own business. This thing made me lose my temper and I started fighting with them. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 27)

Few days ago, a boy in our neighborhood was stalking my sister who uses to go to nearby madrassa. My sister told me that this guy is stalking her for last three to four days. Next day, I went to that guy and I told him to avoid doing this thing again he said ok. But next day he did the same and my sister told me that he did it again, it made me so angry and I went after that guy. I found him near the cricket ground and beat him so much. Now he will never do this again then I taught him a lesson. Another thing which cannot be tolerated is if someone among my friends backstabs me, means discloses my personal information and things to my family members, things that I don't want them to become aware of. If someone does that then he has to face its consequences. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 27)

Family respect and honor are an integral part of socialization in Pakistan. Pakistani socialization requires a person to spend their whole life earning money for the family and to protect the family and maintain its the respect. It is the supreme responsibility of every citizen. Respect is an essential code of the street and its preservation is important for adults in the risky urban neighborhoods of Pakistan. It is produced, reproduced, and consumed both on and off the streets in Pakistan. Similar to the German data, young people's interviews reflected that respect must be shown to elderly people, women, and children.

#### *South Africa*

In South Africa, respect was articulated by the participants in two ways, one of which might be understood as the "public" narrative and the other the "private" narrative. The different usages of these two narratives were most clearly highlighted by comparing the results from individual interviews and the focus group discussions. In the latter, the participants frequently articulated respect in terms of distinctions between those who were deemed successful and those who were not. In this guise, respect is a function of one's position in society, whether it be socioeconomic or through sociocultural distinction—the successful sportsman was seen as equally as respectable as the successful businessman. A particular participant was emphatic in his description of success, and in this articulation, also respect:

I can define success as a time when you have achieved all your goals. All your dreams have come true. You have everything that you have wished for in life. Although I know that as people we always wish for more. But there are times when you can see that some people have achieved what they were wishing for. Some people wanted to become doctors and they have achieved that. They have also wished that they could get married and now they are married. It is having everything that you have wished for. I see that as success. (Durban-KwaMashu 5)

Respect is furthermore not only garnered in the obtaining of such distinctions, but also in laboring toward such a goal. Thus, in terms of a public narrative, those participants identified either themselves or their peers as successful when they could be seen as visibly working toward such more widely shared goals. For instance, one participant noted:

Actually, my older cousin. I grew up with him and he didn't study further, but he went back to finish his matric and now he is the manager or assistant manager at Kirstenbosch Gardens. He used every opportunity that he could and that is how I want to be. (Cape Town-Hanover Park 10)

Such broad overtures to success and respect as the visible manifestation of economic, social or cultural power are however complicated when compared to the "private" narrative articulated by participants in the individual interviews. Respect was also understood to be an important means of both acknowledging and indicating attention to the importance of historical narratives and traditions, a cosmology in which inheriting and passing on traditional forms of knowledge is important and marked by numerous rites of passage. One participant noted that:

Respect is that to respect is to respect someone who is older than you respect is doing something that you know that okay it is to do something which you don't want another person to do it its always looking for whether being the better person, respect its knowing your lane and being conscious of everybody surrounding you in such a way that you guys don't you won't clash because if you people respect each other. (Durban-KwaMashu 8)

With the peer pressure to normalize societal understandings of what constitutes respect and success removed to some extent (although it should be noted that by virtue of the interviewer being present, such attempts at normalization can never be entirely removed, especially in the context of South Africa's recent history in which the interviewer was "white" and the participants primarily "colored" or "black"). The resulting "private" narrative of violence far more closely linked to physical ability, the capability to commit violence, and a life history of having used violence to maintain respect. Interestingly though, the use of violence as a means of enforcing respect was itself understood as a normalized leadership strategy and behavioral outcome.

It happens everywhere if, people don't […] if someone is going to get robbed, and they don't like to want to give their things over, then gangsters are obviously going to like to try to take it off them, and if they try to stop them, most of the time they will stab the person, because that's how it works. (Cape Town-Hanover Park 14. Emphasis added)

"It" here stands as symbolic of what constitutes the norm and is itself representative of the participant's understanding of the normal. Fundamentally important, though, was the importance of ensuring that the reality presented to the participants by their peers was an authentic one, and one that was based on authentic experiences. One participant noted this:

Like if you are just straight up to me like you take me, I can't explain it, you just got to be straight up with me and don't tell lies. If you respect me whatever you do you will not lie to me. Once you have done it you will not back down for it, if you do something but if you don't respect yourself you are going to lie. (Durban-KwaMashu 8)

That this is the default and expected outcome is indicative both of the extensive use of violence in order to articulate and defend self-mandated conceptions of respect. It is furthermore positioned as a verb, indicative of respect being articulated through actions, in which violence is not only the vehicle through which respect is achieved but through which it is en*force*d, to emphasize the word in its repetition. This duality shall be more extensively explored in relation to the code of success, and respect and success are intimately interlinked.

*Similarities*: A common theme relating to the code of respect in the interviews across the sites is that respect is both a vehicle for the cementing of as well as one by which to initially garner a reputation. If built on the use of violence, and symbolically reinforced through myth and storytelling, then such a reputation can both provide cultural capital and protect from further violence. Having "a name" is both violent and peaceful, which shows the ambivalent character of respect in the identity of male juveniles. It is nothing they can be sure about and need to campaign for it all the time, but the way to accumulate the reputation is at minimum twofold. On the one hand, young males need to act violently and show the ability to fight, to become respected. On the other hand, and this is in opposition to Anderson's description of the dynamics within the African American neighborhood in Philadelphia in the 1990s, those violent characters need to act politely and with loyalty toward their friends and family, but also to elders and unknown citizens. So male juveniles in risky neighborhoods are in a dilemma of contradictory expectations and can only lose, which causes anger and frustration. However, a pattern that emerged is that having a reputation is assumed to protect people from violence.

*Differences*: Clear differences are observable in the perception of money and the manner in which respect is connected to the accruement of material capital. Having money is perceived as a goal in life, but it does not mean, that having money necessarily or directly correlates with respect amongst peers. It stands on its own and the perception depends on the broader context. However, in the Pakistani interviews, such a causality is claimed. Another dissimilarity between the contexts is that only in South Africa, violence is a way to accumulate respect in the manner Anderson describes in the example of the Germantown neighborhood in Philadelphia. Neither in Germany, nor in Pakistan such a direct path described is by the adolescents.

# *9.4.6 Comparison of Enemy*

Close social bonds, such as seen in the dynamics between friends and close groups, are considered crucial for the safety of individuals who reside in risky neighborhoods. However, in case of disrespect, friends can turn into enemies, as narrated by Anderson (1999: 90) through the story of Malik and Tryee who were friends and used to hang around together, until Tryee felt disrespect and confronted Malik. Anderson (1999: 190) states that in inner city neighborhoods there is an environment of competition and youth are socialized *competitively* with peers. In the neighborhood, young people vie for respect, girlfriends, and reputation in the staging area and young people are jealous of each other. Furthermore, the residents of inner city neighborhoods have little trust in state institutions, particularly the justice system and police. They think that institutions have double standards: one for black and another for white people (Anderson 1999: 133). Therefore, there are a number of ambiguities through which the concept of the enemy both operates and is used to define individuals as enemies.

#### *Germany*

As has been mentioned, the youths in Germany spend much of their time together in small groups. A common viewpoint among adolescents about the "enemy" is other groups or counterparts who behave disrespectfully. What disrespect means differs between persons, the social situation, and personal attributes like age, religion or ethnicity, and the history of the social relationship between the individuals. One prominent theme in the interviews was insolent individuals who challenge the respect of family and friends:

An enemy? For me an enemy is, for example someone who […] insults my mother […] who for example did something to my best friend, […] steals his girlfriend, it's like this for me, because with such I don't want anything to do with it. (Duisburg-Marxloh 6)

An enemy? […] It used to be like this for me, an enemy is, like I said, if he insults my family several times. In my head he is directly my enemy. Just because! I keep in my mind who insults my family is immediately my enemy. Well I don't hit him down! But we will not become friends. (Berlin-Wedding 4)

Though often minor, such acts of disrespect perpetuate the violence and enmity among adolescents in their neighborhoods. A storyline of young interviewee from Neukoelln about an enemy:

A person who fucks up. Although I shut up and still he carries on with it. And at some point you provoke each other, sometime you fight one other all the time. And then this is an enemy for me. He would be an enemy for me. Then there will be confrontation. (Berlin-Neukoelln 7)

Many adolescents noted their mistrust of their friends or people in the same age in the neighborhoods:

Enemy for me is ambiguous. Some people are two-faced, who talk with you, who laugh to your face, laugh. But talk behind the back. (Duisburg-Marxloh 5)

An enemy? An enemy for me is someone […] who so to say fucked up, he will never be my friend anymore. Because, I am respectful to him, but he is not to me. The thing, the thing doesn't fit together. […] Well then, so to say I don't text him anymore and he, I don't go out with him anymore. (Dortmund-Nordstadt 5)

Among the adolescents, there is competition, e.g., for possessions and women, and in this race, friends can turn into enemies, for instance, if one betrays or tries to take up with the other's girlfriend. Thus, several adolescents claimed that a person who is envious of one's success and belongings can be defined as an enemy. One describes it like this:

Enemy? Is. Pfff. For example, if he sees in you dough, money. Or if he sees that you have good clothes. A lush car. You have a lush house. You buy for your wife, children clothes. Then, no idea, something else. That is one, how do you call that? A jealous person. We call that jealousy. (Berlin-Wedding 2)

In some ethnic diverse neighborhoods, the adolescents see new arrivals, particularly eastern European and Arabs, as competitors. This was stated by an adolescent from Marxloh while discussing what it meant to be an enemy:

Yes, there are some guys, for example, you always hear about the Arab, they are strong. Those are families, with those families you can't mess up. It happens here in Marxloh. Of course, there are families like this. With them, people always say those Arabs, my god, they are. For me, many Arabs are friends with me. (Duisburg-Marxloh 6)

In Marxloh, the largest non-German ethnic groups are Turks, but in the past few years other minority groups, including eastern European and some Arabs, settled down in the neighborhood. As such, some of the youths see them as competitive and ascribed the higher crime rate to these new arrivals in neighborhoods:

Honestly speaking, I don't feel well here anymore. Not anymore like before. Also, for example all the Bulgarian people, here are so many Bulgarians. […] one is worried about one's bags, one's phone, one's money. (Duisburg-Marxloh 1)

Importantly, some of the participants reported being victims of police violence and misconduct. They have a little trust in the police and see them as enemy. The interview partners described that they are not treated well for two reasons: first being resident of the neighborhood and second because of their migration background.

#### *Pakistan*

An enemy is someone with whom one has had a minor disagreement, or where confusion or betrayal of a person has occurred, in the Pakistani interviews. Once a person is termed as an enemy, he is perceived as an enemy for life. Different from the German data, enmity in Pakistan is severe in nature and brings about violence. A respondent explained that every group has a purpose and they form alliances (friendship) or they align with others to secure themselves from enemies. As one participant noted:

All the groups have their purposes. For example, if anyone can help them with their activities, they will develop friendship with him. If anyone opposes them, they consider him as their enemy. (Islamabad-France Colony 16)

The enmity may start with a person, but it incorporates a family or ethnic group instantly, due to the collective nature of the society. In other words, the image of an enemy is not limited to an individual person only; his relatives and ethnic group may become involved due to the strong kinship system.

If the groups are involved in conflicts, then it means they are threat to others too. Sometimes it happens that the conflict becomes severe and that particular time there is a threat for ordinary people, too. (Islamabad-France Colony 17)

When the research team asked about the enemy, a respondent pointed out:

We stand over here [pointing towards the place where the people were entering into Darbar] and observe the boys. Information has been collected about the [behaviors] of the boy. We have sources [Banday] spread over here and they keep a close eye on the movement of those deviants. If we find that the boy is teasing girls, we follow them. By then, that particular boy also becomes aware and then we make him realize about our rules. If he accepts, it is all cool, but if he doesn't, it means he has to prepare himself to become our enemy. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 22)

Once an incidence of enmity is reported, it becomes a source of future conflicts. The adolescents become allies or enemies of each other. They fight, they beat up, harm, and victimize each other. One respondent reported the details of a fight with an opponent group.

They [enemy] beat one of our friends. The reason was not known at that time. The name of our friend was Fauji. Those boys beat our friend [Fauji]. So it was a conflict among them. Then a time came when Fauji was not present and we were, the boys came here and asked about Fauji that who is Fauji amongst you. When we told them that Fauji is not present, they started to call us names. They were trying to make the issue serious. They started to abuse our friends. […] Then my cousin came and he pretended to be Fauji. He started to retaliate and at that very moment all our friends came there. One of the boys from the other group punched our friend with iron knuckles he was wearing in his fingers. We were sitting there idle and they were equipped with conflicting weapons. They were carrying Chabi, Zanjeer and Punch. We injured some of them. After that event we went to Police station and reported about the conflict. They were also there at police station to report. It's been a year since that fight. The boys over here are harami [deviant]. They consider themselves the badmash [gangster] of the area. Violence has been the common norm amongst them. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 23)

Although these adolescents do not consider themselves as "gangs", they nonetheless term the alliance as a "group". Despite repeatedly being asked if they were a gang, they held fast to the terminology of being a "group". It was also asked if they have frequent fights with each other or opponent groups. One of the respondents reported:

Yes, they fight a lot. Few days ago, Angar and Malangi group beat few students of nearby school collectively using locks of bicycle. Those students are not from our colony so that's why they joined each other for the purpose of beating the boys and that what we do in our colony. We might have internal conflicts and contentions but when it comes to a collective action against an outsider we show unity and compete with them with full strength. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 27)

It was also asked of respondent: In what kind of fights have you been? A respondent gave further details of the reasons for the fights, repeating the need for avenging honor crimes committed against close relatives. He mentioned:

As I said, the honor and dignity of my family is very important to me and if someone is threatening me or my family, I can cross any limit to protect my family. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 2)

Closed groups, particularly cousins, have a high level of trust, compared to groups without familial or ethnic ties. Similarly, neighbors or close friends have more trust in each other compared to the trust of a distant person. Another interview partner provided insight into the trust and support required to fight with enemies:

The enmity exists among groups in a way that the groups from this France Colony resist the deviant activities by other groups. If they fight back, then the group members from this colony become united to fight together. We have seen them moving towards other areas of Islamabad in order to have fight with others. Sometimes they don't even know what they are fighting for. (Islamabad-France Colony 16)

Young people gather informally on the corner of a street or a park and are close friends. If any of them has a problem, they send a message to their friends. Upon arrival, they identify the person who has created the friend's problem as the enemy and may start a fight or in some cases, they do not join the fight. This behavior is mutually reciprocal. They join the fight in order to reduce their own vulnerability. The group is considered as their so-called "safety network". Even friends who are reluctant to join in the fight, are forced to join. If they resist they are subject to violence and teasing by the rest of the group to force them to join the group. If the person does not join this group, he could join the opponent in order to get support, but either way, he needs to be part of a group to reduce his own vulnerabilities. Purposeless fights are often due to intoxication, family concerns, or occur through jealousy. As already stated, despite the need to show aggression, masculinity, toughness, and power to both friends and enemies, the enemy is nonetheless an important element of the street code in Islamabad and Rawalpindi.

#### *South Africa*

Enemies were understood by the participants in South Africa in a composite manner, for those identified as enemies were used both in a comparative manner in relation to those they understood to be friends, yet also were used as normative markers by negation—enemies were those people who were not friends. The complexity and interplay of these different understandings can be witnessed in a quote from one of the participants:

Yes I do have enemies most cases people are the one that come to me and make an enemy out of me, let me speak about three people whom I regard as my enemy, one is an old man who use to go to our church, he shouted at man saying I must leave his kid no one is allowed to date at church and so I got slapped so till today he doesn't know he is my enemy. (Durban-KwaMashu 7)

Enemies, more tangibly, were also seen as physical threats especially in Cape Town, where firearm violence poses a continued and almost constant threat both directly—through being targeted by a rival gang and shot at—and indirectly—by falling victim to a misdirected or ricocheting bullet. Indeed, the indirect threat of projectiles fired by gangs in conflict with one another has caused many thousands of deaths in many of the impoverished communities in the city, a process which was facilitated and expedited by a South African Police Service officer who sold over 1000 firearms, confiscated from other areas, to the gangs. He is at the time of writing serving a 15-year jail sentence.

Enemies occupy both a physical and conceptual reality in the minds of the participants, and form part of the architecture of the communities in which they live. Furthermore, they also serve to define the scope of that cityscape in terms of their ability to move around and visit other parts of the city. If, for instance, they are known to be from a particular gang with its owned defined territorial zone, then they cannot move to a rival gang's territory without encouraging some sort of retaliation. Indeed, such an action would be seen as a form of disrespect, a pragmatic linkage between the concept of enemy, territory, and respect. As one participant noted:

An enemy is someone who can stop you from doing what you want to do that's an enemy if someone wants to stop me from doing what I love, is trying to stop or getting in the way of me doing what I want to do then that person is an enemy but how I view, a person is their own enemy like you are your own enemy cause if you want to do something and you cannot because you can't then you are your own worst enemy because no one is trying to stop you but yourself so I think I am my worst enemy so like I always try to impress me. (Durban-KwaMashu 9)

As touched upon above, enemies serve an important role in negatively defining the spaces and ideas that participants use in understanding themselves, including their understandings and performance of violence-related norms. Violence itself is in some sense defined by the relationship that some of the participants had both with their enemies and friends, but also in the manner that these two social groups had impacted on their ideas and choices. There may be then an ontological dimension to participants' understandings of an enemy, as can be seen in a response by another participant:

Well these things of enemy it is someone who has betrayed you, it is someone who has a problem your blood and his don't clash. Enemy can also be your friend they betray you and if they betray me it is over. (Durban-KwaMashu 2)

One participant, for instance, also linked the concerns he had with those he understood to be his enemies to his choices of clothing. Such linkages are important in both showing the intersectional nature of the codes more generally, but also in exhibiting the complexity and nuances of participants' world views. Such nuance is important to note, especially in the South African context, for often poverty is understood normatively, so as to generalize and homogenize diverse communities simply under the rubric of "poor". As he noted:

An enemy is the person, the one who sees you on the road and has negative things to say about you, for example he would make a nasty comment about my skinny jean. I am sorry to bring back the issue of skinny jean. So even I change to another one, this person would still have nothing positive to say. You find that when I am at fault, again this person is the one who will judge me first and go around telling everybody what I have done. That person, that whether you do good or bad, you always look bad to them, which is what I consider an enemy. (Durban-KwaMashu 5)

Perhaps then, considering the centrality that enemies play as a negative of that which participants understood to be enabling, some believed that the best way of transcending the impact that enemies may have on their lives is through their negation. As two participants separately noted:

An enemy you guys have completely different views from me we would, you are an enemy to me I do not like you, you don't like me so it's like that a completely different views is an enemy because you have nothing to share nothing absolutely nothing. (Durban-KwaMashu 10)

I have a lot of them, enemies, people whom you see clearly that they do not want you. Some of the would even tell your straight in the face that thy do not like you. (Durban-KwaMashu 2)

*Similarities*: In all contexts, an enemy was described as someone who works against the social reputation of an individual, or which utilizes their close ties to undermine others in surreptitious ways. They are as such not generally seen as complete outsiders, but those who can utilize their social ties with individuals and groups to hurt or undermine the group from the inside. With this operating as a platform, it is not necessarily an opponent in a physical fight, more a social rival who acts with a hidden agenda. While this may seem somewhat astonishing, it is clearly a logical consequence of the concept of respect and the way to accumulate it. It is not a shame to lose in a fight, as long a male juvenile stands his ground, but having a reputation as weak, cowardly or dishonest can cause serious damage to the important social individual image. Those who build up such a negative image through lies or as a result of undermining others are seen as enemies. Interestingly, violence is not always the way how to deal with an enemy; social strategies, like ignoring or undermine the social reputation of an enemy are accepted strategies. Furthermore, the enemy is conventionalized as the opposite of a friend, which is described as a loyal and trustful person. However, also friends are mistrusted and seen as possible competition, e.g., by attracting women.

*Differences*: The role of families in the way an enemy is conventionalized differs between the contexts. In Pakistan, an enemy undermines the reputation of the opponent family as well, but this is not true for Germany and South Africa. However, the reason for this is the fundamental difference in the organization of this community and family than what Anderson describes in the US context. So too the binary roles of *decent* and *street* are not developed in the same way as proposed by Anderson. Also, the role of friends in shaping an enemy differs between the contexts. Observable is that someone could become an enemy simply because s/he is the enemy of a friend. Also, friends can become enemies, e.g., when they "take" the girlfriend of a friend. Therefore, friends are also a source of mistrust and a potential social threat.

# *9.4.7 Reflection of the Shape of the Code of the Street*

The analysis of the core elements of the street code, enrolled on the individual perception, has brought similarities and differences to the original work about code of the street on the one hand, but shown also differences between the countries, we did research in. Looking at the broader picture, the findings suggest, that the construction of a street code and its shape differs highly between the countries. The differences compared to the work of Anderson are so significant, that we cannot see, that the theoretical approach of the code of the street, with it the causal assumption how the elements are connected to each other and which role violence plays (Chap. 3), can be maintained, if its claimed as a general theory about street violence in risky neighborhoods. But this theoretical reflection will be done more in detail in Chap. 11. Next, we want to discuss if the outcome of the code, the perception of violence, differs between the contexts.

# **9.5 Consequences of the Code of the Street for Male Juveniles from a Comparative Perspective**

# *9.5.1 Comparison of Violence Perception*

In inner city neighborhoods, the poverty and mistrust among people result in violence as a way of public life "which is effectively governed by the code of the street" (Anderson 1999).Moreover, street *fights*, drug use and sale, and harsh police activities are part of normal life. The diverse neighborhood ecologies and household violence experience by young people affirm their perception of the prevalence of violence throughout the community. Many of the respondents reported similar situations in their neighborhoods and described fighting and fist fights as an everyday routine. Moreover, the participants mentioned that violence is an effective way of dealing with everyday matters in the neighborhoods.

#### *Germany*

It is important to note that even the extremes in the German neighborhoods in the sample do not have the same level of violence as those in Pakistan or South Africa. But in the perception of the respondents, all neighborhoods are a threatening environment to which they have to react. From this perspective, we expect that the relational position of a neighborhood within a given context shapes the violence-related norms. Altogether, the sample of the neighborhoods and responses will allow a comparison of the violence-related norms of male juveniles in risky neighborhoods with those in Pakistan and South Africa to find out if the code of the street is a global concept and which norms are equal among all cases. The adolescents are well aware of high levels of street activities, including street brawls, drug activities, and police discrimination in their neighborhoods. The neighborhood's image and discrimination purely due to geography are important themes of narration of the young participants. A neighborhood's disorder and street violence are viewed as routine. Young men from Marxloh described the situation in their neighborhood as follows:

Yes okay, it is normal that some windows or so break, accidently, or some brawl in school, Marxloh. (Duisburg-Marxloh 5)

Violence? When you punch someone, or hit someone with a stick. It hasn't happened in our group, but for example with a stick, knuckleduster, such, such things. If you hit him really hard, he falls down on the ground, but you still hit him, you have no mercy. (Duisburg-Marxloh 4)

[…] then, at the fair, at the fair somehow I had a fight or something. Like it is common among adolescents. Unfortunately. And yes. Once I had a fight, I think it was in April, Easter, Easter break. At that time. Yes and I saw my brother, he also saw that I was fighting. But he did nothing. (Dortmund-Nordstadt 6)

The above excerpts depict the image of the neighborhood and everyday activities. In schools and other public places, a fight is considered as routine activity. Similar to these storylines, other adolescents reported different episodes of violence in their neighborhoods. In this milieu, violence is a commonplace means to settle matters. In various situations, youths tried to avoid engaging in violent acts immediately, to avoid escalating the situation. However, disrespect is countered with violence. As mentioned earlier, young people see violence as instrumental to avoid victimization and disrespect. As such, they frequently attempt to retaliate against any act of disrespect on the street.

#### *Pakistan*

Violence is an integral part of the lifestyle in the risky urban neighborhoods of Pakistan, but violence is not limited to street life. It is also part of the daily life at home, school, and even in the college and educational institutions in the form of violent student unions and violent fights among the students. It is considered as an essential part of the street code and also a part of daily life. It is considered that violence, drugs, and the struggle for girls are an important characteristic of the urban slums of Pakistan. Violence seems to be the dominant characteristic of urban neighborhoods. Adolescents believe that violence is the way to get what they are entitled to, show dominance, control the power dynamics, exercise power and dominance, and obtain honor and respect from the community. Those who are violent and aggressive receive higher levels of respect and honor. Those who are cowardly have low social value. Even the perception of violence is important to understand its deeper meaning in the life of male juveniles in risky neighborhoods. Obviously, violence is more as a physical act, it becomes a symbolic currency at the street. An adolescent defined violence as follows:

Disrespecting others, teasing someone without any reason, killing or torturing someone are all examples of violence. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 27)

The above definition of the violence was very common among the interview partners. Similarly, another respondent intimated that violence lay both in harboring unreasonable expectations as well as in the killing of a person. He told a story of violence:

Beating, teasing or killing someone without any reason all comes under violence. Few days ago, in our neighbor some guys came and they beat an older man here, when we came to know that we all came to his aid but till that time those guys had run away. After investigating we came to know that this old man had to pay some debt of those people but due to his poor socio-economic conditions he was unable to pay back the loan. This was also a kind of violence, a poor person who has no source of income, was beaten by those cowards. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 26)

Some respondents limited the definition of violence to discounting other forms of violence as part of the definition. However, another respondent mentioned physical, emotional, and mental disturbance as violence. He reported:

Any act which could harm a human being is violence, whether the harm is mental, emotional or physical. Though sometimes it becomes necessary to use violence for own defense but not in any other case. Bothering someone without any reason, poking nose in other peoples' business and fighting and beating others all are examples of violence. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 2)

The adolescents believed that violence is the means to gain different objectives, even such as gaining dominance and scoring a victory over others in sport. A respondent shared his experiences of violent activities in sports.

Sometimes violence becomes necessary for you, as once few guys started fighting with our friends during a cricket match. They were in majority and tortured our friends very badly. When we became aware of it we planned and after few days we captured few of those guys and gave them beating of their life. We might be having fights and experiences of violence but I never raised a hand on an elder person neither on a female. I also avoid making any trouble with children […] In our neighborhood most of our peers are violent and are involved in violence in one way or the other. Therefore, it is very necessary for us to look tough and hard in order to avoid possible victimization as if I look very innocent, I might be considered as an easy target by other guys and no one will be afraid of me. Respect is given to a guy who is more tough and aggressive. (Rawalpindi-Dhok Matkial 26)

It was visible from the data that violent behavior happens in the family too. Fights among family members or parents' punishment of their children are frequent. But parents only punish the deviancy of their children and children are expected to accept parental punishment. Common too was corporal punishment in school. Thus, the violence seems an integral part of daily life in risky urban neighborhoods. A respondent stated:

Sometimes family matters also cause violence in our neighborhood, issues over property which become cause of enmities among families and households. These days issues related to girls have become a major reason for violence, as these days, boys and girls are both very hot (garam) who then cause contentions for their families. (Islamabad-France Colony 16)

When violence is used, people do not only fight bodily with each other, but also use weapons. Weapons mentioned included pistols, Kalashnikov rifles, knives, and knuckle-dusters. A respondent asked about weapons said:

Yes, I can use pistol, Kalashnikov, these are at home. I don't take them outside with me because when you have such weapon there is more chance to use it because we mostly indulge in unforeseen problems. And if I ended up using it, I am going to have to spend the whole life in jail. I might commit some murder so that's why it is better to keep them at home […] Keeping in view the situation of our neighborhood we have to show some violence in some cases to gain reputation and respect among our peers. If I do not respond to a violent act for my friend or anyone else, I will then become an easy target in future as well. Nobody will then be afraid of me so therefore it is necessary to react violently in order to gain respect from others. However, I am against of raising hand on women, children or elders. I never did this neither. I allow any of my friends to do so. I don't even help anyone do that. I try to help the women and elders as much as I can if they are in trouble. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 27)

Adolescents in the risky urban neighborhood used knuckle-dusters to fight with each other as well to fight with the opponents. As a respondent mentioned:

Punch is used mostly. Punch is used on fingers. It is dangerous because the injury from punch does not recover or heal soon. So, once it is used, then the injuries remain for a long period of time. Along with punch, stick is also used. Even pistols are used. But all the boys in different groups do not have pistols and it is difficult to use. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 21)

#### Another respondent argued:

We do not use any specific kind of weapon. At the time of conflicts everything is used that comes handy. Rods/Cudgels are mostly used. Some people use punches which is worn around the fingers and it makes severe injury when used. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 22)

It is not true that all adolescents in the risky urban neighborhoods of Pakistan are violent. Those who are involved in violent activities become used to violence. Nevertheless, there was a huge population which was nonviolent. A young respondent reported:

I am personally against all types of violence. Violence is violence, there is no normality in it, though there are sometimes and moments in which you have to become violent for your dignity and honor but it's better to avoid it anyhow. And I personally consider violence against females, elders and children as an act of coward. A man with honor and dignity will never raise his hand on children, elders and females. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 1)

Violence is one of the dominant codes of the street in the risky urban neighborhoods of Pakistan. Deviant adolescents particularly were active participants in violent activities, using different kinds of weapons to fight with each other and in fights against their enemies. They were perpetuators as well as victims of violence.

#### *South Africa*

Violence, and the norms which provide a means of expressing, condoning and/or condemning it remains a central feature of the book. The South African example, at least with reference to an extensive list of publications and reports, has the highest levels of violence amongst the countries compared here, and indeed some of the highest levels of violence in the world. By this measure then, one would expect to find an implicit acceptance of violence, and in which the norms authorizing the use of violence are so deeply ingrained in the practices of young men that its use is widely accepted. While there was some evidence for the former, there is also evidence pointing to the participants having far more complex understandings of violence than belied by such reports. Indeed, as documented below, many of the participants understood violence in both a moral and pragmatic framework, in which its selective use may be a necessary but a problematic tool by which to articulate and perform an identity in the contemporary. Participants' understandings of violence spanned a spectrum, ranging from physical confrontations and the use of weapons, to conceptual and symbolic understandings that are as much structural as interpersonal. Importantly, they also recognized that violence is not limited to physical forms but can be emotional as well. As one noted:

Violence, I can say it's a situation, which happens. It may happen between two people or many people. Violence can be verbal argument and sometimes it gets physical. That is what I could call violence. You find that sometimes a person responds to you with very heavy words or painful. I can call that violence. It also includes beating up a person, that's violence, especially when there is no need. (Durban-KwaMashu 5)

Another, more explicitly, argued that systematic forms of violence are in essence a form of abuse, and that this can be transmitted through emotional pathways:

Violence is to do something that does not sit well nor treat that person well, you might be doing it in a form of hitting them physical abuse, or maybe even emotional abuse or even say things that will hurt that person that is violence, insulting etc. (Durban-KwaMashu 6)

It is important to highlight participants' recognition of the wide range and forms that violence may and can take, for such a recognition stands in contrast to the pervasiveness of reports that characterize South Africa's violence in physical terms. The participants' understandings of violence, in short, were more nuanced than many of the reports. Violence, moreover, was seen by some not as an easily-accepted feature of their lives, but as a last resort or extreme response to the pervasive and explicit actions of those around them. The participant quoted previously continued, in answering whether they would use violence as a means of responding to specific confrontations or situations:

Yes, so you can show that person that what they are doing you don't like and appreciate them doing it, but you need to first sit down with that person and talk to them and them that person and warn him or her but if he or she continues then all hell will break loose if that person does not understand. (Durban-KwaMashu 6)

Violence is of course embedded into the fabric of many South African communities, both as a function of the past and as a product of continued governance concerns. That it is a feature of these communities does not however make it the sole or perhaps even central feature, beyond of course the structural violence that is built into the walls of the architecture itself. As one participant noted:

Violence for me is not important because it happens that you get in a new environment and you find people you don't know people you not sure what their personalities are which in most cases if you do not know someone you might say something they don't like about anything in general and that might end up in a violent manner, other form of violence is being mugged is also part of it, you might get attacked where someone just stabs you, shoot you or even kidnap you that is violence. (Durban-KwaMashu 7)

Another participant explicitly noted that they did not enjoy or condone the use of violence, and strongly rejected the understanding that violence had become normalized in the lives and actions of the young men that lived in the community with him. As he noted:

Nah I don't do violence it's not cool I don't get it I don't understand how stupid you have to be in order for you to be like have to make someone else feel bad just so you can feel good, because that what is it at the end of the day you hurting someone to feel good it's stupid really stupid. (Durban-KwaMashu 10)

This being said, violence can also be symbolically used, both as emblematic of reputation but also as a currency by which to further the aims of an individual or group. As such, in instances where violence is normalized both environmentally and personally, it can itself become a potent form of cultural capital, and thus selectively deployed as a "taste" that may be advantageous. Perhaps, this is implicitly recognized more broadly in the idea of a "taste for violence". Perhaps one of the most revealing of responses can be seen in the answer by a participant who simultaneously seems unaware of, yet acknowledges the role of power and its relationship with violence. They are, in short, aware of the moral dimensions related to the use of violence, but equally, understand its efficacy and symbolic purpose as a form of domination. As they touched upon:

That's violence. Whereas if you call an older person who can assist in sorting the problem out even before people can test each other's power. (Durban-KwaMashu 2)

Furthering this, another participant contrasted violence and its use with intelligence and wisdom, noting that:

I think violence is dumb you behaving like a cave man. (Durban-KwaMashu 9)

This was supported by the comments of another participant from the same site who noted that:

It's not important at all because it does not fix anything in life. You have to talk nicely with people so that you can be able to solve all the problems you have and not be violent. Violence is not important. (Durban-KwaMashu 5)

They further added that they also employed mitigating measures or practices to diffuse both their own responses to violence and any violent confrontations. As they describe:

Its either I go and smoke depending on how angry I am I smoke a lot of weed and also meditate. (Durban-KwaMashu 9)

Such measures can, however, be easily contrasted with the following comment by a participant, which provides an uneasy summary of the contrasting positions expressed by the participants. In answer whether they liked or loathed violence, they noted that:

I'm pretty ok with it. (Cape Town-Hanover Park 7)

*Similarities*: In all contexts, violence has been defined as a physical and social issue. Furthermore, it is a part of daily life and all juveniles struggle with it, but to a different degree, ranging from a relatively peaceful German context, to a highly violent one in South Africa. However, even if violence is a normal part of daily life, it is perceived as an alienated normality and a peaceful way of life is preferred. So, violence is a tool to respond to threats from the environment, but by doing this, juveniles contribute to the very threat they try to keep at bay. Also, violence is not a way to gain respect, but a show of force.

*Differences*: In Pakistan and South Africa, violence is a social currency, which helps to get things done, which is not true for Germany. This is a significant difference, which shows that the code of the streethas different outcomes, depending on the context where it has been analyzed. Furthermore, families are a source of violence in Pakistan in particular. This was not mentioned in Germany or South Africa in the same way.

# *9.5.2 Reflection of the Consequences of the Code of the Street*

Our assumption was that the outcome of the street code would be more or less similar, even if the shape of the code itself differs between the countries in similar spatial frameworks. But the results are different, especially between Germany on the one hand and South Africa and Pakistan on the other. Violence there is a social currency and a guarantee that things will be done. So, it is embedded in everyday life and also connected to the reputation of the family, by holding up traditional values. Again, the difference between the countries is too significant to come to the conclusion that the code of the street, as Anderson proposed, based on findings of an ethnographical analysis in the US, operates equally in different contexts.

# **9.6 Conclusion of the Cross-Cultural Comparison About the Code of the Street**

Altogether, the cross-cultural comparison about the core elements of the code of the street showed similarities and differences toward the original work, which will receive theoretical reflection in Chap. 11. Furthermore, street codes are constructed in all countries, even the shape differs, but violence is an outcome by all. However, the level and perception of violence differ between the contexts. Nevertheless, our cross-cultural comparison brought more results than those which focus on the code of the street alone. These findings provide an insight into different, but sometimes also equal, lifeworlds of male juveniles in risky neighborhoods in different countries. The findings are discussed in the next chapter.

# **References**


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# **Chapter 10 Spotlight on Street Violence in a Cross-Cultural Comparison**

**Simon Howell, Abdul Rauf, Muhammad Zaman and Steffen Zdun**

After the comparison of the elements of the code of the street, as proposed by Anderson, further findings need to be discussed. In addition to the *code of the street*, themes emerged from empirical data that assist at arriving at better understanding of the street and the violence phenomena confronting male juveniles. One the one hand, the coding process can explain these patterns, but can also be explained via the specific context, on the other hand. In-depth discussion by the entire team of the codes and coding strategy prevented bias in the coding, which indicates that the different patterns are evident of more contextually specific aspects of violence-related norms. In all, four codes were found that are similar across all the countries. Below these elements of the street will be compared as well. They are success, the role of the family, new technologies, and perceptions of the police.

# **10.1 Comparison of Success**

Anderson (1999) provides multiple accounts of success among young men in the inner-city neighborhood of Philadelphia. Success is gauged by various standards among families and peer groups in the neighborhoods. In what is deemed to be *decent families*, parents are committed to instill middle-class values and align their careers goals accordingly. Contrary, young men hailing specifically from what is defined as *street families* see successful drug dealers as their role model who have a lavish lifestyle. Weighing up their choices and abilities, young men set these as the goals for their success. The street-oriented youth who embrace the street code and work in the drug economy idealize success as being a successful drug-dealer. Also, success is dignified by successful sexual counters (Anderson 1999: 75). In this vein, our study participants mentioned school achievements, family life, and house. Interestingly, the accounts of young men showed tension between individual aspirations and participation in street culture. Though the participants reported their involvement in violent events on the street, they expressed a strong desire for a conventional family life. In the interviews, success to the many youths meant completing their studies, finding a job, and having a family.

#### *Germany*

The German sample, especially, showed the desire for a conventional, middle-class life, usually including a wife, an own house and a car and perceived themselves as the breadwinners of the family:

I imagined a simple family house, a small garden or something and then being a permanent employee.Well, I didn't imagine anything big.Well I imagined a comfortable life. (Duisburg-Marxloh 9)

Ah, success, for me success is to have a calm, modest life, That's already success, I think. Well, for sure, I would like to make a lot of money, but don't have to become rich or something. If I get a good wage, house, a car, that's enough. (Dortmund-Nordstadt 4)

Some even have particularly high aspirations:

Study medicine, work, start a family. I don't study for fun because, but because I know later I will marry and want to take care of my children, my wife, so they would have the best life possible. (Berlin-Neukoelln 6)

Yes, I want that he [brother] does something with his life. (..) He really wants a Lamborghini. I say, […] maybe you afford it someday, if you have a proper, study if you like. Do any, but most importantly come to grips with your live. (Berlin-Neukoelln 7)

Importantly, some of them clearly distance themselves from criminal careers:

Be able to stand on my own two feet. Make real money. Not false money, well with, no idea, drugs, such things. Real money, honestly earned money. With work. (Berlin-Neukoelln 9)

Work, through hard work one can earn money. Not only through shortcuts. (Duisburg-Marxloh 3)

The rejection of criminal activities for future success partly also included religious beliefs, but not necessarily based on them:

Well, there is success in the religion, well there you must be successful. Well I am in my religion, Islam, well it forbids us all, well all that crime. And all, all that has nothing to with Islam I would say. And success is, when I fulfil all my religious duties, when I am successful in life. (Berlin-Neukoelln 10)

All the interviewees claimed a safe future with a good job and stable familyrelations to be of utmost importance. They seem to perceive a clear link between this dimension, indicated by their own explanations of current family conflicts and their dissatisfaction with their current lack of financial freedom:

First, when my parents are proud of me, […] when they tell me, I'm proud of you. [Then] I have a good feeling in my heart, then I know, I have done nothing wrong. […] best my father, because he says to me, I am proud of you my son. Then you think boah, wow, ok I have achieved something. (Duisburg-Marxloh 1)

Well, for me success actually is if I have for instance no stress. If I simply have my life, if my family is happy, school is good, true friendships, or working, earning money, most importantly my family is doing well. (Duisburg-Marxloh 6)

A particular difficulty here is partly their concept of achieving success. While some youths were more or less realistic about attaining the careers of the ordinary person in society or studying for better careers, others built their hopes on much more random options in the music business or in sport.

[…] study and the I want to become a mechanical engineer and then I want to start my own company for that. (Dortmund-Nordstadt 2)

I, well of course in peace. Of course, no more fucking up and something, but I definitely want to become a rapper. I am really into it. I set this goal to myself and I don't have bad, I have good prospects. I know and I have good producers who also produce for rappers. (Dortmund-Nordstadt 1)

My success, for example, I play football and I want to be a football star like Ronaldo. And I play in the first class team Dortmund, for instance. That it is success for me. (Berlin-Wedding 5)

## *Pakistan*

In Pakistan, adolescents who conformed to wider social mores, frequently mentioned their school achievements, job, owning a house or to be a gentleman as a great achievement. Nondeviant youth mentioned school grades as their achievements. They were also of the view that a white-collar job is their dream and they consider it as a big achievement. People with a respectable job are termed "gentlemen", as a respondent reported:

For me any respectable job is an achievement. If I have a job people would consider me as noble (shareef). There is another thing about which I have always thought and that is to serve the poor people. It is difficult but if one is committed then I do not think it is difficult for that individual. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 18)

To earn money and give it to the family is one of the biggest responsibilities for these adolescents. A respondent mentioned:

I have been working for a long time and I am happy with my life. There is not much pressure on you if you are working because it gives satisfaction. If there is expectation from the family, then it is the work that can help in the satisfaction of the family […] I want to have more and more experience in my life. It will be my experience that will help me in my life. The rest is in the hand of God who is responsible to provide for the needs to every single individual. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 24)

Another respondent wanted to move abroad in search of a job and money. For him, if he could work abroad, he would have sufficient money and could then build his own house. In the Pakistani cultural context, if a person does not own a house, and lives in rented accommodation, he is of low social status. Owning a house means that the young person is ready to get married, otherwise, he has to wait till his family arranges a house for him. As a respondent reported:

We work at different places. We want to have experience so that we can move abroad to earn money. If a person has money, he can make home for himself and live a happy life. An individual should do every kind of work in order to have experience and without experience and skills it is difficult to find any job. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 22)

All of the respondents believed that getting married would be the milestones in their life narratives and contexts, as is more widely understood throughout the country. It is pertinent to mention that marriage is one of the big dreams for an adolescent, as physical relationships are only possible, as per the rules of Pakistani society, after marriage. Premarital relationship must be hidden, are illicit and illegal, and if the relationship comes about outside of the family context, often has serious consequences. Such relationships are thus secret, meetings are clandestine, and are disclosed only to the closest friends and preferably among non-cousins. Should a cousin know, the person will have difficulty in getting a spouse, as most of the marriages are arranged among close cousins.

School, college and university education are all also considered as significant achievements. Those who achieved higher academic grades are considered brilliant persons. They earned a lot of respect. Similarly, a person with a Quranic education is of high repute and people give them respect and honor. Being able to memorize complete or large proportions of the Quran was of considerable importance for a number of respondents. As a respondent stated:

Yes, they have only read the Quran, but our sister has some education. I want her to get higher education. We were unable to study due to our deprived situation, but I want her to study. I know people here do not like women getting educated but I don't care about people. Why should I care about people; when we were in severe need of help from the people, no one was there to help us. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 1)

However, some of the youngsters have another perspective of success. For those who were deviant, in line with Anderson's argument, success came in the form of multiple girlfriends at the same time, having influence and honor. A respondent explains:

For me I want to get a good job and make my parents happy, but most of the boys in our neighborhood give importance to having relationships with girls. They consider it an achievement in their life to have a long list of girlfriends. Also those boys, who are good at fighting, are considered as achievers among their peer group. Some of the boys also want to get some kind of experience in the market which can help them in going abroad. They think this is how they can earn a respectable position in society […] I think I am working and not wasting time like other boys of my age. My family and parents are happy from me and that's a big achievement for me […] I don't belong to a wealthy family and I have nothing that I can show off in the streets. I don't have a car or expensive smart phone. To me status is nothing. I don't care if someone has billions of rupees. For me, the most important thing is that I earn with my own hands, and I never ask anybody for any money. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 2)

Thus, getting an education, securing a job, building a house, respect, and honor from the elders in their community is deemed to be and understood as indicative of success in the Pakistani cultural context among conformist youth. For deviant youth, winning fights, instilling fear and having multiple girlfriends are the sign of success.

#### *South Africa*

For the participants in South Africa, success was understood in both material and immaterial ways. Moreover, success was understood to be a function of the combined achievements that an individual may have reached, and which include aspects of many of the codes noted above. Success then is itself a complex code and one which changes over time. It should, however, be noted that the structural parameters discussed severely restricted what success might be thought of for many of the participants. These limitations made themselves felt both unconsciously—through the limiting of the horizons which the participants could imagine—and consciously—through participants realizing that their dreams would remain largely unachievable, not because they as individuals could not potentially achieve them but because their contexts prevented them from doing so. One participant noted for example:

I can define success as a time when you have achieved all your goals. All your dreams have come through. You have everything that you have wished for in life. Although I know that as people we always wish for more. But there are times when you can see that some people have achieved what they were wishing for. Some people wanted to become doctors and they have achieved that. They have also wished that they could get married and now they are married. It is having everything that you have wished for. I see that as success. (Durban-KwaMashu 5)

Another noted, touching on both material and immaterial forms of success, that education is a means of obtaining success:

Success is when you wish for something in life and you end up getting it after you have worked so hard for it and to achieve it, like going to university you study and then get your degree you have succeeded not that you have succeeded but what you have always wanted you have finally got it. (Durban-KwaMashu 6)

It is important to note that when the participants were first interviewed in groups, they expressed their understanding of success in terms which they thought the interviewer might like or adhere to. Thus, for example, many spoke of becoming sports stars, furthering their education, and so on. However, when they were interviewed individually, they would not necessarily express the same goals, but would rather draw on a more limited set of objectives. This is important to note, as it reveals that the expression of what an individual may perceive to be a norm is as much a function of their own understanding as it is a product of what they think the person listening might expect to hear.

One participant noted for instance that success was the result of overcoming forms of hardship, and had little to do with material gains. As he noted:

Let me talk about my success before my success was passing matric which is grade 12 with good results got a distinction in isiZulu, another thing also was the athletics that I participate in not at school but at home I managed to get in different positions but I need to talk about my first game the sun was too hot and I got affected but I tried my best to be position number 10 even though it was hard but I tried 10 km it was, and now I want to talk about my success now I think it would be all the things I do now will all depend on how much I want to push and work hard which is going to determine where I will be in the future and whether I will be happy there too or not with what will be the end results then, not everything that I can call success has happened I am still hustling eventually I will make it and prove to myself that I can do even better and also like here in Varsity I am trying to study so that I can see my success where it is. (Durban-KwaMashu 7)

Finally, it is important to note that many of the participants engaged with the paradox of being able yet limited in their achievements through defining success in negation—they defined success not as something that could be achieved but as the normative measure of what they were at least not. One participant noted, for example:

I can say that from home, it is my mom, my dad, in reality I can say the whole family because there is somebody whom I don't ask for help in my house. I can even ask from my brother in-laws. But I still say one should not rely on other. The thing with me is that I do not beg a person, I don't. (Durban-KwaMashu 1)

*Similarities*: The idea of success was reported in a similar way across the sites and between the countries. In all the cases, education and a family and one's own household were clearly seen as success in life—at least when spoken of in public or when participants were conscious of the interviewers perceived expectations. These ideas follow middle-class values, even in risky neighborhoods and are formulated by male juveniles, despite engaging in criminal careers to a greater or lesser extent or are confronted with the normative structure of the street. This is clearly opposite to Anderson's findings in Philadelphia in the 1990s.

*Difference*: Only marginal differences were shown to be represented. Juveniles in Pakistan are closer to the binary logic between understandings of what constituted "the street" and "the decent", as Anderson suggests. In South Africa, such aspirations were limited by the context and socio-spatial structure of the participants' lives, with becoming a sports star one of the primary means by which they viewed success. In all instances, however, such conceptions of success may be as much a product of the participants' perceptions of what the interviewers might expect them to say as representations of their own understandings of success itself. This is itself emblematic of a particular conception of success, in which the participants strategically drew on their knowledge and preconceptions of the expectations of others to articulate a position which they themselves believed would be successful.

# **10.2 Comparison of the Role of the Family**

Family was an integral part of an individual's life, particularly in Pakistan and South Africa. It is the family that controls the behavior of an individual in the private and public sphere. Young people care about their family expectations; to earn money, to look after the needs of the family. Family members provide care services and assistance in times of crises. The individual was also responsible for protecting family honor and respect by whatever means, including violence. As mentioned earlier, Anderson (1999) described the types of families and the importance of embracing the code of the street. The *street family* socializes youngsters for violent behavior on the street. On the other hand, family disorganization, a lack of sense of community, and an uncertain future also become important factors for engaging in street culture.

#### *Germany*

In the narrations of the adolescents, the family was an important theme, particularly talking about mothers. Some of them mentioned that conflict situations arise when someone shows disrespect towards their family members. In the German case, a sample with diverse family backgrounds was part of the study: it included single parents, extended families, and families with a migration background. The participants appreciated the efforts of their family to provide them with education and security in the neighborhoods. They mentioned that they hide their street activities from their families. The narrations of respect and success are associated with family. While talking about his success a young footballer:

Yes, my family, I think it's like for everybody, it's the most important. Thanks to them, I am where I am now. Thanks to them I am doing what I am doing. They helped me actually since I was a child. My mother, my father of course too. Yes, family is of course the most important thing. Without family actually you cannot reach anything, I think […]. (Duisburg-Marxloh 7)

A similar account was narrated by another interviewee from Neukoelln in Germany:

Well my family actually means everything to me. So, if I didn't have a family, I would end up on the street and God knows what would happen to me, I couldn't imagine. (Berlin-Neukoelln 2)

While discussing the role of friends and family to embrace street culture, a young participant from Neukolln said:

Family is the most important thing in life, that is with you in bad times. Do you know what I mean? And yes such things, well if nobody is with you but for sure the family is with you. (Berlin-Neukolln 4)

#### *Pakistan*

A dichotomy of relationships within the family system was noted in Pakistan. On the one hand, families have a very strong hold over an individual and they observe and control the behavior of the young people, especially those who were non-deviant. Deviant adolescents, on the other hand, were beyond the control of their families, and in some cases, family members encouraged their adolescents to get involved in deviancy. A respondent mentioned the importance of his family and how a person is dependent on his family in the Pakistani cultural context. He said:

For me, my family is the most important thing, I can't listen to anything against them, some guys abuse each other's family members in fun but I do not tolerate this as well. I told you before that I don't have any girlfriend and neither do I want any. I will marry whoever my parents want me to marry. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 1)

Another respondent revealed his conformist behavior within the family. He observed and followed his religion as a justification of family authority. He mentioned familial control and he reported:

My family is very strict and religious. My father strictly emphasizes on offering prayers on time and also told me not to wander outside the home at night. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 1)

Everyone in the family is expected to show his loyalty to his family. He has to protect his family by gaining and maintaining honor and respect. For this, they were ready to go to any extreme and become violent. This explains the honor killing. There is a cultural logic to justify their violent actions. A respondent mentioned:

Anything which could cause us shame and harm our honor and dignity cannot be tolerated. Family honor is the most important thing for me. The people who kill their daughters, sisters and brothers in the name of honor, I think it's not easy for them to do it. A person could only kill a close kin, brother, sister or daughter in extreme situations [of the violation of honor]. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 27)

It may be worthwhile to mention that family in Pakistan consists of family members of both the matrilineal and the patrilineal and their extended family in rural and urban slums. This may be different in the economically well-off families, where the nuclear family is the norm. Even grandparents have authority to control the behavior of adolescents. This especially applied to non-deviant young people. A respondent reported his story:

Reality is that when someone becomes mature enough then it is his will to do whatever he wants. In our family, my father has no such authority, but my grandfather holds great authoritative position and he has always kept me free as he really loves me. That is the reason that no one can say anything to me at home. My family got aware of the incident, but I didn't receive any punishment, however, my mother used some harsh words to scold me as she always keeps telling me what I should do and what I should not. Thanks God my father is not like her. (Rawalpindi-Dhok Matkial 4)

Adolescents are expected to study in school or take up technical or vocational training. If they are unable to get an education or acquire vocational or technical skills, they are expected to work as a manual laborer in order to contribute to the household income. A respondent reported:

My family thinks that young should not be idle. If an individual [boy] is not studying in school, then he must do work for his family. It is not a pressure from the family rather it is a part of their socialization. I have been sometime told by my parents to go out there for work. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 12)

Another respondent also confirmed the above argument. He mentioned:

I told them that I cannot continue my studies. I have no interest in studying and I have to do work. They agreed because if you can work, it is always in favor of them. Now I am earning through my work and contributing in my family income. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 14)

Some youngsters who have 'discovered freedom' follow deviant ways, but outwardly showed conformity. They wandered the streets and engaged in deviant acts, such as drugs and making friends with other deviant people in urban neighborhoods. A respondent mentioned:

When I used to do work, I had a lot of money at that time, but now I am totally dependent on my family for everything. My family does not know that I am a drug user, if they come to know they will throw me out of the home. […]These guys have no check and balance on them from their families. They can do whatever they want. I am not a good guy myself, but my family is very strict. I can't smoke charas (marijuana) in front of them. […] I really respect my family, my parents, though they are unhappy from me these days due to my joblessness, but I care about them so much. (Rawalpindi-Dhok Matkial 5)

In some cases, families use different techniques to force their deviant adolescent to conform. They may start by giving the youngster a chance to conform through prohibitions and withholding physical and emotional support. If that fails, they may punish the juvenile physically. A responded narrated his story:

They told me to continue my studies, but I am not good in studies. That's why I don't want to study anymore. My family members are angry with me. They didn't talk to me for a long time. My father also does not talk to me. He told me to continue studies otherwise he told me to get a job. But I have no interest in any sort of work here as well. Now I even avoid spending most of the time at home. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 3)

Another respondent explained how he was caught behaving badly and that his family punished him severely, which he just had to tolerate. He explained:

Few days ago, my friends made a plan of visiting Murree. I also went with them and ditched the school. I don't know who told my family that I was missing from school. When I came back home, my brother asked me whether I was in school or not? When I said yes, I was in school, he caught me and beat me so harshly which I can't describe in words. I am still in search of that guy who told my brother regarding my absence from school. I will teach him a lesson whenever I come to know about him. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 3)

Strong social control is exercised by the family, and violence from and by elders (grandparents, parents/uncle/aunt, and elder brother/sister) is an accepted norm. It is not perceived as violence but as a corrective act, which they must bear. Rather, they might self-harm to release the anger. Thus, another respondent mentioned that he fought with his brother over friendships with girls and boys. He was rebelling against the family norms. He explained his story of the physical punishment from his elder brother:

When my brother slapped me, I stopped his hand. Then he beat me. He told me not to avoid the vulgar boys. You should do your work. You are wandering here and there. I got angry over it and that led to severe conflict between us. Other people also came and asked about the reason. I said ask him what he has done. Then the family member settled the issue and I moved away from my home. At that time I wanted to go to a place where there was nobody around. I injured my head too on that day because I was not able to control my anger. Then I used a knife to cut and the blood flowed with a sound Chirr. When I cut my wrist with knife, the blood streamed out on my face. When the blood streamed from my head, my anger was released. After this event nobody ever said anything to me. If I went home late at night, they wouldn't say anything. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 25)

The adolescents believed that it was the right of the parents to control their behavior. They think that their parents take action against their children only to be corrective because they wanted to see their children become successful person. Once the youngster conforms, harsh behavior is abandoned. A respondent narrated his experience and said:

At first, they [parents] used to scold me too much, but now I have started my work. So now they are happy and giving me some respect as well. […] I think the first right of parents upon their children is that they will give them respect and I also do the same. For my parents it is not important how tough I am. For them the only thing which matters is that I earn for them through legal ways and do not create any problem for them by engaging in conflict with others or start using drugs like other boys in the street. […] Sometimes there are domestic problems. They become normal and I think they exist in all families. It is important to accept all things and decision from parents because they are the sole authority at homes. If you do not accept them, there is a possibility of conflict even between the parents and their children. In my family I have never disobeyed my elders and they are also there for me at every time. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 8)

Relationships with girls was a primary flashpoint in family relationships. A respondent reported that due to sexual needs, some of the boys deviated from family norms. Others became drug addicts to avoid increased sexual frustration. The families remain unaware of the deviant behavior of their youngsters, or if they know, they try to change their deviant behavior. He mentioned:

The boys have gone crazy after girls. They can even beat their mothers for girls. They cannot accept their sisters because of girls. The girls have dominated the mind of boys.

I myself have been in this type of conflict with my family members. There was girl and we had understanding. Then there came another person who told the matter to the brothers of the girl. They came to my brothers and told them about the issue. After that my family member told me to stay with my brother. Thus, I started to live in his house. That girl didn't marry even today. She wants to marry me. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 24)

Some of the respondents blamed the family of deviant youngsters for such behavior, claiming that such families did not care for or provide socialization for their adolescents. They believed either that such parents wanted their children to be deviant or they were incapacitated to provide proper socialization to their young adolescents. A respondent argued:

The parents are themselves responsible for it. It is not difficult to control one's own children. They do not care about them. Thus, they come to these streets where there is nobody to stop them. They are involved in drug use and all the other bad habits. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 13)

Another respondent says the parents of deviant adolescents are often involved in deviant behavior as well:

They don't listen to their parents even if their parents forbid them from involving in these activities. But many parents are also involved in drug usage and gambling, so they can't forbid their children either. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 3)

A respondent was of the view that parents do not want their children to become deviant. Rather, the choice to become deviant rests on the young themselves. Youngsters earn money for the family and in return enjoy autonomy and choose to become deviants. He reported:

If it is not acceptable for parents, how are they doing it? These [deviant] boys are less concerned about parents. They are not scared of their parents, because they earn money for their families. When they are young their parents send them for work. They think that these children are the source of money for them. Thus, they are spoiled at their early age by their parents. […] Parents are also poor and they are unable to meet all the needs. Thus, these children are fulfilling the needs of the family along with their fathers. The parents usually do not intervene in their personal activities. Probably, it is a lack of socialization from the parents. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 15)

Contrarily, a deviant respondent mentioned that families are not aware of the poor behavior of their adolescents and do not know what they were doing outside of the home. He was able to engage in deviant activities without the knowledge of his parents, who therefore had no reason to suspect him of bad behavior. He said:

No, the families are not involved in our own daily matters. Usually they remain unaware about our activities. If they become aware of our activities, we make them believe that it was not our fault. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 22)

Another respondent said:

If my family becomes aware of my activities what I do outside the home. For example, if they come to know that I use heroine, they might kick me out of the home. Therefore, the time I smoked, before entering home I washed my mouth and never kept cigarette in my pocket. (Rawalpindi-Dhok Matkial 26)

Overall, family is an important social institution in Pakistan and it is responsible for adolescents. The family does not only provide the everyday needs of youngsters, but they also control their behavior. These young people are expected to provide assistance, obey their elders and respect and protect the family.

#### *South Africa*

In South Africa, the concept of the family and its role was decidedly differently understood between the two sites from which the respondents were drawn. For participants from the site in Durban, family was understood as an integral and important node in the chain of being in which they stood at the bottom and the ancestors stood at the pinnacle. Family is frequently conceptualized as an anchor, or idealized as a perfect state from which they have in the modern, urban life, transgressed in multiple ways. This conception of transgression, ironically, is borrowed from a Christian ethos but has become interwoven with the traditional cosmology so as to create a hybrid narrative. For instance, one participant noted that:

So many people die because of so many people being arrogant until I see the thing of aids maybe then I will respect it and then, going back to the roots of my family, roots of my family will remind me of what respect it but I am not even at home because I lost my respect. (Durban-KwaMashu 8)

Such an understanding is furthermore frequently also seen as a limiting or constraining normative barrier, to which they may either conform or rebel. Another participant noted, in terms of the symbolic discussion around tattoos, that:

I do not have tattoo, my family does not believe in them. (Durban-KwaMashu 5)

The family may also be seen as a safety net or place of refuge in times of conflict or trouble. Such a conception of the family places it in diametric opposition to that of violence, for it is seen as a sanctuary. One participant further noted:

I can say that from home, it is my mom, my dad, in reality I can say the whole family because there is somebody whom I don't ask for help in my house. I can even ask from my brother in-laws. But I still say one should not rely on other. The thing with me is that I do not beg a person, I don't. (Cape Town-Hanover Park 12)

In saying this, the family is mentioned very little by participants from the other site in South Africa, primarily because so few had any family members that were either not alive or in prison. Family, finally, is also related to narratives of success, through a process of mythologization and actualization. As one participant noted:

There is one that I can talk about. You see this one is educated, she is around 39 years or more. But I can say that she is still young. But she is successful. She is highly educated. She has many things in life. Married. She has everything but she still wants more but personally I can say she is successful. (Cape Town-Hanover Park 4)

*Similarities*: Family is a safety net in Pakistan and South Africa. It provides not only care during childhood or old age but also provides financial assistance, moral support, and social capital and thus forms a safety net. It is like a shelter, where members feel comfortable, relax and feel free of threats. They get almost every kind of support from the family. Similarly, family is also important in German context where the people feel proud to be part of their family. Particularly, the mother was considered to be the most significant person in the family.

*Differences*: Pakistani data reflected that family was a kind of total institution or state within a state which look after the needs of the members. They provide the safety, welfare, and security for the members. In the absence of a welfare system in the country, the family enjoys coercive authority. It has authority to mold, change and regulate the behavior of the members of society. The Pakistani familial control may be close to Anderson's conception of the *descent* or *street families*, but cannot be completely labeled as such. However, the notions of *descent* and *street families* are not clear in the German and South African data. In Germany, where the welfare system as well as state role is clear, the space for the family institution is limited and families do not have complete control. Middle-class values are dominant, even among deviant male juveniles. Thus, the theoretical approach of the code of the street cannot apply to the realities of the three countries.

# **10.3 Comparison of Modalities of Technology**

In the study, the modalities of technology, particularly social media, was accentuated by young participants. Youths described that various uses of technology have become commonplace to find girlfriends. Because the youth of these risky neighborhoods face geographical discrimination, by virtue of being resident in such neighborhoods, they used social media to renounce their neighborhoods. Thus, the development of technology and use of social media provides a new space for street culture. In this respect, our findings should provide some insights into how young men from risky neighborhoods use technology in everyday life and negotiate their identity on social media. During Anderson's fieldwork in the 1990th, this technology, particularly the Internet, was not part of everyday life. Nowadays youth opt for the Internet, particularly social media, to communicate and interact.

### *Germany*

In Germany, the participants reported that social media is part of everyday life and the forum used to communicate with their peers, as well as for verbal violence to present a tough image of themselves. For instance, one participant from Marxloh described that those who exaggerate their ruthlessness on social media are in fact cowards in reality:

[…] they all write on Facebook, yes if I grab him, I will beat him to death, I put him into the hospital. I bet with them for hundred thousand euros, [in actual confrontation] they will run away. (Duisburg-Marxloh 5)

The narration of a participant showed that there is incoherence between what is presented on social media and an actual situation. Similar accounts were mentioned by other participants:

Many are very, very aggressive on Facebook, on internet. But if you face them, they have no balls. (Berlin-Wedding 5)

Sometimes social media becomes the avenue where conflict arises, which leads to serious confrontation. Adolescents mentioned that online disrespect instigates violence and confrontation, particularly with people from outside the neighborhood. Moreover, young people face verbal violence and bullying on social media.

There is also verbal violence, of course insulting someone or something. Or on the internet too. Let's say bullying and stuff. (Berlin-Wedding 6)

Other themes echoed in the narrations of young participants was online discrimination because of the reputation of their neighborhoods. The territorial discrimination based on a resident's address is visible online.

[…] Why does anyone say Hamborn, no-go [area]? Why crap, as, as I read this stuff on Facebook, this bank robbery in Hamborn [a district close to Marxloh]. Immediately, I read in the comments below, it would have been someone from Marxloh. Immediately, I read that. I also instantly commented below. I said […] did you plan that or what? Then this other person said to me: Certainly, you are one of the guys from Marxloh. I told him: Yes, I am from Marxloh. Do you have any problem with that? (Duisburg-Marxloh 5)

In some cases, residents tried to defend their neighborhoods. In defense of his neighborhood, the above young interviewee went on:

They said only: Marxloh no-go area, ha ha ha. That's the problem for us. They think, they believe that stuff, what the upper people, the big ones believe. […] But they know nothing. (Duisburg-Marxloh 5)

However, others from risky neighborhoods distance themselves from their neighborhoods on social media particularly when they meet a girl online on a dating website. Owing to the bad reputation of their neighborhood they will avoid mentioning where they live and will meet outside their neighborhoods.

For instance, when I chat with her, I don't tell that [I am from Marxloh], because the other girls are afraid of coming here. Girls are scared to come here. They are scared to enter Marxloh. They think all people from Marxloh are criminal. I write I am somewhere from Duesseldorf, from somewhere there or I meet in the city. I don't meet in my own district. (Duisburg-Marxloh 1)

#### *Pakistan*

Young adolescents in Pakistan are well connected on social media. Particularly, the use of Facebook and WhatsApp is ubiquitous. WhatsApp, Instagram and other social media apps like Twitter serve to keep in contact with each other. YouTube is used for music and to watch action and violent movies. Facebook is used to attract girls, see their photos, and chat with them. If a person is known to them, their social media platforms will show decent behavior. However, they also have fake accounts on Facebook, where they abuse and bully each other in the virtual world.

In case of emergency, they will call each other on their mobile phone directly and ask for help. Alternatively, they send a message and a group member comes to the place of the emergency. There they will strategize and fight their enemy. A respondent mentioned:

When an issue arises, it becomes important to call the friends. Sometimes issues become severe if the man from rival group finds out that you are alone. At that particular time it is mobile phone which helps. Text messages and telephone calls are the source of communication in any situation. (Rawalpindi-Dhok Matkial 24)

It is mobile phone. At present there is no other medium of communication that is as quick as mobile phone. It has brought convenience in the life of people. (Rawalpindi-DhokMatkial 25)

I communicate with my friends through mobile phone. I load super card every month in which I receive minutes and SMS and use it. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 2)

Use of social media also causes violence. For instance, one of the respondents from the France Colony mentioned that his friend used the photos of his sister and posted them on social media. In response to this, the brother fought with his friend. He rebuffed his friend and in revenge posted the photos of his erstwhile friend's sister on social media. In order to avoid escalation, influential local community members intervened and settled the issue. But for the two young men involved further communication was at an end due to this conflict.

#### *South Africa*

In South Africa, access to the Internet, in general, is extremely limited and the cost of data very high. As such, few of the participants regularly used social media or narrated much of their identity through online profiles or accounts. Participants were, however, aware of and aimed to emulate those individuals who were seen as leaders of the entertainment industry, as one noted in relation to codeine addiction:

I met him two weeks ago his actually the most creative guy I have ever met in my life he doesn't sleep I was with him like now I was with him, his a perfectionist in every single way he raps I think his the best rapper I have ever heard he doesn't think that yet but he wants to win a 100 Grammys from this and he walked through. (Cape Town-Hanover Park 3)

*Similarities*: Use of technology is common in the three countries. The use of cell phone and social media has brought about cyberbullying, abuse and virtual violence due to Internet connectivity.

*Differences*: Social media is widely used in Pakistan and Germany, but limited data usage and connectivity was found in South Africa. Virtual violence (e.g. cyberbullying) was common in Germany and Pakistan. We also found fake social media accounts in Pakistan. However, we did not notice cyberbullying and virtual violence in South Africa.

# **10.4 Comparison of Police and State Institutions**

It has been mentioned that youths of risky neighborhoods have little trust in state institutes, particularly the police. In all the cases, the participants mentioned geographical discrimination based on the bad reputation of their neighborhoods. The ambivalent image of police was represented by the young participants. However, police violence was one of the major themes of their storyline. Anderson (1999) describes similar findings; that people of inner-city neighborhoods question the morality and authority of state institutions. They believe that police profile their neighborhood negatively and treat inhabitants adversely. The same was found to be the views of the participants of our study. They believe that the police are incompetent to handle situations in these neighborhoods, and thus keep police away from everyday matters and try to solve problems themselves.

#### *Germany*

In the German context, the image and role of police is ambivalent. Some participants appreciated the police presence in their neighborhoods. However, others mentioned police misconduct. Regular police patrols are a routine activity in these neighborhoods. During the patrols, the adolescents are searched and ill-treated by police. An interview partner from Neukoelln mentioned police violence and the usual routine:

Violence? Yes. Violence. There is a lot. […] There is also police violence here. […] Once. On a 1st May festival. Yes. I didn't do anything. I was just standing there. A policeman came to me with a shield and stuff. Just kicked me, I fell down. Just like that, because I had my foot on this railing. (Berlin-Neukoelln 9)

He went on about police violence and believed that people face excessive use of force from police due to the neighborhood's image and the violence there. Other young participants particularly from Marxloh and Neukoelln reported police misconduct and abuse during police patrolling. An interviewee from Dortmund stated:

[…] a friend was brought to the police station with a police car to and, still in the police car, they beat him up. […] Yes, next day he could leave. Well the boy got into the car, one policeman left, on policeman right and then, but the boy didn't have anything [no bruises]. Then, next day, when we saw him agaun he was beaten black and blue, in any case. (Dortmund-Nordstadt 10)

After a series of adverse encounters, these young people refuse to involve police in their matters. Thus, a participant describes a confrontation between two groups in the neighborhood like this:

No matter who loses, who wins, now it is over. Now we simply must go, so that there is no stress with the police. […] It also happened, we were fighting, the one called the police. One heard it, said: Police is coming. Then we have, we ran away. (Berlin-Wedding 6)

The storylines of interviewees show that police violence is commonplace in the neighborhoods. Owing to a neighborhood's bad reputation and high levels of reported violence, youths of the risky neighborhoods reported a high level of coercion by police.

In my opinion, if you confront with the police you can expect that harassments and other things will happen. For example, once we were in Blücherpark, just stood there, maybe a little bit louder and were talking, that's common among us young people. And then it happened that the police came, because of complaints. And probably one of our friends hid the weed as he saw they were coming. And I stood at least 15 meters away from that and the policeman says: yes, you have been that [with grass]. Then I say: No, I wasn't. Then he says: Come on, don't take the piss out of me. Give me your remaining grass, then I'll turn a blind eye. Though I had nothing to do with it, you know? It's those things, you don't expect anything bad and then someone just tries, because he had a bad day or just doesn't like the people from this area, he searches for a reason to teach you a lesson. (Dortmund-Nordstadt 3)

#### *Pakistan*

Among the youth in Pakistan the police are perceived as the enemy. It was also perceived as criminal and engaged in corruption and nepotism. The adolescents stated that the police take bribes from them. A respondent mentioned:

Police here always keeps an eye on people's pockets. If someone has a lot of money and he shares a part of it with the police, then he is free to do anything in this area. Powerful people have advantage in everything. If we face any trouble from someone and I go to the police, they ask for money that's why no one trusts the police these days, because they favor only those who could give them money. (Rawalpindi-Dhok Matkial 26)

Another respondent narrated his story and told how a friend was released from custody through a bribe to the police. He said:

All of a sudden, he appeared and hit one of the boys from the opposite group on the head with a metal rod. The boy fell on the ground and started to bleed. Seeing this, other boys of the opposite group covered us from all direction. I asked my friend to run, but he didn't. Before the other group could attack us, the police came, arrested my friend and took him to the nearby check post. This time the officer was new, but he knew me. I went to the check post to get my friend released and settle down the issue. But, the police refused to release him and said that he had committed a serious crime, attempted murder. My friend was shifted to police station and was handed over to one of the officials named "Qazi" (judge) for police remand. Fortunately, I had acquaintance with the Qazi, so I requested him to be lenient. Meanwhile, I called my friends to collect some amount for the bail. We collected around 14000 rupees and paid to the officials and got "Shaarti" released. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 29)

The police do not provide protection. The adolescents mentioned that police make them criminal:

I have a friend and he was in prison for two years. He was caught by police under allegations of using drugs (Chars-marijuana). He was with his friend when the police followed them. At that time his friend ran away. When the police caught my friend, they immediately found the drug (Chars) from his pocket which was slipped in his pocket by his friend before running away. In this way he became the criminal in the eyes of police and was kept in prison for two years. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 27)

#### He further added:

The major reason is that no one trusts the police, they are only for poor people to torture and to beat. But they do not take any action against the powerful rather they help them in their dirty activities. Another major reason is the culture of nepotism and bribe among the police. (Islamabad-Bari Imam 27)

Corruption, bribery and the violent behavior of the police officials bring about low trust in police among the young. As a result, they settle their issues through traditional methods of the conflict resolution. Consequently, a large portion of conflict and violent incidents is not reported to the police.

However, we also noticed changes in the behavior of the police officials. The police, as an institution, is struggling to make its image friendly. Some of the respondents reported some structural changes and added that training in soft skills has had an impact on the behavior of the police officials. These changes have come about due to persistent criticism from the civil society organizations and the changing role of civil institutions.

#### *South Africa*

In meeting their respective legislative mandates, the regulation/policing of illegal substances in South Africa has been ineffective, scattershot and piecemeal. Drugrelated arrests are the most significant arrest type and have remained so for the last five years, with 258,472 incidents occurring in 2014, 266,902 in 2015, and 259,165 in 2016. Despite this, conviction rates remain extremely low—aggregated convictions relating to cannabis (the most widely used illegal substance in the country) have remained below 3% of arrests (2.71% in 2012, 2.25% in 2013, and 2.12% in 2014). Moreover, there are massive disparities in the arrest and conviction levels between population groups, with cannabis-related convictions of white women standing at just 0.0038% in 2014. At the same time, the availability and affordability of the primary illegal substances continue to increase. While the nominal value of the primary drugs of use in South Africa has only decreased marginally over the course of the last decade, as a result of rapid inflation the *real* value of these substances has decreased greatly—methamphetamine is 181.7% more affordable, heroin some 317.4% more affordable, and cocaine 159.7% more affordable than ten years ago.

I would go so far as to say that it is organize, because of the kind of the money on the table when you engage with car hijackings and house robberies, a couple of thousand Rand for each event, it now becomes a structured part of your life, where you may have to do this once a week or every couple of days […] I think it is partly to do with unemployment, but I also think that it becomes a viable alternative way of earning a living. (Durban-KwaMashu, Police expert)

While high-arrest or conviction rates are not indicative of effective regulation, they are symptomatic of significant structural challenges in the police services, most prominent of which are corruption/racketeering driven by very low salary levels and the lack of significant career opportunities, traumatic working conditions and a lack of counseling/support structures, and a numeric performance measurement matrix, which mandates for the meeting of 'quotas' at the station level. Indeed, evidence exists of officers specifically *not* arresting local dealers so that the 'pool' of users that purchase substances from them is maintained within their jurisdiction, and which can be drawn upon in the fulfilling of these numeric objectives. Despite this, many officers are aware of these challenges and of the ineffectiveness of the policing model but lack the scope and space to voice such concerns, for fear of being persecuted by colleagues or for being charged with dereliction of duty. The overall result is that the regulation of illegal drugs is uncoordinated and marred by systemic obligations that preclude effective responses. The police, in the present context, has become seen as the enemy of the people rather than their protectors. Such a description is in line with one participant's description of violence, when they argued that

You find that sometimes a person responds to you with very heavy words or painful. I can call that violence. It also includes beating up a person, that's violence, especially when there is no need. (Durban-KwaMashu 3)

*Similarities*: State institutions in general, but police particularly, have the lowest popularity and trust among these adolescents. They feel that the police are their enemy and hardly helps any person. Rather, in all three countries of the study, the police used violent behavior to handle these juveniles.

*Differences*: In South Africa and Pakistan, the state institutions are perceived as colonial institutions and perceived as untrustworthy. However, the German sample has ambivalent relations with their police. Although German police are not saddled with a colonial legacy, they were nonetheless perceived as the enemy.

# **10.5 Patterns of Street Violence in a Cross-Cultural Comparison**

We identified and then analyzed four further elements of street culture, which are important for juveniles in all countries: success, the role of the family, new technologies, as well as perceptions of the police. The similarities and differences are described in detail element by element. However, a closer look at the patterns of who said what exactly shone a light on differences that stand out when one goes beyond an analysis of the code alone. These are personal experiences of violence as an offender. Only few differences were found between deviant and non-deviant juveniles. They all attach utmost importance to their family, which is contrary to the findings of Anderson. In fact, they have values close to what Anderson called *middle-class values*. They want to get an education, employment and then have a family and a decent life. However, many of them remain on the verge of the poverty, discrimination, and inequality in the three countries.

Besides differences between the countries, we also see differences between highly deviant males and those who rather stay out of trouble. For example, highly deviant adolescents were of the view that success came with fights and dominance over their enemies. Moreover, in Pakistan deviant youth estimated having multiple girlfriends as success whereas non-deviant youth attached high importance to their belief system.

Anderson distinguished *descent* and *street families*in the USA. However, we were unable to find this pattern in the countries studied. The adolescents never termed themselves or others as coming from street or descent families. Rather, they mentioned either lose or tight social control by their families. Family was very important in every country. Whether deviant or non-deviant, juveniles were inclined to respect and honor the family. Some of them referred to this as a part of their belief, especially in Pakistan and Germany.

Anderson's code of the street was silent about technological advancements, as his work was carried out in the 1990s before the emergence of the internet and social media. We discussed this code and found variations in the responses. In Germany and Pakistan, we noted cyberbullying. However, in the interviews from Pakistan, the intensity or perhaps the realization of it as a part of violent behavior was not noted. Though we found excessive usage of social media (Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, and WhatsApp) in Pakistan, it was used less for violence and abuse. Rather, it was used for direct telephone communication and short messages (SMS) to friends in time of need or when deviant adolescents wanted to fight with each other or even with the non-deviant young people.

Police and state institutions (judiciary and prison etc.) were further important elements. It was found that the police enjoy almost no trust among the youth of the three countries examined. It was perceived as being violent in Germany, whereas less or no complaints were made regarding other state institutions. In Pakistan the police were considered corrupt and it was reported that they take bribes. It was violent and was also reported to be part of criminal activities. The police also suffer from the stigma of being a legacy of colonialism.

Nonetheless, it was clear that Anderson's code of the street has limited application across continents and societies. It may be visible in some societies or it may have partial application. It could be irrelevant in other societies.

# **Reference**

Anderson, E. (1999). *Code of the street: Decency, violence, and the moral life of the inner city*. New York: Norton.

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

# **Chapter 11 Conclusion: The Need to Develop the Code of the Street into a General Approach**

**Wilhelm Heitmeyer, Sebastian Kurtenbach and Steffen Zdun**

# **11.1 Answer of the Research the Question**

A cross-cultural comparison of the single elements of the code of the street shows differences and similarities to the original theory, which will be reflected in the following chapter. The purpose is to evaluate if the code of the street is a general concept or, limited just to the US or only in part operational in all contexts. Our study started with the research question: *Does the code of the street operate equally in different contexts than that of the US?* The answer is no. We do see significant differences in the elements of the code of the street in the examined countries. However, the code of the street is a well-established concept used to analyze youth violence in risky neighborhoods and it is an important explanation for street violence occurring in African American neighborhoods in the US. Moreover, it has become a wellresearched theoretical explanation to understand youth violence in other contexts too, but a reflection of its limitations was still lacking. These variances of the code in different countries and neighborhoods should not be underestimated, because it limits the range of the concept as it has been formulated. The established concept of the code of the street cannot explain them.

As Anderson proposes, elements of the code hark back to the time of the Roman Empire. We are able to discuss now if there are elements that are stable across very different countries, and if so, we can propose too that over time and generation the relational circumstances are stable as well. However, one basic assumption of the street code approach did not turn up in our research. The binominal logic of "street" or "decent" families or individuals was not observable in any of the neighborhoods where we conducted our study. For example, juveniles in Dortmund or Berlin behave violently on the street but act decently in the family milieu. This ambiguity is more than just simple code-switching because decency is part of the street identity, even for highly violent individuals. The same is true for adolescents in Pakistan, in particular. However, juveniles in risky neighborhoods of South Africa were often not embedded in such tightly knit family relations in their communities, both because of broken families as well as high homicide rates. There, male juveniles need to develop another kind of street code and its elements need to sample together but differently from other contexts.

# **11.2 Similarities to the Code: Evidence of Cross-Cultural Comparison**

In our intensive study, we found three striking similarities between the assumptions of the code, as Anderson proposed it, and our findings. The first, and for the entire concept the most important element, is *respect*. This is the symbolic currency of the street, for male juveniles in particular, and their campaign for respect is part of their daily routines. Therefore, many different strategies are developed by young men in each of the settings under investigation, which range from being a good friend and a peaceful person to "gangster-style" behavior. However, one important expectation of the similarity of our findings with those of Anderson needs to be mentioned. The role of violence in the campaign for respect is not uniform among all countries and neighborhoods. In the neighborhoods researched in South Africa, the assumption is very similar to how Anderson described the pathways of early 1990s Germantown, but it is not true for Germany, as shown in Chap. 9. Violence is a reaction to a perceived threat or as a way of self-defense; it is not a means to ensure that certain things will be done. Regarding the issue of respect, the level of violence is unclear. The ability to fight is connected to respect, but not the aggressive behavior itself. Dissimilar to Anderson's description, the ability to "freak out" does not build up a respectful reputation. Maybe what Anderson describes is true for all socially segregated neighborhoods in American metropoles, independent of the ethnic or religious groups who live there, however, the way respect is developed and maintained is different in other countries. These exceptions remind us that respect needs to be analyzed in the context where it is perceived as such.

The second similarity of the street code approach, as outlined by Anderson, and our cross-cultural findings is the *perception of space*—most importantly, the neighborhood. The social and spatial environment of male juveniles is perceived as a threat. Following this path, the development of code, as a coping strategy to handle the challenging environment, is rational. Not completely explained, however, is the mechanism as to how the threatening image of the space is built up. Part of it is the behavior of peers or people in the same age group. Their (deviant) behavior places juveniles in the position to react, which means that they must build up a violent reputation to stay safe. This is the purpose of their performance on the street towards peers but ignoring the fact that such behavior is threatened in return. This paradox of threatening behavior as a reaction towards the threat of others, causes the construction of a street code. Here, the risky neighborhood evolves its effect because it is not possible to refer to collective and generally accepted norms. However, neither in our study nor in Anderson's approach the interactive effects between different age groups, ethnic groups, public or private agents towards the perception of space are clearly explained. In our study, we focused on the concept of the code of the street in particular, but it is necessary to keep in mind that other elements are part of the code too, which are not connected to violence and were beyond the scope of this analysis. Thus, we need a broader understanding of the street code in further studies. The below discussion about street culture could provide a helpful approach to understanding this complex and dynamic field (Ross 2018). This discussion particularly addresses the fact that street culture goes far beyond engaging in violence, which is just one extreme option of showing off in public. Many daily interactions are based on the street habitus—streetwise behavior, even aggressive but non-violent displays of masculinity—however, they do not go further. In other words, a lot of street cultural behavior is more about a tough appearance in public than about actual violent behavior.<sup>1</sup>

Third, the lengthy description of informal rules on the street code approach is very fruitful for understanding youth violence in risky neighborhoods. This *street wisdom*, as a fluid knowledge about how to stay safe in violent situations without losing street reputation, helps to find the individual's place within the social hierarchy and network of the street. Outside of the code of the street debate, this has been described and analyzed as well (e.g., Anderson 1990; Sharkey 2006). Stressing two points of street wisdom is important to understand the relationship between it and becoming a victim. First, having knowledge about how things operate on the street is helpful for daily routines, but it does not provide protection in unexpected situations, like police controls. Second, to build a reputation, violence is embedded in this knowledge, as has been described in the interviews as well as by Anderson. Thus, the paradox of street wisdom is that it helps young street-involved youth to stay out of trouble, as well as justifying violence, when these specific norms on the street are breached. It becomes necessary to act violently to defend one's own reputation, but not to build it up. However, the causes of aggression and "defense" are not always a physical act; mere "wrong" eye contact or answers to questions can be triggers. In extreme cases, like gang membership, street wisdom guarantees coming into violent situations (Dierenfeldt 2017; Stewart et al. 2008).

In sum, the core assumptions of the street code approach are stable across all contexts. Respect, neighborhood perception as well as street wisdom are powerful elements of a broader street code concept to explain youth violence in risky neighborhoods, independent of the cultural framework. However, other elements of the code of the street differ from the findings of Anderson and an analysis cannot stop at the verification of important aspects; the differences too need to be considered to

<sup>1</sup>Interestingly, we can show in a new study, which is based on other data sets, that even non-violent participants of street culture engage in the same attitudes and behaviors in Germany; they just avoid violence. Due to their outfits, habitus, and especially their aggressive appearance, they are not easy to distinguish at first glance from violent individuals. It is noteworthy that they do not merely imitate violent participants in some kind of fake mode of street culture in order to appear as something that they are not; it is merely their way of living and interpreting street culture. Moreover, the non-violent participants are usually the majority of youths in such neighborhoods (Zdun 2019). This even adds to the argument that respect and recognition might be more relevant in street culture than violence; at least in certain locations.

develop the street code approach as a framework to explain youth violence in risky neighborhoods independent of the cultural framework.

# **11.3 Differences to the Code: Evidence of Cross-Cultural Comparison**

In Chap. 3, research of the code of the street was deconstructed down to its core elements. Besides the three elements discussed above, which are the core of the concept, five more turned up. In all of them, the findings vary between the proposition of the street code approach, worked out in the US context, and our findings. For some elements, we found results which would verify the assumption of the street code approach, but not in all contexts. This gives us a hint that major parts of the code of the street are influenced by the cultural framework within which it is embedded.

The first of these elements is the social construction of an *enemy*. As discussed in Chap. 9, an enemy is more a threat to social reputation by deviousness or gossip, and not an opponent in a fight, with the clear exception of the South African context. However, in the US context, as described in the study about Germantown, as well as in the South African context, high levels of violence are part of daily life because of an absence of community regulation on the street. So, if the environment itself is threatened directly by violence, enemies are not respected, neither in a fight nor as a person. This interpretation hints to a tipping point regarding the level of violence in the neighborhood and the strategy required to treat an enemy. Our data point out that the Germantown neighborhood in Philadelphia in the early 1990s was quite violent, which provoked physical violence towards an enemy, but that is not the general rule of how to act in a risky neighborhood. The patterns are more complex and the consideration between violence as a way to react on a provocation, the norms of the family, behavior of friends and spatial circumstances, like the local street culture, form the relationship between two enemies.

The second element, where the findings were different to what was assumed, is *toughness*. Reassured by a sample of exclusively male juveniles, the findings of the element are close to ideas about masculinity. However, toughness is not proximate to violent behavior or respect in the street way, as proposed by the findings from the Germantown neighborhood. For example, a number of the very young in our sample were described as a symbol of masculinity and toughness, which guaranteed respect among peers, but none fitted the description of behaving as an "old head" or "decent daddy, who takes care about them" (Anderson 1999: 180). Probably because of the absence of the dichotomous logic of "street" and "decent" families in our three contexts and ten neighborhoods, this type of father image was not reported. As Anderson cleared up, such behavior is typical for those he classifies as "street". However, other research shows that such a typology does not work outside of the US or in extreme circumstances, like homeless children (Naterer 2015) or prisons (Mitchell et al. 2017). Constant in our findings is the idea that social mobility is a sign of toughness and also masculinity. Despite the notion that the ability to fight when needed is linked to toughness and masculinity, the ideal to build up a good life for himself and his future family, by finishing school and having a legal job prevailed. This is also true for the older boys in the sample, who fall into the extreme of the parameter of the sample's age cohort and were already working. In the German case, close to all respondents share the desire to live in a house with a garden with a wife and children in the suburbs one day, which is the classic middle-class image.

Also, the perception of *symbols* varies between our findings and those of Anderson. The link between violence and the symbolic world is by far not so close as we thought, based on the street code approach. Brand clothes, for example, were not highly desired by the juveniles in our sample from their point of view. Furthermore, Pakistani juveniles claim that the traditional clothes are valuable as well, even in the risky neighborhoods of a metropolitan area and these neighborhoods have a higher population density than that of Philadelphia in the 1990s. The argument that the element of the street code is true only in "western countries" is contradicted by the findings from Germany, were brand clothes or expensive cars are not seen as necessary or something to rate highly. Among the juveniles, social values were more important, like being a good friend, who to respect, etc. However, it does not mean that symbols of wealth are not important, but they are not connected to respect or violence directly, more as a flag of status, which is in line with some of the descriptions of the Germantown neighborhood in Philadelphia. But neither in Germany nor in South Africa or Pakistan are symbols or a clear sign of a way of life in risky neighborhoods evident. So, the element of symbols is culturally framed, and this is not surprising. Symbols carry knowledge with them, which reflect parts of the circumstances of life in the context in which it is developed. What Anderson describes is an American perspective on symbols in risky neighborhoods, which do not have the same meaning and function in other parts of the world. However, symbols are more an element of a street code, which explains violence; it is a part of the micro-level street culture as a whole and shows belonging to a neighborhood with its norm shared by a part of the residents.

The fourth element of the street code where we found dissimilarities, is the element of *friends*, their role and perceptions thereof. In the original work, friends are a source of power and usually part of street life and engaged in the drug market or with the will to do so. We do not question that deviant peers could have an influence on others to become criminal as well Thornberry et al. (1994), but their role is much more complex than claimed. For example, the data from Pakistan shows that cousins are friends as well, which is true for some Arabic–German juveniles as well. Here the concept of friends overlaps with family issues, which means that the norms of the family operate in the friend groups as well. Often, those families held up traditional roles and religious duties. Hence, the role of the friends in the development of a street code is limited under such circumstances, even if the poverty rate and blocked opportunities in life are higher than in the US context. Furthermore, in all three countries in which we did research, friends were perceived as sources of emotional support and people to spend time with, which also means that comparison among friends does not dominate daily life. An exception is when it comes to contact with


homicide rates, per 100.000 inhabitants

**Table 11.1** Comparison of

*Source* http://www.unodc.org; last viewed: 06th October 2018

girls of the same age. Here the role of friends is two-faced. On the one hand, they are perceived as an important part of life, on the other hand, they are potential enemies, by way of trickery, gossip or taking someone's girlfriend. This ambivalent role of friends is the reason why the interviewed juveniles make a distinction between friends and close or real friends.

The fifth important dissimilarity is the perception and interpretation of *violence* itself, and this differs not only between our findings and those of Anderson, but also between the contexts analyzed. In the South African context, violence is a symbolic currency by itself. It makes sure that things keep running or have been done. Logically, the level of daily violence is much higher than in the other two contexts or that of the Philadelphian Germantown neighborhood in the 1990s. The Pakistani case is ambivalent, regarding the perception of violence; we observe in some interviews the same as in South Africa, but also a clear rejection of violence as normal behavior. In the German context, we observe a wide disagreement among male juveniles regarding violent acts, even if they "need" to do it sometimes. This begs the question as to how these differences can be understood. Noticeable is that the differences are seen at the country level, and this hints at macro-level impact. The pattern described correlates with the level of the homicide rate, as seen in Table 11.1.

Risky neighborhoods are specific contexts, but not independent of the city, metropolitan area or nation as a whole. This means that the macro-level of violence frames the interpretation of such on the local level as well and this is what we found in the comparisons of the data of our study, but also with the findings of Anderson. The result is that all are correct in the context of their national or relational position. However, violence has a very different character in street culture and its norms, depending on the level of violence of the entire society. The way it is used and interpreted on the street and among male juveniles is not static and more an outcome than an element by itself.

In a nutshell, the level of violence in street culture is much higher in societies/communities with an overall high level of violence, such as South Africa, particularly, but also certain neighborhoods in the US. We have already demonstrated this difference in a cross-cultural comparison of Brazil, Germany, and Russia (Zdun 2008). While violence has an existential character in the street culture of some countries and is about a daily struggle for survival, it has a more light-hearted character in other locations, where it is often just a competition for respect and recognition but does not include fights for territories and illegal businesses.2 Thus, engagement in violence and the extent of violence should be seen as a spectrum, ranging from rather low in countries such as Germany to regularly lethal in countries such as South Africa.

# **11.4 What Does it Mean for the Code of the Street as a General Approach?**

The wide discussion about the original claim of the code of the street with its advantages and limitations highlights two thoughts. On the one hand, the code of the street is a powerful concept through which to understand youth violence in risky neighborhoods, but, and this is the second point, more so in the US context than in others. We have to notice that most of the published research about the code, as well as its basic study, was conducted in the US or with US data. There, the findings are clear and there is no doubt that such a street code is developed in risky neighborhood, especially if they are predominated by African Americans. Otherwise, the extensive use of the FACHS data, which includes only African American families in Georgia and Iowa, in studies about the code of the street cannot be explained. Even previous studies about the code of the street conducted in the US rarely ask for the code in Latino neighborhoods (Rojas-Gaona 2016) <sup>3</sup> or in smaller towns (Keith and Griffiths 2014).

But the restriction of an explanation of the code of the street for youth violence in risky neighborhoods is a starting point to develop this fruitful concept into a real general approach. Therefore, our findings in very different countries are helpful. Anderson is right when he claims that elements of the code are stable, independent of space and time (Anderson 1999: 179), but it is not true for the entire concept of the code. The concept of the code claims that a specific set of norms is developed by male juveniles in poor and criminal neighborhoods, which justify violence. This set has several dimensions, but at the core stands respect. In the comparison we have made, the perception of violence, respect, as well as street wisdom, are equal to those of Anderson's study, but all the other dimensions differ, and the reason is twofold.

First, a *bottom-up explanation*, focuses on the individual. Generally, people, irrespective of whether they live in a risky, mixed or wealthy neighborhood like to be in balance, in harmony, with their environment. So, they develop strategies to fall in with the environment as best as they can. However, in some neighborhoods, people are threatened by violence, drugs and or in general, deviant behavior. Here, specific

<sup>2</sup>But note, street culture violence is also no harmless game in countries such as Germany and might cause severe injuries and even death at times. When a fight starts it can become as hard as it gets in every location. The level of violence and the readiness to kill are just different in an overall framework.

<sup>3</sup>For sure, the group of Latinos has been described in criminological further studies, which do not use the street code approach explicitly. (e.g. Bourgois 2003; Martinez 2004; Burchfield and Silver 2013)

strategies need to be developed to be able to cope with the challenges of the environment. If a strategy is acquired and no alternatives are available, for example, role models or caring parents, such strategies are internalized and no longer questioned. Anderson calls the first type 'decent', and those are able to do "code switching". The last type, 'street', are adopted by those who have internalized the coping strategy and its norms as being what is 'right'. Therefore, developing a code is a rational strategy to handle the perceived challenges of a risky environment. Empirical support comes from the finding, which is in line with the original work, of the perception of the neighborhood as a threat. However, the shape of a street code, as a coping strategy, differs significantly between countries and maybe groups. The achievement of the original work is to put the stable elements of the code into focus, but what is called the code of the street has its limitations and is applicable in its entirety to only a few neighborhoods in the world.

The *top-down explanation* refers to the other elements of the code. Here, macrolevel influences, like the general level of violence and crime in a society (Kesteren et al. 2014), a history of discrimination (Maylam 2017), or the type of welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990) form the elements of the code in a significant way. The role of friends or the perception of violence are examples of this. So too are how the police are perceived or the role of symbols on the street. In this regard, the code, which was described in the Germantown neighborhood of the 1990s, is a very specific one, shaped by the context of African Americans in a risky neighborhood. Certainly, the social mechanism, as a reaction to a challenging environment, is true, but the face of the code, meaning the coping strategies and with them a set of norms, differ according to context. Following this argument, one can state that Anderson found the (African) American Code of the street, but not a global phenomenon.

The empirical findings of our international research project show that historical, economical, but also cultural circumstances influence the form of street codes in significant ways. With Anderson's seminal work in mind, only a few of the elements are stable across all contexts, but the differences are more important, which is true not only for the comparison between our three cases but also regarding the theoretical approach toward the code of the street. Coming back to the macro-driven factors that form the code, three factors need to be considered to understand the construction of sets of violence-related norms in risky neighborhoods:

(1) The different opportunity structures to integrate young people into the functional systems of society, for example, education, labor or housing. These are *sources of recognition* and pathways to social mobility. Obviously, these functional systems of society are confronted with social inequality within, but also between countries. Cross-cultural comparisons show that social inequalities undermine the social cohesion of a society, and consequently violence increases (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). Thus, the street becomes a staging area too for male juveniles to campaign for their recognition, or as they say, respect. However, respect is not a social recognition, more a peer-driven factor, especially if respect requires violence. Important to note is that nobody can live without recognition, but violence is not a mechanism to gain respect or recognition in the overall context, as our analysis has shown.


Therefore, the code has its culturally-specific face and the characteristics of important elements differ and someone who grew up in a risky neighborhood in Pakistan cannot utilize the Pakistani street code to get by in a risky neighborhood in South Africa. However, to analyze and compare street codes, the concept of Anderson, with its element, is very useful. The core of the code, respect, but also the perception of the neighborhood and informal rules on the street help to understand the basic dynamics in a given neighborhood. The other elements of the code cluster around this core and is questionable if the list of elements—enemy, symbols, friends and toughness—is exhausted. We found evidence for the need to take into account the factors of success, the role of the family, new technologies, as well as perception of the police. But for all findings, the range of explanations require reflection. Such an approach is analytically helpful to understand, for example, youth violence in Indonesia, but the findings are not generalizable on their own. It is more that *a* code is operating, not *the* code, and is has to be viewed in the cultural context where it occurs.

To understand the street codes and the mechanism which shape them, it is helpful to incorporate them into the broader discussion about street culture, which can be understand as a *set of norm-based activities of individuals or groups in public or semi-public spaces with specific purposes and mechanisms of recognition and a shared interpretation of symbols. Such activities provide a hyper-local social status among peers and neighbors as well as the impression of the ability to stay out of street violence, if needed.* The behavior of juveniles, police officers, taxi drivers or even drug dealers are a part of it and form the world individuals perceive and interpret. By doing so, the development of a street code, to navigate environmentally driven challenges, is logical, and is a negotiation with the broader spectrum in which people are embedded. This would also close the gap between the street code concept on the micro-level- and the macro-level characteristics, like the homicide rate. From an analytical perspective, street culture stands between these dimensions by bringing more than just one group into focus but is reconcilable at the local level.

With all this in mind, the discussion about the code of the street, more specifically its applications and limitations, as we have elaborated in this study, show the need to develop the code into a real general approach. Therefore, it is necessary to keep in mind what the stable elements are and what is formed by macro-level influences. Furthermore, analyzing street codes as characteristics of street culture helps to understand the challenges and circumstances under which street codes are developed. Beside further cross-cultural comparison studies, which we really need, it is necessary to steer toward the street codes of the other users of the same space than "only" that of juveniles so as to bring together the different coping strategies of street codes of a risky neighborhood. This would open the perspective to different normative worlds within a space and opens the path to understand what stands beyond violence on the street.

# **References**


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# Index

#### A

Anderson, Elijah, 1, 3, 4, 22, 24–35, 40, 48, 63, 65, 66, 71, 76, 88, 107, 108, 111, 115, 116, 120, 121, 126, 127, 132, 137, 144, 145, 150, 151, 157, 159, 162, 164, 170, 171, 173, 177, 179–187

#### B

Berlin, 63, 72–75, 77, 78, 109, 110, 115, 128, 129, 139, 145, 146, 160, 161, 165, 171, 173, 174, 179, 187

#### C


#### D

Data, 2, 3, 8, 10–15, 23, 30–34, 39, 41, 43, 45, 48, 51, 61, 63, 64, 66, 71–73, 81–83, 86, 87, 90, 94–96, 98, 104, 107, 108, 111,


#### E

Enemy, 16, 36, 42, 46, 67, 75, 76, 87–89, 100, 107, 108, 117, 119, 131, 145–151, 172, 174, 176, 182, 187

#### F


#### G

Germany, 2–4, 12, 48, 49, 61–66, 72, 75, 102, 107, 109, 115, 117, 120, 121, 125–127, 129, 132, 137, 138, 145, 150, 151, 157, 160, 165, 170, 171, 173, 177, 180, 181, 183–185

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019 W. Heitmeyer et al., The Codes of the Street in Risky Neighborhoods,

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16287-0

# I

Introduction, 4, 39, 93, 107 Islamabad, 50, 63, 64, 81–85, 87, 89, 111, 112, 118, 119, 122–124, 129, 130, 133–136, 140–142, 147, 148, 153, 154, 161, 162, 165–169, 172, 175

#### L

Legal cynicism, 11, 13–15

#### M

Masculinity, 22, 35, 44, 45, 75–78, 87, 100, 107, 108, 113, 114, 122, 127, 129–131, 140, 148, 181–183

#### P


#### R


#### S


#### T


#### U

Urban sociology, 21

#### V

Violence, 1–4, 7, 15–17, 21–36, 39–53, 61–67, 71, 75–78, 86–90, 95–98, 100, 103, 107, 108, 111–115, 117, 119–122, 124–127, 129, 130, 137–142, 144–159, 164, 167, 170–174, 176, 177, 179–188

#### Y

Youth violence, 2, 3, 8, 17, 21–23, 25, 29, 31, 35, 39–41, 49, 61, 62, 65, 71, 73, 98, 101, 107, 179, 181, 185, 187